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Abstract
This Article will first review whether and how EC competition and state aid rules are appli-
cable to privatizations, emphasizing issues peculiar to the privatization process. Other EC law
principles that are relevant in the context of privatizations, such as freedom of establishment and
investment, and public procurement rules will also be discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The competition rules of the EC Treaty' ("Treaty") both
protect competition as an economically desirable force and pre-
serve individual economic freedom as one of the fundamental
political freedoms guaranteed by a democracy.2 These rules are
based on the fundamental liberal belief that market forces
should be the principal regulating factor in the economy and
must be protected from improper interference: optimal eco-
nomic efficiency is achieved when economic decision-making is
left to businesses competing with one another in the market-
place, so that available resources are allocated to the most pro-
ductive sectors and firms are stimulated to undertake risk, inno-
vate, stimulate technical progress, and develop active market
strategies.3
The Treaty competition rules also have a key role in ensur-
ing that the establishment of a single market, through the open-
ing of the Member States' national markets, completed in 1993,
yields the expected economic and social benefits in terms of
higher output, growth, and employment. These rules must en-
sure that existing regulatory barriers to trade are not replaced by
market divisions, resulting from restrictive business practices or
protectionist measures adopted by the Member States.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 85, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573, 626 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made &y Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
2. See LENNART PRITIER ET AL., EEC COMPETITION LAW 9-10 (1991).
3. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 1988 13-17, Introduction (1989); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES, XXIID REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1992 13-16, Introduction (1993).
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Therefore, companies must not be allowed to thwart market
integration through the creation of cartels for the purposes of
splitting markets, blocking exports or imports, by abusing ex-
isting local or Community-wide dominant positions,' or by block-
ing new entrants or creating new dominant positions through
anticompetitive mergers.5 Moreover, although it is true that the
EC Treaty competition rules concern only the behavior of un-
dertakings and do not apply to legal or regulatory measures
adopted by Member States, these provisions, if read in combina-
tion with Article 5 of the EC Treaty,' impose an obligation upon
Member States to abstain from adopting or maintaining in force
measures, including those of a legislative nature, that could
render ineffective the EC Treaty competition rules.7 This may
be the case, for example, where a Member State imposes or facil-
itates the conclusion of agreements contrary to Article 85,8 rein-
forces the effects of such agreements, or deprives its own legisla-
tion of its official character by delegating the responsibility for
taking decisions affecting the economic sphere to private trad-
ers.' It may also occur where a Member State extends an exclu-
sive right granted to a monopolist to cover an ancillary activity,
without objective justification,"0 or structures such an exclusive
right in a way that inevitably leads the monopolist to commit an
abuse of that right contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty."
4. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28.
5. See Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989) (setting forth control
of concentrations between undertakings), amended by O.J. L 257/13 (1990) [hereinafter
Merger Regulation].
6. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591.
7. GB-INNO v. ATAB, Case 13/77, [1977] E.C.R. 2115.
8. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.
9. See Meng, Case C-2/91 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 17, 1993) (not yet reported); Bundesan-
stalt ffir den Gfiterfernverkehr v. Gebrfider Reiff, Case C-185/91 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 17,
1993) (not yet reported) [hereinafter Reiff]; Ohra Schadeverzekeringen, Case C-245/
91 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 17, 1993) (not yet reported) [hereinafter Ohra]. See also Germany
v. Delta Schiffahtrs- und Speditionsgesellschaft, Case C-153/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2517.
10. RTT v. GB-INNO, Case C-18/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941 (holding that state mea-
sure extending, without any objective justification, exclusive right granted to undertak-
ing for establishment and running of public telecommunications network to adjacent
but separate market for importation, marketing, bringing into service, and mainte-
nance of equipment violate Articles 90(1) and 86 of Treaty).
11. See, e.g., H6fner v. Macrotron, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979 (stating that
grant by German state to Federal Employment Office of exclusive right to provide re-
cruitment services could result in violation of Articles 86 and 90(1) if mere exercise of
right would oblige monopolist to abuse its dominant position, for example, where it
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In addition, Member States must not be allowed to replace
protectionism, abolished in the market integration process, with
state aid.12 The use of public funds by a Member State to give a
national industry a competitive advantage over industry else-
where in the European Union' 3 or to prop up inefficient busi-
nesses at the expense of those that are more successful, is as
likely to distort competition in the EU market as the anticompe-
titive behavior of companies. It discourages the entry of new
firms and prevents efficient players from increasing their market
share through internal growth.' 4
Moreover, although Article 22215 of the EC Treaty leaves
Member States free to adopt their own system of property owner-
ship, which may include state-owned enterprises,' 6 they must re-
frain from acting in a manner contrary to the EC Treaty when
they engage in commercial activity or influence the conduct of
business enterprises.' 7 Pursuant to Article 90(1) of the EC
Treaty, Member States may neither enact nor maintain in force,
in relation to public enterprises and enterprises to which they
grant special or exclusive rights, any measure contrary to the
rules of the EC Treaty, including the principle of non-discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality,"8 and the rules on competition
and subsidies. 9 As a result, EC competition rules can also be
used to open sectors, such as the markets for energy, telecom-
would be manifestly unable to satisfy market demand for placement services for busi-
ness executives).
12. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 92-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 631-32.
13. As of November 1, 1993, following the entry into force of the TEU, supra note
1, which substantially amended the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, the European Economic
Community is referred to as the European Union. Deletion of the word "economic"
reflects the broadening ambit of the Union from the purely economic objective of pro-
moting the integration of the twelve (now fifteen) Member States' national markets
into a unified "common market," which includes matters of social and monetary policy,
education, international relations, defense and environmental concerns.
14. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 92(2), (3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630-31. The
EC Treaty does not declare the granting of aid per se incompatible with the common
market, but provides for a number of exceptions either automatic or available at the
discretion of the European Commission ("Commission"). Id.
15. Id. art. 222, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711.
16. Id. "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States gov-
erning the system of property ownership." Id.
17. See Italy v. Commission, Case 41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 873, 21-23 [hereinafter
British Telecommunications].
18. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591.
19. Id. arts. 85-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-32.
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munications, and postal services, that remain closed despite the
establishment of the internal market, because Member States
have entrusted management of those sectors to undertakings to
which they have granted special or exclusive rights. 20
It may be interesting to note that, subject to the exception
under Article 90(2) of the EC Treaty,2 1 the commercial activities
20. See id. art. 90(3), (1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 629. Under Article 90(3), the Commis-
sion is to ensure the application of Article 90 and, where necessary, to address appropri-
ate directives and individual decisions to Member States imposing upon them an obli-
gation to abolish certain special or exclusive rights which conflict with the objectives of
the internal market. In recent years, the Commission has more frequently used Article
90(3) of the Treaty as an instrument for attacking various state or private monopolies,
in particular those that are fragmented along national lines or otherwise uncompetitive
in the sectors of insurance, maritime transport, postal services, port services, airport
services, and telecommunications. See Commission Decision 85/276/EEC, 0J. L 152/
25 (1985) (Greek Insurance); Commission Decision No. 87/359/EEC, OJ. L 194/28
(1987) (maritime transport); Commission Decision No. 90/16/EEC, 0.J. L 10/47
(1990) (Dutch express delivery services); Commission Decision No. 90/456/EEC, 0J.
L 233/19 (1990) (Spanish international express courier services); Commission Deci-
sion No. 94/119/EC, 0.J. L 55/52 (1994) (port services); Commission Decision No.
95/364/EC, 0.J. L 216/8 (1995) (landing fees at Brussels National Airport); Commis-
sion Directive No. 88/301/EEC, 0J. L 131/73 (1988) (on competition in markets in
telecommunications terminal equipment); Commission Directive No. 90/388/EEC,
OJ. L 192/10 (1990) (on competition in the markets for telecommunications services);
Commission Directive No. 94/46/EC, 0.J. L 268/15 (1984) (amending directives
881301 and 901388 with regard to satellite communications). The distribution of gas
and electricity, air transport and financial services are other areas in which the Commis-
sion indicated its intention to introduce greater competition by tackling existing mo-
nopolies. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1994, at 19, 6 (1994); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XX-
IIIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1993, at 30-34, 1 36-42 (1994); COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1992, at 29-31,
11 21-27 (1993). The Commission's powers to use Article 90 of the Treaty to prevent
national governments from restricting competition by conferring monopoly or other
special rights when it is not justified on genuine public-interest grounds of a non-eco-
nomic nature were upheld by the Court ofJustice in two judgments involving the Arti-
cle 90(3), France v. Commission, and Spain, Belgium and Italy v. Commission. France v.
Commission, Case C-202/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-223; Spain, Belgium & Italy, Joined Cases
C-271, 281, 289/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-5833. And, in a ruling concerning an Article 90(3)
individual decision that the Commission addressed to the Netherlands in order to im-
pose the liberalization of the provision of express delivery services. The Netherlands,
Koninklijke PTT Nederland & PTT Bost v. Commission,Joined Cases C-48/90 and 66/
90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-565.
21. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 629. Article 90(2)
provides that undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly are only sub-
ject to the Treaty competition rules insofar as their application does not obstruct the
performance of the particular tasks assigned to them and where the development of
trade is not affected to an extent contrary to the interests of the European Union. See
Corbeau, Case C-320/91, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 621.
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of public enterprises and firms granted special or exclusive
rights are treated much like the commercial activities of private
enterprises. Indeed, like Article 222,2 Article 90 is neutral as to
the ownership of business enterprises23 and makes only a func-
tional distinction in favor of undertakings, public or private, that
are required in the general economic interest to perform spe-
cific tasks on behalf of all consumers. 24 Although the privatiza-
tion of utilities may increase the number of privately owned
firms that enjoy special or exclusive rights, such firms will remain
within the scope of Article 90.25
At first sight, the process of privatization, that is, the transfer
of the ownership of an enterprise from public to private hands,
appears to raise no particular issues in relation to the competi-
tion rules of the EC Treaty. Ostensibly, privatizations should be
treated no differently than the transfer of businesses between
private parties.
There are cases, however, when privatization should be
treated differently. The following analysis of the impact of com-
petition rules on the privatization process starts from the intui-
tively appealing assertion, which has now become commonplace,
that the privatization of enterprises enjoying special or exclusive
rights must be accompanied by market liberalization measures
to prevent private monopolies from replacing pre-existing public
ones. 2 6 Indeed, the apparent neutrality towards public and privi-
leged enterprises of the Treaty of Rome 27 establishing the Euro-
22. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 222, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711.
23. See Sacchi, Case C-155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, 14. As established by the
Court ofJustice ("Court"), nothing in the Treaty prevents Member States from remov-
ing certain activities from the field of competition by conferring on one or more estab-
lishments an exclusive right to carry them out, for considerations of a non-economic
nature relating to the public interest. Sacchi, [1974] E.C.R. 409, 1 14. Moreover, the
Treaty does not prohibit the creation of all state monopolies, since Article 37(1) only
prohibits those "of a commercial character" (i.e., state monopolies having as their ob-
ject transactions regarding a commercial product capable of being the subject of intra-
Community competition and trade, and playing an effective part in such trade) and
only insofar as they tend to introduce exclusive rights to import and export goods (not
services) and thereby to discriminate against nationals of other Member States. Costa v.
ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 598.
24. See DEWOST ET AL., 15 LE DROIT DE EA COMMUNAUTt ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE
423 (1987).
25. Leigh Hancher & PietJan Slot, Artide 90, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 35, 36
(1990).
26. See, e.g., PIERRE GUIStAIN, LES PRIVATISATIONs 71 (1995).
27. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1.
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pean Economic Community seems to have been replaced in the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union by a policy that clearly
favors free markets over state planning." The aim of this Article
is to establish a firm legal basis for this concept, derived from the
Commission's practice and the case law of the Court of Justice.
This Article will first review whether and how EC competi-
tion and state aid rules are applicable to privatizations, empha-
sizing issues peculiar to the privatization process. Other EC law
principles that are relevant in the context of privatizations, such
as freedom of establishment and investment, and public pro-
curement rules will also be discussed.
I. COMPETITION RULES APPLICABLE TO ENTERPRISES
A. The Control of Concentrations: The Application of The Merger
Regulation to Privatizations
1. The EC Merger Regulation in a Nutshell
EC antitrust law concerning merger control was, until re-
cently, based on the concept of "structural" abuses of a domi-
nant position under Article 86 of the EC Treaty. 9 The law was
changed by the long-awaited Council Regulation 4064/891"
28. TEU, supra note 1, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719. Under Article
3(a) of the Treaty on European Union, "the activities of the Member States and the
Community shall include ... the adoption of an economic policy.., conducted in
accordance with the principles of an open market economy with free competition." Id.
art. 3(a), OJ. C 224/1, at 8 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589. See generally Anthony
Gardner, The Velvet Revolution: Article 90 and the Triumph of the Free Market in Europe's
Regulated Sectors, 16 EUR. COMPETITON L. REv. 78 (1995).
29. Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commis-
sion, Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, 244-45 ("Abuse may... occur if an undertaking in a
dominant position strengthens such position in such a way that the degree of domi-
nance reached substantially fetters competition, i.e., that only undertakings remain in
the market whose behavior depends on the dominant one."). As first established by the
Continental Can Court, mergers strengthening an existing dominant position held by
one of the merging firms may amount to an "abuse" in violation of Article 86 of the
Treaty. Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company, [1973] E.C.R. at 244-
45. This case is solely of historical interest since Article 86 of the Treaty is no longer
applicable to concentrations except by national courts, and only in case of transactions
which do not create but strengthen a dominant position through concentration.
30. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, O.J. L 395/1 (1989). Firms are referred to as
"undertakings" in EC law parlance. On the other hand, the Regulation uses the wider
term of "concentrations" instead of mergers because it also applies to operations, such
as concentrative joint ventures, which are not "mergers" in the strict sense. The Regula-
tion has been supplemented. See Commission Regulation No. 3384/94, O.J. L 377/1
(1994) (notifications, time-limits, and hearings); Commission Guidelines, O.J. C 203/5
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("Merger Regulation" or "Regulation") on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings, which came into force on
September 21, 1990. The Merger Regulation established a "one-
stop-shop" review procedure for all mergers having a "Commu-
nity dimension."31
The concept of "concentration" in the Merger Regulation is
based on a principle of "change in control. 32 According to Re-
cital 23 of the Merger Regulation,3 3 the concept of "concentra-
tion" covers only operations that bring about a lasting change in
the structure of the enterprises concerned. Such a structural
change, under Article 3(1), s4 is brought about by either a
merger between two previously independent undertakings or
the acquisition of control over the whole or part of another busi-
ness.
Under Article 3(5) of the Merger, Regulation,35 acquisitions
of securities made by credit, other financial institutions, or insur-
(1990) (concerning ancillary restrictions in connection with notified concentrations);
Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/1 (1994) (distinction between concentrative and coop-
erativejoint ventures); Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/5 (1994) (articulating notion of
concentration); Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/12 (1994) (notion of undertakings
concerned); Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/21 (1994) (calculation of turnover). The
notification form, known as Form CO. was published as an annex. Commission Regula-
tion No. 3384/94, O.J. L 377/9, annex (1994).
31. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, arts. 9, 21, O.J. L 395/1 at 7, 11 (1989). In
order to avoid overlapping review of mergers by the Commission and the enforcement
agencies of the Member States, the Regulation gives the former exclusive jurisdiction
over mergers having a "Community dimension" (with the possibility, however, for the
Commission to refer the merger to national agencies in certain cases). Id. A merger,
including a combination involving non-Community firms, has a Community dimension
where the merging companies have combined worldwide sales in excess of 5 billion
European Currency Units ("ECU") (equaling approximately US$5850 million at the
average 1994 exchange rate of 1.16982), at least two of the firms have a minimum of
ECU250 million sales each within the European Union, and no more than two-thirds of
each firm's sales in the European Union come from within one and the same Member
State. Id. art. 1(2), O.J. L 395/1, at 3 (1989). Mergers above these turnover thresholds
must be notified to the Commission in advance of their implementation and may not
be consummated for three weeks after notification or until the Commission so decides.
The time limits for Commission action are one month from notification for straightfor-
ward cases and five months for mergers which "raise[ ] serious doubts as to [their]
compatibility with the common market" and thus require the opening of in-depth sec-
ond-phase proceedings. Id. arts. 4-7, O.J. L 395/1, at 4-6 (1989).
32. See generally II BARRY E. HAWK, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
TRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 915 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992).
33. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, recital 23, O.J. L 395/1 (1989).
34. Id. art. 3(1), O.J. L 395/1, at 4 (1989).
35. Id. art. 3(5), O.J. L 395/1, at 4 (1989).
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ance companies, whose activities include transactions for their
own account or for the account of third parties, do not consti-
tute "concentrations" if the securities are acquired for resale and
are held only on a temporary basis. In this context, temporary
basis means one year from the date of the acquisition, subject to
extension where the acquired company can show that disposal of
the acquired securities would not be reasonably possible within
that period, and the acquiring company abstains from exercising
the pertaining voting rights, or exercises them only with a view
to preparing the disposal of the securities acquired and not in
order to influence the competitive behavior of the undertaking
involved. 6
Control is defined in Article 3(3)-(4) of the Merger Regula-
tion as the ability to exercise a decisive influence on another un-
dertaking through rights, contracts, or any other means, and
may be acquired by one or more undertakings or persons, in-
cluding public bodies, 7 acting alone or jointly.38 A concentra-
36. Id. The acquisition by an investment bank, therefore, acting as global coordi-
nator or underwriter in the context of the privatization of a state-owned enterprise, of a
controlling interest in that enterprise for re-sale to institutional or retail investors does
not normally involve a change in control and does not amount to a concentration. Id.
On the other hand, the exception set forth in Article 3(5) (a) of the Merger Regulation
does not normally apply to acquisitions of controlling interests by investment banks
(e.g., in the context of rescue operations or buy-outs) in which, although the primary
intention of the banks involved is a restructuring of the financing of the acquired com-
pany for its subsequent resale, the restructuring program requires the controlling banks
to determine the company's strategic commercial behavior and makes it unrealistic to
transfer a rescued company into a commercially viable entity and resell it within one
year. See, e.g., Commission Decision, O.J. C 223/38, 11 5-6 (1991) (Kelt/American
Express) (finding concentrative joint venture in new entity formed by eight banks be-
cause strategic decisions on development of new entity would require unanimity). See
also Commission Decision O.J. C 67/11, 11 6-7 (1994) (CWB/Goldman Sachs/Tarkett)
(clearing management buy-out where joint control acquirerers of newly-formed hold-
ing company would have certain rights coffered on them over acquired companies);
Commission Decision, O.J. C 258/10, 11 5-9 (1992) (CCIE/GTE) (authorizing buy-out
of IL by Edil, special purpose company set up and controlled by CCIE, which is wholly-
owned subsidiary of Citicorp, where purchase constituted concentration since CCIE
would continue to control Edil after completion of proposed transaction). In Medi-
obanca/Generali, the Commission apparently concluded that, under the surrounding
circumstances, the Article 3(5) (a) exception was not applicable to Mediobanca's partic-
ipation in the underwriting of an issue of new shares by Assicurazioni Generali, the
largest Italian insurance company. Mediobanca/Generali, Case IV/M156, [1994] 4
C.M.L.R. Ml, M3, 1 8.
37. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 94/449/EC, O.J. L 186/38 (1993),
(Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand). "Persons" also include states. Air France/Sabena, Case
IV/M517, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. MI, 1 11.
38. Air France v. Commission, Case T-2/93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-323, 11 62-65. In Air
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tion may also occur where a transaction leads to a change in the
structure of control, such as a change from joint to sole control
or an increase in the number of shareholders exercising joint
control.3 9 Even the creation of a joint venture is a "concentra-
tion," pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Merger Regulation, if the
new entity "perform [s] on a lasting basis all the functions of an
autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to coordi-
nation of the competitive behavior of the parties amongst them-
selves or between them and the joint venture."40
In the Commission's assessment of mergers notified to it,
the Merger Regulation is intended to determine whether the
proposed combination is likely to increase the risk of the unilat-
eral exercise of market power or the risk of coordinated interac-
tion between players in the relevant market, i.e., the risk of the
collective exercise of market power.4' Pursuant to Article 2(3)
France, the Court of First Instance ruled that where the holdings of shares in a con-
trolled undertaking and the conferment of powers laid down by its statutes are such
that major decisions can only be taken by mutual consent by the two undertakings
involved in a concentration, the combined entity is jointly controlled in spite of the fact
that one of them exercises a substantial influence over it. Id.
39. Commission Notice, OJ. C 385/1, at 1-2. E.g., O.J. C 38/12 (1993) (Volk-
swagen AG/VAG UK); Commission Decision, OJ. C 165/26 (1992) (Solvay/Laporte/
Interox) (finding that transaction, in which Solvay and Laporte would break-up and
divide assets of jointly controlled Interox group, gave rise to two separate concentra-
tions through which both parties would acquire sole, as opposed to joint, control over
two separate activities and sets of products); Commission Decision, O.J. C 204/12
(1991) (Eridania/ISI) (holding that new shareholder agreement, that came about be-
cause Eridania increased its shareholding enough to give it sole, instead of joint con-
trol, was not sufficient to confer on Finbieticola decisive influence over ISI); Commis-
sion Decision, OJ. C 163/9 (1995) (Nokia Corporation/SP Tyres) (finding that obliga-
tion of second largest shareholder fell short of indication of joint control, making
Merger Regulation inapplicable).
40. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 3(2), O.J. L 395/1, at 4 (1989).
41. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, O.J. L 395/1 (1989). Although the Merger
Regulation appears to focus overwhelmingly on the former risk, the Commission has
already accepted the concept of collective dominance. Commission Decision No. 92/
553/EEC, OJ. L 356/1 (1992) (Nestl6/Perrier) (determining that oligopolistic domi-
nance may result in restriction of competition, in particular, where relevant market is
already performing anti-competitively prior to proposed merger and leading companies
therein face no sufficient price-restraining actual or potential competition). See, e.g.,
Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand, O.J. L 186/38, at 46-49, 1 51-68, 96 (1993) (finding that,
absent agreement of parties to give several undertakings, acquisition would lead to du-
opoly because no effective competition would remain due to structural features of mar-
ket, fragmentary nature of competition, and longstanding links between two compa-
nies). See generally HAwK, supra note 32, at 964.3; Derek Ridyard, Economic Analysis of
Single Firm and Oligopolistic Dominance Under the European Merger Control, 15 EUR. COMPETI-
TION L. Rav. 255 (1994).
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of the Merger Regulation,4" where the Commission finds that a
concentration "creates or strengthens a dominant position as a
result of which effective competition would be significantly im-
peded in the common market or in a substantial part of it," the
Commission must declare the transaction "incompatible with the
common market" and prohibit its consummation. Commission
decisions under the Regulation have, thus far, endorsed the
Court's established definition of dominance43 as the Commis-
sion refers to the combined entity's power "to gain an apprecia-
ble influence on the determination of prices without losing mar-
ket shares."44
The privatization of an enterprise, by definition, implies
one or more successive changes of control over it. Transition
from public to private ownership of the business to be privatized
often takes place in stages, with the national government or local
entities selling significant minority stakes prior to transferring
control to, or sharing control with, private investors.45 A change
in the control or in the structure of control of a public enter-
prise triggers the application of the Merger Regulation or, where
the transaction does not fall within the Regulation's scope for
lack of Community dimension, the national merger control rules
42. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 2(3), O.J. L 395/1, at 3-4 (1989).
43. See, e.g., Nederlandse Bandenindustrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81,
[1983] E.C.R. 3461, 3511. A dominant position relates to a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking that enables it to prevent maintenance of effective
competition on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave, to an appreciable
extent, independently of its competitors, customers, and ultimately of consumers.
Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. at 3511.
44. See, e.g., Re The Concentration Between Renault and Volvo, Case IV/M4,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 297, 302-03, 14. See also Commission Decision, O.J. L 211/1, 105
(1995) (Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer); Commission Decision, O.J. L 354/32, 183
(1994) (Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedenz (II)); Commission Decision, OJ. C 68/5,
10 (1993) (British Airways/Dan Air); Commission Decision, O.J. L 334/1, 72 (1991)
(Atrospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland) (referring to combined entity's "freedom of ma-
neuver that escapes adequate competitive control" or power "to act independently of its
customers and competitors"). See also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XX-
IST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1991, at 85-86, 110 (1992) (stating that analysis of
mergers is based on definition of dominant position under traditional case law of Arti-
cle 86 of Treaty).
45. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, O.J. L 395/1 (1989); EC Treaty, supra note 1,
arts. 85, 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28. If the new private investors do not acquire
decisive influence over the public undertaking individually or jointly (e.g., through a
shareholders' agreement among themselves, or with the state), the transaction does not
fall under the Merger Regulation but may be scrutinized under Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty. Id.
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of the relevant jurisdictions. 46
2. Potential Impact of the Privatization Process on the
Structure of Concentrations Involving Privatized
Companies
A review of the decisions adopted by the Commission pursu-
ant to the Merger Regulation shows that the very structure of
concentrations undertaken in the context of privatizations is
often affected by the relevant national legislative framework, or
by the vendor national government's need or desire to ensure a
smooth transition from public to private ownership.
For example, in order to acquire Cokoladovny, a company
manufacturing and marketing biscuits and chocolate sweets
privatized by the Government of the Czech Republic, the agri-
food groups BSN and Nestle established a Dutch holding com-
pany in which they each owned 50%." 7 The holding company,
in turn, acquired a 43% stockholding in Cokoladovny. Follow-
ing a capital increase reserved to shareholders, this percentage
would grow to 50.41%, with the rest of the capital divided among
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
Investicni Banka, the firm's employees, and the National Prop-
erty Funds of the Czech Republic. This contractual structure was
dictated by the Czech Government's decision that the privatized
business could not be dismembered. Since Nestl6 specialized in
chocolate and BSN in biscuits, with neither having expertise in
the other's sector, only a common project could enable them to
pursue the economic policy objectives of privatization.48 Inter-
estingly, although the agreement relating to the structure of the
ownership of Cokoladovny could be terminated after seven
years, when the commitments entered into by BSN and Nestl6
vis-a'-vis the Czech Government would come to an end leaving
46. The latter situation may test the independence of the relevant national anti-
trust authority from the national government in the assessment of a concefitration in-
volving the outright or partial privatization of a company owned by the same state.
47. BSN-Nestl6/Cokoladovny, Case IV/M90, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 441.
48. BSN-Nestli/Cokoladovny, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 441. The Commission eventually
found that the transaction amounted to a cooperative joint venture, to be scrutinized
pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty, because of a risk of coordination between
Cokoladovny and its parent companies. The Commission, however, expressly ruled out
any risk of coordination between the parents. Id. It is submitted that if the Commis-
sion reviewed the same transaction now, it would conclude that it constituted a concen-
trative joint venture. Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/1 (1994).
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the parent companies free to determine the future structure and
development of the joint venture, the Commission found that
Cokoladovny would perform all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity on a lasting basis. The Commission's finding
was presumably influenced also by the fact that the transaction
was a privatization where the government vendor sought to pro-
vide for an initial period of stability and residual involvement.49
Another example of a transaction whose structure was
largely determined by the existing legislative framework con-
cerning the privatization of the acquired entity was the acquisi-
tion of an important shareholding in Banco Totta & Agores
("Totta") by the Spanish banking and financial group Banco Es-
pafiol de Cr~dito ("Banesto") directly and indirectly through
Valores Ib~ricos ("VISA"), a holding company owned by
Banesto, and certain Portuguese partners jointly operating
through the holding company MSF.50 The transaction was car-
ried out by way of a staggered subscription of shares within the
framework of the two-stage privatization of Totta's capital, which
started in 1989. To avoid exceeding the 10% ceiling on share
capital acquisitions by foreign investors in the Portuguese priva-
tization law, Banesto directly acquired a 9.4% stake and, at the
same time, set up a holding company, VISA, whose sole activity
was the purchase of the highest shareholding in Totta allowed by
Portuguese legislation. Since undertakings in which the major-
ity interest was held by foreign persons were treated as foreign
investors by Portuguese law, Banesto subscribed for only 49% of
VISA's share capital, with the remaining 51% belonging to a
group of Portuguese partners jointly operating through the
holding company MSF. Following gradual direct and indirect
acquisitions, the total shareholding of Banesto and its partners
in Totta rose to 46.5%. Since the rest of the capital was spread
among more than 40,000 shareholders, with the exception of a
16.6% stake held by the Portuguese state, Banesto, MSF and
VISA held, in practice, more than 60% of the voting rights at
Totta's shareholders' meeting. In addition, they were empow-
ered to appoint twelve out of the thirteen directors of Totta's
Board. It is interesting that the notification made to the Com-
49. See Jonathan Faull, Case Note, 2 EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. 684.1 (Kluwer
1992).
50. BANESTO/Totta, Case IV/M192, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 542.
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mission concerned not the acquisition of joint control of Totta
by Banesto and MSF, which had taken place a year before the
notification, but the agreement entered into by the two compa-
nies to allow Banesto to consolidate Totta in its annual financial
statements. To that end, it was agreed that seven out of the
twelve directors would represent Banesto's interests in Totta,
with only five representing MSF, and that Mr. Roquette, Chair-
man of Totta and VISA, would become a director of Banesto.
3. Different Forms of the Change in Control Brought About
by Concentrations Involving Privatized Companies:
In Particular, Concentrative Joint Ventures
A state's disposal of all or part of its interest in a company to
be privatized may result, depending on the relevant factual and
legal elements of each transaction, in the acquisition of sole con-
trol by the acquirer or one of the acquirers,5" in the acquisition
of joint control by a number of undertakings or persons,52 or
even in the acquisition of both sole and joint control, where a
single notification is made in relation to several acquisitions by
and between the same parties.53
51. See, e.g., Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, Case IV/M235, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 203;
DASA/Fokker, Case IV/M237, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 18; Nestl/Italgel, Case IV/M362,
[1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 311; Commission Decision, O.J. C 162/7 (1994) (GE/ENI/Nuovo
Pignone (11)); Commission Decision, O.J. C 185/3 (1994) (Tractebel/Synatom); Com-
mission Decision, O.J. C 249/3 (1994) (Tractebel/Distrigaz II); Commission Decision,
O.J. C 280/3 (1994) (VAG/SAB).
52. E.g., BANESTO/Totta, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 542; Air France/Sabena, Case IV/
M517, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. M1; Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand, O.J. L 186/38 (1993); Com-
mission Decision, o.J. L 158/24 (1994) (Pilkington-Techint/SWV); Commission Deci-
sion, O.J. C 189/5 (1994) (PowerGen/NRG/Energy Morrison Knudsen/Mibrag); Thys-
sen Stahl/Krupp/Riva/Falck/Tadfin/AST, Case IV/M484 (Eur. Comm'n 1994) (not
yet reported); Commission Decision, O.J. C 181/17 (1995) (DOW/BUNA); Commis-
sion Decision, O.J. C 200/10 (1995) (Swissair/Sabena).
53. Commission Decision, O.J. C 23/13, 10-12 (1994) (Fortis/CGER). In ana-
lyzing the acquisition by the Group Fords ("Fortis"), controlled by AG Group and
AMEV, of a 49.9% shareholding in ASLK/CGER Bank and ASLK/CGER Insurance
from ASLK Holding/CGER Holding ("Holding"), a Belgian state-owned public-interest
banking holding company that also retained a 49.9% interest in each of the two compa-
nies, the Commission reasoned that after the transaction Fords and Holding would
have equal shareholdings and numbers of directors on the boards of ASLK/CGER
Bank and ASLK/CGER Insurance. Id. The Commission, however, found that Fords
would have sole control over ASLK/CGER Insurance due to its right to a casting vote in
case of deadlock, whereas Fords and Holding would have joint control over ASLK/
CGER Bank because Fortis, in proposing strategic decisions, was obliged to obtain the
agreement of the members of the company's management committee, whose composi-
tion is subject to the approval by the Belgian Banking and Financial Commission. Id.
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In the case of partial privatizations or privatizations carried
out in stages, in which the entity concerned is subject to joint
control, one of the persons exercising control may be the state
itself, whose desire to retain a presence in the venture may be
motivated by considerations of a financial, long-term strategy, or
general interest nature rather than by a desire to maintain an
effective role in its daily management. In such cases, the Com-
mission has taken the view that, for joint control to exist, the
state and its partners must be in agreement on the strategic deci-
sions to be taken by the new entity and the state must retain a
real possibility of contesting any decisions taken by the other
parent company.54
Moreover, the Commission has found that the acquisition of
joint control of a privatized company does not give rise to the
coordination of the competitive behavior of the state vendor and
its partners, either among themselves, or between them and the
joint venture,55 where the state, which by definition lacks exper-
tise in the joint venture's economic sector, exits the joint ven-
ture's market in circumstances in which it could not foreseeably
re-enter it and, at the same time, gives preeminent weight in
management decisions to the other parent company, which itself
continues to operate on the joint venture's market: the "indus-
trial leadership" principle.56
54. See, e.g., Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand, O.J. L 186/38, at 39, 1 5-7 (1993). Treu-
hand retained 49% of the share capital and voting rights of MdK, but its approval was
required for a number of market-related strategic decisions and it participated in draw-
ing up a detailed five-year business plan for the joint venture together with the majority
partner K+S. See Commission Decision, O.J. C 162/7, 6-9 (1994) (GE/ENI/Nuovo
Pignone (II)). Since the veto rights conferred on the seller, the state holding company
ENI, by the notified share acquisition agreement were temporary in nature and only
concerned actions likely to have a social impact and not foreseen in the industrial plan
put forward by the acquirer GE, the Commission found that ENI had no joint control
over the combined entity. Id. See also Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/5, at 10, 36
(1994).
55. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 3(2), O.J. L 395/1, at 4 (1989). The
absence of any coordination of competitive behavior is one of the two requirements
that must be fulfilled under Article 3(2) of the Merger Regulation for the setting up of
a joint venture constituting a concentration. Id.
56. The Commission introduced the industrial leadership principle in a number
of concentrations not involving a privatization. See, e.g., Thomson/Pilkington, Case IV/
M86, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 897; UAP/Transatlantic/Sun Life, Case IV/M141, [1992] 4
C.M.L.R. 1; Ericsson/Kolbe, Case V/M133, at 81 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 22, 1992) (not yet
reported); British Airways/TAT, Case IV/M259, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 7; Linde/Fiat, Case
IV/M256, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 2987; Commission Decision, OJ. C 305/11 (1993) (Arvin/
Sogefi). It is submitted that the industrial leadership principle "has links back to the
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Applying the industrial leadership principle, the Commis-
sion decided that the acquisition by Air France's newly created
subsidiary, Finacta, of a 37.58% stake in the national air carrier
Sabena from the Belgian State, which retained a 62.11% interest,
created a concentrative joint venture between Air France and
the Belgian State.5 7 Under the protocol of agreement, signed by
Air France, Sabena, and the Belgian Government, that was noti-
fied to the Commission, Air France was granted rights that, the
Commission stated, would go far beyond those ordinarily
granted to minority shareholders for the protection of their fi-
nancial investments. For example, not only would Finacta ap-
prove the designation of Sabena's President and Vice-President,
but it would also, itself, appoint five out of the fourteen mem-
bers of Sabena's Board. A three-quarters majority was required
for Board decisions entailing substantial changes in the com-
pany's business strategy. Finally, Finacta would also appoint half
of the members of Sabena's Executive Committee. On the other
hand, the Commission noted that the protocol did not provide
for any specific dispute resolution mechanism, so that the Bel-
gian State, which remained the majority shareholder, had a pre-
eminent position in the case of significant disagreements in
Sabena's operation."
In relation to the competitive relationship between the par-
ent companies, and between each of them and Sabena, the Com-
mission decided that the Belgian State could be ruled out as an
actual or potential competitor since it had no involvement in any
other airline and was highly unlikely to establish a new airline in
the future. On the other hand, in the Commission's view, the
possibility of effective competition from Air France was rendered
remote by the preeminent influence Air France would exercise
,single economic enterprise' approach in Article 85 cases involving parents and their
subsidiaries." 2 BUl-rERWORTHS COMPETITION L. VII/499 (Spearing & Brandeburger
eds., 1994). For a critical view of this approach see Anand S. Pathak, Case Note on Erics-
son/Kolbe, 2 EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. 656.1 (Kluwer 1992). The industrial leadership
concept was apparently abandoned by the Commission since the 1994 Commission No-
tice on the distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures, which re-
placed a previous notice published in 1990, makes no reference to it and clearly states
instead that parent-to-venture coordination is relevant only insofar as it produces or
reinforces parent-to-parent coordination. Commission Notice, o.J. C 385/1, at 3, 17
(1994).
57. Air France/Sabena, Case IV/M517, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. Ml, 1 7-11.
58. Id.
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over Sabena's market behavior, particularly in light of the Bel-
gian State's lack of technical expertise. The Commission
pointed out that not only did Sabena's new industrial coopera-
tion plan provide that the company would in many sectors be
dependent on Air France's technology, installations, and equip-
ment, but also that it was up to Sabena's President, who would
be approved by Air France, and not the Belgian Government, to
appoint one-half of the members of the Executive Committee
and to coordinate with Air France on certain matters, such as
Sabena's day-to-day management. Therefore, the Commission
concluded that Sabena would integrate to a certain degree with
Air France, although that integration would most probably not
result in a complete harmonization of management policies at
all levels.59
Three years later, the Commission found that the acquisi-
tion of a 49.5% interest in Sabena by Swissair, which took place
in July 1995, following a repurchase by the Belgian State of
Finacta's stake in Sabena and a recapitalization of the air carrier,
would result in Sabena being jointly controlled by Swissair and
the Belgian State, which retained 'a 33.81% interest.6 The issue
of control was central to this transaction, because under EC
law,61 Member States may only grant or maintain in force oper-
ating licenses to air carriers that are wholly or majority owned by,
and are under the "effective control"6 2 of, Member States and/
59. Id. As noted, the Commission has ceased to apply the industrial leadership
principle, since it is no longer concerned with the risk of collusion between the parents
and the joint venture. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing industrial
leadership principle). For ajoint venture to be considered concentrative it is now suffi-
cient that one parent withdraw form the joint venture's market, regardless of whether
the remaining parent is the "industrial leader."
60. In addition, a pool of Belgian institutional investors will hold a 16.5% stake in
the acquired company, whereas the remaining 0.19% of Sabena's capital will be held by
former or current employees of the company.
61. See Council Regulation No. 2407/92, art. 4(2), O.J. L 240/1, at 2 (1992). Pur-
suant to Article 3(3) of Council Regulation No. 2407/92, the grant of an appropriate
operating license is a precondition for the provision of air transport services in the
European Union's territory. An air carrier to which an operating license is granted
pursuant to this Regulation enjoys free access to all intra-Community air routes. Com-
mission Decision No. 93/347/EEC, O.J. L 140/51 (1993) (Viva Air).
62. Council Regulation No. 2407/92, art. 2(g), OJ. L 240/1, at 2 (1992). "Effec-
tive Control" is defined by Article 2(g) of Regulation 2407/92 according to the notion
of control in Article 3(3) of the Merger Regulation. Id. The majority ownership and
effective control obligations set forth in Regulation 2407/92 reflect, at the Community
level, the restriction customarily imposed upon air carriers by international agreements
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or EU nationals.63 In taking the view that Sabena would be
jointly controlled, the Commission emphasized that in light of
its considerable expertise, Swissair would play an active role in
the management and operation of the combined entity. At the
same time, the Commission noted that, under the notified
agreement, the Belgian State appeared to have the stronger in-
fluence over Sabena's board, which would have the primary re-
sponsibility for the company's management. Of the twelve
board members, five would be appointed by Swissair, six by the
Belgian shareholders, and one, the Chairman, by joint decision
of the two groups of shareholders, or, in case of disagreement
between them, on Swissair's proposal subject to approval at the
shareholders' meeting. The new entity's board would make de-
cisions by simple majority vote and would appoint, upon a joint
proposal by Swissair and the Belgian State, a CEO who would be
in charge of Sabena's day-to-day management. The Commis-
sion, however, found that the notified agreement included insti-
tutional mechanisms ensuring that Swissair and the Belgian
on air transport services. Id. These restrictions, which were originally based on na-
tional security justifications, are nowadays directed towards ensuring that the traffic
rights exchanged in the framework of such agreements are effectively exploited by, or
to the benefit of, the contracting parties and that third-country carriers are not allowed
to take full advantage, on a non-reciprocity basis, either directly or through their subsid-
iaries, of the liberalization of the internal market for air transport services in the Euro-
pean Union. Id. Moreover, these restrictions prevent third-country carriers from pro-
viding services exclusively within the territory of one state or a group of states through
subsidiaries. Id.
63. Swissair/Sabena, O.J. C 200/10 (1995). In a decision on a separate procedure
relating to the application of Council Regulation 2407/92 on licensing of air carriers,
the Commission reasoned that the first requirement was clearly satisfied as 50.5% of
Sabena's voting shares will be held by the Belgian state and a pool of Belgian institu-
tional investors, which will act as a single group pursuant to a shareholders' agreement
between them, containing voting agreements. Id. With respect to the effective control
requirement, the Commission found that both the corporate structure and the manage-
ment organization of the combined entity would not jeopardize the ultimate decision-
making power of the Belgian shareholders and would not be such as to confer on Swis-
sair any prerogative incompatible with the effective control requirement. Id. In partic-
ular, Swissair would hold no veto rights at the board level, but only the power of creat-
ing a deadlock in the event that the Chairman voted against the Belgian shareholders.
Id. Moreover, although as a matter of law Swissair will hold a veto right over certain
decisions of the shareholders' meeting, that right would be limited to amendments to
Sabena's articles of incorporation, capital increase or reduction, and winding-up,
merger, or spin-off involving the company. Id. The Commission thus took the view
that such a veto right amounted to an ordinary measure for the protection of minority
shareholders of the same kind as those prescribed by the national company laws of most
Member States. Id.
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State would jointly exercise a decisive influence over Sabena. 4
Finally, in the Commission's view, the parties' intention to de-
cide jointly the new entity's commercial policy was reflected in
provisions in a concomitant cooperation agreement entered into
between Sabena and Swissair, directed at achieving operational
synergies in areas of strategic commercial importance. Under
the agreement, all management action in such areas would re-
quire approval by the boards of Sabena and Swissair, which
would define common planning and control processes in certain
areas, harmonize their brand image, and set up a joint sales or-
ganization outside Belgium and Switzerland.65
The Commission ruled out any risk of coordination of the
competitive behavior between Swissair and the Belgian State,
noting that all the latter's activities in the field of air transport
were included in the joint venture, and decided that the new
joint venture would be concentrative.66
On the other hand, in the DASA/Fokker case, 67 which in-
volved the acquisition by Daimler-Benz of a 51% interest in the
Dutch group Fokker through its subsidiary Deutsche Aerospace
("DASA"), the second largest European aircraft manufacturer,
the Commission decided that the Dutch State's 49% holding
would not give it joint decisive influence over Fokker, in the ab-
sence of rights going beyond those normally granted to minority
shareholders. 68 The Dutch State, DASA, and Fokker had con-
cluded a primary agreement that would limit Daimler-Benz's
control in some respects. While DASA would control a majority
of seats on Fokker's management board, major decisions would
need approval of the supervisory board, where a qualified major-
ity would be required on some important business matters.
Here, DASA would need the votes of two independent directors
appointed by Fokker's labor unions, or one independent direc-
tor and a director appointed by the State, in order to obtain the
qualified majority. Nonetheless, the Commission determined
that the transaction would result in Daimler-Benz acquiring sole
64. See id. OJ. C 200/10, at 6, 10 (1995) (noting new entity's board could
neither appoint CEO without joint proposal of both parties, nor appoint or dismiss
other members of executive management without CEO's recommendation).
65. Id. OJ. C 200/10, at 6, 11 (1995).
66. Id. OJ. C 200/10, at 6, 14 (1995).
67. DASA/Fokker, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. at 18.
68. Id.
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control of Fokker. The Dutch State's influence would be lim-
ited, the Commission noted, because it could not alone block
business decisions in relation to Fokker, and, in any event, had
agreed separately not to oppose the termination of troubled air-
craft programs.6 9
4. States' Public Power Prerogatives Do Not Confer a Decisive
Influence over Privatized Enterprises
With respect to the notion of control, the Commission has
also drawn an interesting distinction between the state's role as a
shareholder and its role as public guarantor of the general inter-
est. In the Tractebel/Synatom7° and the Tractebel/Distrigaz If'
cases, the Commission decided not to oppose the acquisition by
Tractebel of sole control over, respectively, Synatom, a supplier
of uranium to nuclear power plants operated by Belgian electric-
ity producers, and Distrigaz, the Belgian gas distribution monop-
oly. Prior to the notified concentrations, the Belgian State not
only controlled the two companies, solely in the case of Synatom
and jointly with Tractebel in the case of Distrigaz, but also en-
joyed special public power prerogatives regarding the defense of
the public interest in the continuity of the national energy sup-
ply and the definition of the state energy policy. Therefore, the
Belgian State was represented on the two companies' boards by a
government commissioner with the right to veto decisions
deemed contrary to the public interest. As a result of the two
concentrations, the Belgian State disposed of virtually its entire
shareholding in both Synatom and Distrigaz, retaining only a
"golden share" in each company, permitting it to appoint two
board representatives without voting rights. In addition, the Bel-
gian State retained the veto rights it formerly held as the public
authority. In both privatizations, the Commission decided that
the veto right was not sufficient to give the State joint control of
the combined entities within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Merger Regulation, since it had neither the object or effect of
permitting the State to exercise a decisive influence on the activi-
ties of the companies concerned and, instead, reflected only the
69. Id. Compare Commission Decision, OJ. C 156/10 (1991) (Sanofi/Sterling
Drug) (citing prior consultation right given to minority shareholder in a 70-30 venture
as one of several factors establishing joint control).
70. Commission Decision, 0J. C 185/3 (1994) (Tractebel/Synatom).
71. Commission Decision, 0J. C 249/3 (1994) (Tractebel/Distrigaz II).
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State's regulatory role, exercisable only in limited circumstances
to protect the public interest.72
5. Potential Impact of Statements Made by the Relevant
National Privatization Authority on the Commission's
Substantive Assessment of a Concentration
Finally, in ElfAquitaine-Thyssen/Minol,7 s the Commission de-
cided that a notified concentration effected in the context of a
privatization would not create or strengthen a dominant posi-
tion, in reliance, inter alia, on statements that the relevant na-
tional privatization authority had made in the course of the ad-
ministrative procedure. In that case, the Commission gave con-
ditional clearance to the acquisition by a consortium led by
Soci~t6 Nationale Elf Aquitaine ("Elf") of the assets of the for-
mer East German state oil-company, Minol, from the German
Treuhandanstalt ("Treuhand"). As part of the transaction, Elf
would have the right to manage two existing refineries in the
new German Lnder"4 until it built a replacement refinery. The
Treuhand would, however, hold the old refineries in trust and
bear their operating losses until they were dismantled. The
Commission was concerned that the management agreement
would give Elf an unfair advantage over its competitors by pro-
viding it with a service station network in the new German
LUnder under conditions more favorable than those available on
the market generally and at the expense of the taxpayer.
The Commission was satisfied, however, with an undertak-
ing by letter written by the Treuhand that it would use its inspec-
tion rights under the management contract to supervise the
terms under which Elf would supply gasoline from the two refin-
eries to its affiliates and competitors. The pricing and marketing
policies of Elf would be certified by independent auditors.75 In-
terestingly, the Treuhand's statements seem to have been rele-
vant not so much to the issue of whether Elf would hold a domi-
nant position in the German market for distribution of petro-
leum products, as to its opportunity to abuse that dominant
position. Such potential abuse falls outside the scope of the sub-
72. Tractebel/Synatom, O.J. C 185/3,. at 4, 12-14 (1994); Tractebel/Distrigaz
II O.J. C 249/3, at 3, 16-17 (1994).
73. Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 203.
74. A Under is a German national State.
75. Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 203, 12.
1021
1022 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:999
stantive test in Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation,76 which
relates only to combinations resulting in a lasting and substantial
change in the structure of the market and, unlike Article 86 of
the EC Treaty, is not a market behavior control instrument.77
6. Privatizations Carried Out Through the Public Flotation of
a State-Owned Enterprise
Finally, the sale of a state-owned enterprise to private inves-
tors may take place through a public flotation, that is, in a way
that would not necessarily qualify as a concentration as defined
in the Merger Regulation. Indeed, no concentration takes place
when a privatization is carried out through the creation of a
"public" corporation with a large number of small shareholders,
as opposed to a corporation with closely held shares in which, by
definition, nobody acquires control.
The public flotation of an enterprise to be privatized is occa-
sionally combined with a private placement to create a "hard
core" of investors with necessary technical, financial, or en-
trepreneurial expertise that will act as a single group in a voting
or non-voting syndicate. The coordinated exercise of voting
rights pursuant to some obligatory formula normally confers on
this hard core of pooled investors, in which the state may also
participate, joint control over the privatized company, not only
where they hold a majority interest,78 but often also where they
have only a minority interest, since the remaining shares are usu-
ally widely dispersed.79
76. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 2(3), O.J. L 395/1, at 3-4 (1989).
77. Kurt Markert, Case Note on ElfAquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, 2 EEC MERGER CONTROL
REP. 872.4 (Kluwer 1993).
78. Commission Notice, O.J. C 385/5, at 8-10, 30-35 (1994) (stating that minor-
ity shareholders may obtain joint control if they have majority of voting rights and act
together in exercising them by virtue of legally binding agreement or on defacto basis
due to existence of strong common interests). See, e.g., Kelt/American Express, O.J. C
223/38, 5-6 (1991); Costa Crociere/Chargeurs/Accor, Case IV/M334, [1993] 5
C.M.L.R. at 206, 5-7 (voting syndicate among three shareholders holding 53.3%
stake of acquired company found to exercise joint control over it); Commission Deci-
sion, O.J. C 132/12 (1991) (Elf/BC/Cepsa) (finding that Elf and Banco Central to
jointly control CEPSA, in which they held 34% stake each).
79. See, e.g., Commission Decision, O.J. C 225/2, (1993) (Socit G~n~rale de.
Belgique/G~n~rale de Banque) (citing projections based on percentages of shares pres-
ent at past shareholders' meeting of GCn~rale de Banque and hypotheses about future
behavior of small shareholders and concluding that SGB would acquire effective con-
trol over G~n~rale de Banque since, by virtue of increase from its prior 20.94% share-
holding of the company to 25.96%, it would have more than half of votes at future
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Joint control by the syndicated investors may also come
about via their acquisition of a "qualified minority interest." For
example, the purchase of preferential shares linked to a majority
of voting rights, or conferring other rights enabling the minority
shareholders to determine the strategic commercial conduct of
the company to be privatized, such as the power to appoint more
than half of its supervisory or administrative board, may establish
joint control over a privatized company.
Moreover, a hard core of investors acquiring a minority in-
terest may obtain control of the company to be privatized in con-
junction with other non-syndicated shareholders as a result of a
binding agreement between them; in particular where veto
rights conferred on the hard-core shareholders allow them to
block strategic decisions relating to business policy of the enter-
prise to be privatized, including its budget, business plan, major
investments, and the appointment of senior management.8 0
On the other hand, syndicated shareholders do not nor-
shareholders' meetings and thus would be able to elect majority of G~n&ale de Ban-
que's board); Commission Decision, O.J. C 321/16 (1990) (Arjomari-Prioux/Wiggins
Teape Appleton) (holding that 39% stake was sufficient to confer on Arjomari decisive
influence over WTA because remainder of WTA's capital was widely dispersed and in
light of attendance and voting patterns at annual general meetings). See also Medi-
obanca/Generali, [1994] 4 C.M.L.R. at M3, 1 8 (stating that control over company may
result from agreement among minority shareholders that either confers on syndicated
shareholders majority vote at company's shareholders' meeting, or otherwise enables
majority to exercise decisive influence on composition or decisions of company's man-
agement boards).
80. See Commission Notice, O.J. L 377/1, at 21-29, 1 14 (1994) (concerning no-
tice of notion of concentration). See also Commission Decision, O.J. C 181/4 (1993)
(Aegon/Scottish Equitable) (finding that Aegon initially acquired 100% of equity capi-
tal and 40% of voting rights of Scottish Equitable Life Assurances Society, whereas
other partner (newly incorporated to safeguard rights of existing and future Scottish
Equitable policy holders) held 60% of voting rights; joint control was established be-
cause strategic and business decisions and appointment of directors required parties'
common agreement); Commission Decision, 0.J. C 199/12 (1992) (Thomas Cook/
LTU/West LB) (finding that acquisition by LTU and West LB of entire issued share
capital of Thomas Cook, although two shareholders would acquire 90% and 10% share-
holdings, respectively, West LB would obtain joint control because it could nominate 5
of 10 directors, including chairman of Thomas Cook's board, who had tie-breaking
vote, and various strategic and ongoing business decisions would require consent of
both shareholders); Commission Decision, 0.J. C 203/14 (1991) (Elf/Enterprise)
(finding that acquisition by Enterprise of one-third of the stock in subsidiary of Elf with
proportional board representation found to confer joint control on Enterprise because
of additional right to veto applications for petroleum licenses or exploration conces-
sions as well as rights of budgetary approval; finding joint venture to be of cooperative
nature on other grounds).
1024 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:999
mally acquire control over a privatized entity where the share-
holders' agreement between them is of a non-voting nature and
only provides for consultation, a standstill or no-sale obligation,
and/or a right of first refusal over the appointment of certain
directors.
In the Mediobanca/Generali case,"1 the Commission decided
that a transaction where the Italian merchant bank Mediobanca
underwrote part of the shares issued in the context of a capital
increase of the insurance company Assicurazioni Generali
("Generali") did not constitute a concentration within the mean-
ing of the Merger Regulation. As a result of the capital increase,
Mediobanca brought its shareholding in Generali from 5.98% to
12.84%. The Commission reasoned that such a minority interest
might itself confer control if a sufficiently poor attendance at
Generali's ordinary shareholders' meeting could be demon-
strated, but concluded that this was not the case. The Commis-
sion based its conclusion on the level of shareholder participa-
tion at such meetings in the five preceding years, which revealed
that shareholders owning at least 33% of Generali's capital were
present or represented and voted. Mediobanca informed the
Commission of its agreement with Euralux, Generali's second
largest shareholder, with a 4.77% holding, which provided for
consultation between the two shareholders and included an un-
dertaking from each not to sell its shares. This agreement did
not, however, contain any provisions concerning the joint exer-
cise of voting rights or any procedure intended to ensure that
Mediobanca exercised a decisive influence on the composition
and decisions of Generali's governing bodies. The Commission,
therefore, concluded that the notified transaction would not
give to Mediobanca joint or sole control of Generali and, as a
result, did not constitute a concentration.
An unusual development in the Mediobanca/Generali case
took place a few months after the adoption of the Commission's
decision in December 1991, when an Italian financial newspaper
published the text of a hitherto allegedly secret agreement
signed in 1985 by Generali, Mediobanca, and Euralux's parent
company, Lazard Fr~res. In addition to the bilateral no-sale
clause already disclosed to the Commission, this shareholders'
agreement provided, inter alia, for the creation of a three-mem-
81. Mediobanca/Generali, Case IV/M156, [19941 4 C.M.L.R. M1.
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ber steering committee comprised of representatives of Generali
and its two main shareholders, with a view to examining
problems suffered by Generali that were of common interest to
the shareholders and proposing candidates for appointment to
the company's administrative and senior executive positions, in-
cluding the President, Vice-President, and Managing Director at
the shareholders' meeting." The belated publication of this
shareholders' agreement prompted a number of other minority
shareholders in Generali to first ask the Commission to reopen
the proceedings and, later, to attack the Commission's refusal to
do so in the Court of First Instance. In their request to the Com-
mission for the reopening of proceedings, three minority share-
holders, which at that time represented less than 0.5% of Gener-
ali's share capital, submitted that the Commission's decision had
been based on a misapprehension as to the essential facts of the
case, attributable to manifestly incomplete or erroneous infor-
mation on the terms and effects of the shareholders' agreement.
The Commission rejected the applicants' request on the ground
that it had been aware of the entire scope of the 1985 agreement
and had taken it into account when adopting its decision on the
case. The Court of First Instance declined to adjudicate on the
interesting substantive issues raised by the appeal and dismissed
the action on the grounds that the applicant shareholders
lacked standing. In the view of the Court of First Instance, the
shareholders could not establish that the contested decision that
declared the Merger Regulation inapplicable to Mediobanca's
increase of its stake in Generali was of direct and individual con-
cern to them. 3
Although, in the absence of a shareholders' agreement con-
cerning the joint exercise of decisive influence by a sufficiently
powerful group of investors, a minority stock acquisition falls
outside the scope of the Merger Regulation, it may, nonetheless,
be subject to Article 85 of the EC Treaty if the stock acquisition
82. Zunis Holding, Finan and Massinvest v. Commission, Case T-83/92, [1994] 5
C.M.LR. 154, 157, 1 3; Ecco come nato e cosa dice il patto tra Mediobanca, Lazard e
Generali [The New Agreement Between Mediobanca, Lazard and Generali: How It
Was Born and What It Says], II Sole-24 Ore, Mar. 19, 1992.
83. Zunis Holding, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. at 157, 3. An appeal from thisjudgment is
pending before the Court of Justice. On September 12, 1995, Advocate General Lenz
presented his opinion on the appeal, recommending that the Court uphold the judg-
ment of the Court of First Instance.
1025
1026 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:999
confers on the shareholders concerned the power to exercise a
certain degree of influence over the commercial activities of a
competitor.84 Commentators have suggested that the Commis-
sion's broad interpretation of the "decisive influence" test under
the Merger Regulation, through a gradual expansion of the con-
cepts of sole and joint control, has extended the scope of the
Regulation to acquisitions of minority interest that would have
otherwise been eligible for review under Articles 85 and 86 of
the EC Treaty.85
Finally, a common feature of privatizations of public inter-
est companies is the retention by the government, pursuant to a
special clause to be inserted in the company's by-laws, of a
"golden share" granting the state certain special rights and pow-
ers. In general, such powers include, for example, the power to
prohibit acquisitions of significant holdings in the privatized
company, to prohibit voting shareholders' agreements and no-
sale clauses, to appoint one or more directors and statutory audi-
tors, or to veto amendments to the company's articles of incor-
poration, capital increases and reductions, and any winding-up,
84. EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85, 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28. Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty are not applicable to concentrations falling within the scope of the
Merger Regulation. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 22(1)-(2), O.J. L 395/1, at 11
(1989) (disapplying enforcement powers under Council Regulation 17/62). Further-
more, the Commission has taken the policy position that, in general, it will not inter-
vene under Articles 85 and 86 with respect to concentrations falling below the Merger
Regulation's "Community dimension" turnover thresholds. The Commission, however,
retains the right to take action according to the procedures laid down in Article 89 of
the Treaty, in cases not provided for by Article 22 of the Merger Regulation, "where a
very clear case of dominance is established that is not able to be dealt with by national
competition authorities." Accompanying Statements Entered in the Minutes of the
Council of the EU of December 19, 1989, Statement by the Commission at Article 22 of
the Merger Regulation, 3 Butterworths Competition L. A/721B (Apr. 1995). See state-
ment of then-Commissioner for competition matters Sir Leon Brittan, cited in Commis-
sion press release IP(92) 1048, Sir Leon Brittan Announces Preliminary Conclusions in
relation to Proceedings in the British Airways/Dan Air Case (European Comm'n Dec.
15, 1992). On the other hand, concentrations, whether above or below the Merger
Regulation's "Community dimension" turnover thresholds, remain subject to the appli-
cation of Article 85(1), provided, however, that, in the absence of implementing legisla-
tion, there has been a ruling of infringement by the Commission or by the national
competition authority having jurisdiction under Articles 88 or 89 of the Treaty, and
Article 86 of the Treaty by national courts. Minist&e Public v. Asjes, Joined Cases 209-
13/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1425; Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebciro v. Zen-
trale Zu Bekimpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs, Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803.
85. Barry E. Hawk & Henry L. Huser, "Controlling" the Shifting Sands: Minority Share-
holdings Under EEC Competition Law, 1993 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 373 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1994).
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merger, or spin-off involving the company. As discussed above,
since these "golden share" powers reflect only the state's regula-
tory role and can only be exercised in limited circumstances to
protect the public interest, they are normally insufficient by
themselves to give the state joint control over privatized entities
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation, unless
the state is otherwise empowered to exercise jointly a decisive
influence on the privatized companies' activities in its position as
a shareholder.
B. Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty to Acquisitions
of Influence Short of Control
1. Minority Shareholding Acquisitions Resulting in a Transfer
of Control of the Acquired Company
As mentioned above, minority stock acquisitions and other
commercial arrangements aimed at acquiring influence over an
enterprise, such as cross-shareholdings, shared directors or man-
agers, non-voting equity interests, and financing agreements may
constitute concentrations for the purposes of the Merger Regu-
lation to the extent that they involve an acquisition of sole or
joint control and, in the latter case, to the extent that the joint
venture established is of a concentrative rather than cooperative
nature.86 In addition, where the Merger Regulation does not ap-
ply,"7 such transactions may come within the scope of Articles 85
86. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 3(1)(b), (2), OJ. L 395/1, at 4 (1989).
See 2 BUTTERWORTHS COMPETITION L. VII/494 (Spearing & Brandeburger eds. 1994)
(stating that "cross-shareholdings and reciprocal board representation may also fall
within the [Merger] Regulation's scope, if a 'combined group' constituting a genuine
economic unit is created through profit and loss sharing and joint liability to third
parties").
87. E.g., Renault/Volvo, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 302-03, 14. The acquisition of 45%
crossholding in truck and bus/coach sector was found to be a concentration because it
created a situation of strong common interest that forced parties to reach common
decisions in the relevant joint management committee. The parties' positive commit-
ments to make certain activities complementary pointed towards an irreversible recipro-
cal dependency. The acquisition of a 25% crossholding in the car sector was found to
be cooperative because a joint management committee created by parties could adopt
binding decisions only with an agreement between both parties and there was no con-
crete indication that the parties would proceed to irreversibly integrate the product
ranges of respective car businesses. See also Commission Decision, OJ. C 259/3 (1993)
(British Telecom/MCI) (finding that proposed purchase by BT of 20% of outstanding
shares of common stock of MCI is not an acquisition of control because BT would have
no veto power over MCI's competitive behavior and commercial strategy, and provi-
sions enabling BT to block third party from acquiring control over MCI not considered
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and 86 of the EC Treaty.88
2. The Influence Threshold Triggering Application of
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty Under the
Philip Morris Judgment
In its Philip Morris judgement, the Court of Justice estab-
lished for the first time that the acquisition of a minority share-
holding in a competitor may fall within the scope of Article 85 to
the extent that it may "serve as an instrument for influencing the
commercial conduct of the companies in question so as to re-
strict or distort competition."8 9 According to the Court, such a
situation arises where one of the following conditions is met: (1)
the shareholding confers on the acquiring entity legal or de
facto control of the target, or a related agreement gives the ac-
to confer positive control except in extraordinary circumstances); Commission Deci-
sion, OJ. C 113/12 (1992) (Eureko). The holding company set up by four insurance
companies or groups engaged in non-life and life insurance to whom they would trans-
fer their business outside their respective home countries. The Commission was unable
to establish the existence of joint control since none of the parent companies would
have a veto right on the decisions of Eureko management board and changing their
alliances in the decision-making process were allowed in all areas of commercial impor-
tance where their decisions could be approved by the supervisory board by simple ma-
jority or a super-majority. But see Commission Decision, OJ. C 258/9 (1992) (Avesta/
British Steel/NCC/AGA/AXEL Johnson) (finding that newly formed joint venture
combining stainless steel activities of British Steel and Avesta, which held stakes of 40
and 25.1%, exercisedjoint control because shareholders' agreement required approval
of both two largest shareholders and one of two minority shareholders for strategic
decisions, including approval of budgets and business plans, and despite risk of "shift-
ing alliances").
88. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27. From a different
standpoint, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty remain applicable to any agreements
whereby the parties to a concentration, including the state or a public body disposing of
its interest in a publicly-owned enterprise accept restrictions on their freedom of action
in the market which are not directly related and necessary to the implementation of the
transaction, whereas truly ancillary restrictions are to be assessed together with the con-
centration under the Merger Regulation. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, recital 25
OJ. L 395/1 (1989); see supra note 30 (listing Commission Notices regarding restric-
tions ancillary to concentration). See also, e.g., Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand, OJ. L 186/
38 (1993) (finding clause, by which K+S and Treuhand agreed not to compete with
their joint venture MdK for period of ten years and to transfer non-compete obligation
to third parties purchasing from them any assets or shareholdings that could be used to
compete with MdK, did not qualify as an ancillary restraint since first obligation ex-
tended beyond five-year maximum duration for such clauses permitted by Commis-
sion).
89. British American Tobacco Ltd and RJ. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. Commis-
sion, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4487, 4577, 37 [hereinafter Philip
Mors].
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quiring entity the option of reinforcing its position at a later
time and thereby eventually taking effective control; or (2) ac-
quisition of the shareholding requires the two companies to take
account of each other's interests when determining their com-
mercial policy, or the agreement in question provides for or cre-
ates a structure likely to be used for commercial cooperation be-
tween the parties.90 The Court further indicated that an acquisi-
tion of a minority interest in a dominant undertaking by a
competitor that "results in effective control of the other com-
pany or at least in some influence on its commercial policy" may
amount to an abuse of dominant position in violation of Article
86 of the EC Treaty.91
The practical importance of the Philip Morris influence stan-
dard has been called into question following the Merger Regula-
tion's entry into force, because, as mentioned above, the Com-
mission appears to have progressively expanded the concept of
"decisive influence" under the Merger Regulation so as to find
sole or joint control in a variety of transactions involving minor-
90. See also Commission Decision No. 94/771/EC, O.J. L 309/24 (1994) (Olivetti-
Digital) (declaring Article 85(1) of Treaty inapplicable to acquisition by Digital of 8%
stake in Olivetti and to technical cooperation agreement between two companies). The
Commission also granted an Article 85(3) exemption to Olivetti's purchasing commit-
ment concerning Digital products based on Alpha AXP technology contained in the a
contribution. With respect to the share purchase agreement and the shareholders'
agreement between the parties, which Olivetti and Digital terminated three months
before the decision, the Commission noted that Digital's minority acquisition could not
lead to a change in control over Olivetti because: (1) Digital was barred from acquiring
an interest in excess of 10% and could not enter into voting arrangements with third
parties; (2) Digital held no veto rights; and (3) Olivetti's controlling shareholder, CIR,
held a right of first refusal as to any proposed sale by Digital of its Olivetti shares.
Although Digital had a proportionate representation on Olivetti's board for so long as
it owned at least 25 million shares of Olivetti's common stock, such representation
could not lead to a coordination of competitive behavior or an exchange of informa-
tion since Olivetti's board was not involved in any decisions on the development of new
products or new product pricing, having delegated all of its operative functions to the
company's President and General Manager).
91. See Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4584, 65. The Court upheld the Commis-
sion's decision that declared Articles 85 and 86 inapplicable to the acquisition by Philip
Morris of a 24.9% interest in the outstanding voting rights and the right to appoint one-
half of the board members of Rothman's Holdings ("Rothman's"), the parent company
of its competitor Rothmans International. Although the share transfer agreement be-
tween PM and Rothmans provided for the creation of reciprocal rights of first refusal in
the case of subsequent share transfers and the acquisition by Philip Morris of 50% of
the Rothmans International convertible bonds, the Commission and the Court took the
view that the transaction at issue did not enable Philip Morris to control or influence
Rothmans' conduct and did not allow the parties to coordinate their activities.
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ity shareholdings that would have otherwise been subject to scru-
tiny under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.92
3. The Expansion of the Philip Morris Influence Standard in
the Gillette Commission Decision
Not only did the Commission apply the Philip Morris doc-
trine again in the 1992 Gillette case,93 but it appears to have also
interpreted this standard quite extensively. First, it applied Arti-
cle 86 of the EC Treaty to a seemingly passive investment made
by the U.S. company Gillette in Eemland, a Dutch company
which had become Gillette's leading competitor after buying out
Wilkinson Sword. Gillette, which held a dominant position in
the EU wet-shaving market, made the investment in Eemland by
way of an acquisition of a minority shareholding and limited
rights giving it no influence.94 Second, the Commission applied
Article 85 of the EC Treaty to a transaction constituting a con-
centration, i.e., the sale by Eemland of Wilkinson Sword's busi-
ness outside of the European Union to Gillette, that was found
to result in an artificial geographic break-up of the business sub-
ject to the change in control and an inevitable post-closing coor-
dination between Gillette and Eemland.9 5
92. HAwI & HUSER, supra note 85, at 393-94.
93. Commission Decision No. 93/252/EEC, O.J. L 116/21 (1993) (Gillette).
Before Gillette, the Commission relied on Philip Morris to review a variety of acquisitions
of minority shareholdings. Hudson's Bay/Finnish Fur Sales, COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PFA, COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1989, at 59, 1 42
(1990); Ibercobre/Outokumpu, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINE-
TEENTH REPORT ON COMPTITION POLICY, 1989, at 80-81, 65 (1990); KLM/Transavia,
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIsT REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
1991, at 72, 1 90-92 (1992). See also Commission Decision No. 87/100/EEC, O.J. L
41/31 (1986) [hereinafter Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra]. In all these cases, the Commission
raised objections and the parties either abandoned the deal or restructured it along the
lines of the Philip Morris case. Id.
94. HAWK & HUSER, supra note 85, at 398-400 (opining that sound policy basis
exists for making minority acquisitions in competitors by dominant undertakings sub-
ject to lower influence threshold than minority acquisitions involving no dominant
firm).
95. Id. at 402-07 (stating that application of Article 85 of the Treaty to concentra-
tions beyond unique factual background of Gillette would have no policy justification
and would run contrary to reduced transaction costs and legal certainty benefits created
by "one-stop shop" principle underlying Merger Regulation). The agreements concern-
ing Gillette's investment in and relationship with Eemland were executed by the parties
in December 1989 and notified to the Commission, for negative clearance or an indi-
vidual exemption under Regulation 17/62, in February 1990. Id. These dates probably
explain why, although the final decision was adopted on November 10, 1992, the Corn-
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In the context of a management buy-out of the Swedish
company Stora, Eemland purchased the Wilkinson Sword razor
and razor blade business worldwide, and re-sold the business
outside the European Union and the United States to the mar-
ket leader Gillette, while retaining the EU and U.S. activities.
Rights to the Wilkinson Sword trademark were likewise divided
between Gillette and Eemland. Gillette had provided substantial
financing for the management buy-out, which was highly lever-
aged, so that it became a significant creditor of Eemland, its
main competitor after the purchase. Although Gillette also ac-
quired a 22% equity stake in Eemland, this participation did not
include any voting rights, board or management representation,
or access to any of Eemland's internal information. The Com-
mission found that the pre-emption and conversion rights and
options that Gillette obtained in connection with the acquisition
of its shareholding in Eemland and its status as a major creditor
enabled Gillette to exercise influence over Eemland's commer-
cial policy, notwithstanding the lack of any direct means of con-
trol and a "Chinese Wall" undertaking given by Gillette to ab-
stain from attempting to influence Eemland's board.96
The Commission determined that the transaction's change
in the structure of the wet-shaving market weakened competi-
tion in the market and created new barriers to entry by preclud-
ing other competitors from acquiring Eemland or cooperating
mission scrutinized the transaction at issue under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty in-
stead of the Merger Regulation, which only entered into force on September 21, 1990.
96. Compare Gillette, O.J. L 116/21 (1993) with CCIE/GTE, 0J. C 258/10, 30
(1992). In CCIE/GTE, the Commission found: (1) a buy-out of GTE's non-American
light bulb and lighting fixture business by Citicorp's subsidiary CCIE and simultaneous
disposal by GTE of its North-American lighting division to Siemens' subsidiary Osram
(the latter transaction falling outside the scope of the Merger Regulation); (2) that
Siemens provided bridge financing for more than one-half of purchase price in the
form of a loan to Edil, Citicorp's vehicle for the acquisition, but acquired no represen-
tation on Edil's board or access to its confidential information; (3) the Commission
assessed the competitive impact of the links between Siemens and Edil created by the
loan financing and various post-closing agreements with a view to both excluding Sie-
mens' joint control of Edil and to appraising the compatibility of the concentration, of
which they formed an integral part. In concluding that Siemens would not acquire a
"permanent, long-lasting and decisive" influence over Edil, the Commission noted inter
alia that the loan agreement was of limited duration, involved no shareholder rights
and no traditional creditor's right prior to maturity, 75% of the loan would only fall
due after a three-year "grace period," and the provision of an interest rate increasing
over time would constitute an incentive for Edil to re-finance to loan earlier than would
otherwise be the case. Id.
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with it.97 As a result, the Commission decided that Gillette's par-
ticipation in the purchase of the Wilkinson Sword business from
Stora constituted an abuse of its dominant position in the Euro-
pean Union razor market.98 The Commission further held that,
although the acquisition by Gillette of the equity interest in Eem-
land did not in itself amount to a Philip Monis-like violation of
Article 85, the concomitant agreements for the geographic sepa-
ration of the Wilkinson Sword business and trademark between
the European Union and neighboring countries would necessi-
tate commercial cooperation between Eemland and Gillette.
Such inevitable cooperation would be reinforced by a two-year
supply arrangement, under which Gillette would obtain Wilkin-
son Sword products from Eemland for sale outside the Euro-
pean Union, and by the parties' obligations to refrain from sell-
ing products under the Wilkinson Sword trademark outside
their respective territories. According to the Commission, these
agreements violated Article 85(1) and were not eligible for an
individual exemption under Article 85(3). 9 This decision re-
quired Gillette to dispose of its interests in Eemland as both
shareholder and creditor within a fixed period. Furthermore, to
97. Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 28, 26 (1993). Compare with Philip Morris, [19871
E.C.R. at 4580-82, 11 53-56 (ruling that similar preemption rights would not allow PM
to influence Rothmans by enabling it to prevent any third parties from acquiring
Rothmans and thereby improving its competitive performance).
98. The Commission distinguished the facts in the case at issue from the relevant
facts in Philip Morris, and reasoned that in the latter case the Court considered a situa-
tion in which a dominant position was held not by the acquiring company, as in Gil-
lette, but by the entity in which the minority interest was acquired. Gillette, Oj. L 116/
21, at 27-28, 1 24 (1993).
99. Compare Gillette, O.J. L 116/21 (1993) with CCIE/GTE, O.J. C 258/10, 11 12,
31-32 (1992). In order to recreate the position of GTE's non-American business, which
prior to the planned concentration had access to the Research and Development
("R&D") of the North-American business and to Osram's technical information and
patents pursuant to certain reciprocal patent licenses and technical information ex-
change agreements with Osram, Edil and Siemens entered into a number of non-recip-
rocal commercial agreements aimed at ensuring Edil's access to Osram's R&D expertise
for a transitional ten-year period. Id. Osram and Edil also executed non-exclusive sup-
ply agreements for bulb parts and, for maximum four-year periods, new bulbs and parts
at a competitive price in order to enable Edil to fill any gaps in its product range while
building up its own R&D capacity. Id. The Commission found that such post-closing
agreements might afford Siemens a certain influence over Edil but not a permanent or
decisive one, since they only represented a "safety net" for the buy-out during the time
necessary for Edil to build up its own financial resources and in-house R&D and to
develop new lines of supply. The firms had built-in economic incentives to encourage
Edil to develop its own capacity for R&D as quickly as possible.
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prevent coordination of the parties' commercial conduct in
neighboring markets, Gillette was required to reassign the Wil-
kinson Sword trademark to Eemland in the former East Ger-
many, certain Central and East European countries, and Tur-
key. 100
Similar anticompetitive concerns seem to have prompted
the Commission to object recently to the proposed acquisition
by Dresser-Rand, a joint venture between the U.S. companies
Dresser Industries and Ingersoll-Rand, of a 24% stake in Nuovo
Pignone ("NP"), a business active in the gas turbine and com-
pressor sectors that General Electric ("GE") bought from the
Italian State holding company ENI in 1994.101 As originally
planned, the deal involved ENI transferring its 69.3% sharehold-
ing in NP to a GE-led consortium that included Dresser-Rand,"0 2
NP's main competitor in the worldwide compressor market.
The transaction was later restructured to exclude any participa-
tion in NP by Dresser-Rand, due to intense opposition by labor
unions and in order to obtain approval from the Commission. 03
After the merger had been cleared under the Merger Regulation
on May 6, 1994,104 however, GE asked the Commission to clear
the transfer of a minority shareholding to Dresser-Rand, as envis-
100. See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 85, at 397-400 (identifying only influence "plus
factor" in Gillette, vis-i-vis Philip Morris, in existence of broader non-EU cooperation
agreements between parties that were apparently more likely to produce effects within
European Union, but opining that these facts did not justify application of either Arti-
cles 85 or 86 of Treaty under Philip Morris influence test).
101. Commission Notice No. 94/C162/04, O.J. C 162/7 (1994) (GE/ENI/Nuovo
Pignone (II)).
102. GE Group Wins Nuovo Battle, INT'L GAS REP.,Jan. 7, 1994; General Electric Consor-
tium Acquires Majority Share of Nuovo Pignone, PR NEwswiRE PREDICAST PROMT, Jan. 24,
1994.
103. Anti-Trust Gommission Blocks Dresser-Ingersoll's Participation in Nuovo Pignone/
General Electric Deal, IL SOLE-24 ORE, Apr. 1, 1994, at 25. Accordingly, a former notifica-
tion lodged by GE with the Commission on February 24, 1994 was withdrawn and a new
notification was submitted by GE and ENI on April 5, 1994. Commission Notice, O.J. C
105/7 (1994). On April 21, 1995, the Commission announced that GE agreed to drop
its plan to sell a minority stake in Nuovo Pignone to Dresser-Rand and to terminate the
shareholders' agreement it had entered into with Dresser-Rand, as a precondition for
the GE/ENI concentration to be approved under the Merger Regulation. GEAgrees not
to Sell Two 12 Pct Stakes in Nuovo Pignone, AFP-EXTEL NEws, Apr. 21, 1995.
104. GE/ENI/Nuovo Pignone (II), O.J. C 162/7 (1994). GE later increased its
stake in NP to 78.46%, following a public offer to purchase the NP shares still on the
market in February 1995. Anti-Trust Authority Blocks Acquisition of Nuovo Pignone Stock by
Dresser and Ingersoll, IL SOLE-24 ORE, Apr. 22, 1995, at 28.
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aged in the original plan.'05 According to press reports, the
Commission eventually decided to block the transfer of the mi-
nority shareholding, taking the view that any cooperation be-
tween the two largest players in the market for gas compressors
would contravene the EC Treaty's competition rules. 10 6 Unfor-
tunately, since the Commission published no formal decision or
press release on this matter, the details of the proposed minority
acquisition remain secret, including the existence and scope of
any board or management representation, or related post-clos-
ing cooperation agreements requiring the exchange of sensitive
information. It is thus impossible to ascertain precisely how.the
Commission applied the influence standard.0 7
In the event that an acquisition of a minority shareholding
or other corporate governance rights in a company to be priva-
tized not involving a dominant firm raises any competitive con-
cerns under Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty, the transaction in
question may be notified to the Commission and an individual
exemption may be obtained under Article 85(3) if it results in
efficiencies or other pro-competitive benefits offsetting its re-
strictive effects. 0 8
4. Acquisition of Influence over an Enterprise To be Privatized
by Way of a Minority Shareholding Acquisition or
Other non-Joint Venture Arrangement: The
Requirements for Application of
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty
In light of the Commission's evolving policy, the following
comments can be made in relation to the application of Articles
85 and 86 of the EC Treaty to minority stock acquisitions and
other commercial arrangements aimed at acquiring an influence
105. GE Says Still Wants to Sell Part of Nuovo Pignone, REUTER NEws SERVICE - WEST-
ERN EUR., May 8, 1994; GE Bids for Rest of Nuovo Pignone, Receives Formal Bid for Outstand-
ing Shares from General Electric, PR NEwswiRE PREDICAST PROMT, June 30, 1994.
106. Brussels Blocks Pignone Plan. Irr'L GAS REP., Apr. 28, 1995; Anti-Trust Authority,
supra note 104.
107. For example, whether under the restructured transaction plan, Dresser-
Rand's investment was intended to be purely passive.
108. E.g., Commission Decision No. 92/C333/03, O.J. C 333/3 (1992) (STET,
Italtel-SIT, AT&T, AT&T-NSI) (notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17/62
informing any interested third parties of Commission's intention to grant an individual
exemption to technological and commercial cooperation agreements among parties in
field of telecommunications agreements).
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over an enterprise to be privatized, such as cross-shareholdings,
interlocking directors or managers, non-voting equity interests,
and financing agreements.
First, the single investor or "hard-core" syndicate must be in
a competitive relationship, or at least in a vertical seller-buyer
relationship, with the business in which the minority sharehold-
ing or other corporate governance rights are acquired.10 9 Sec-
ond, since Article 85 only applies to agreements and concerted
practices among undertakings, open market share purchases fall
outside its scope; also, the acquisition of a minority interest by a
dominant enterprise in a competitor to be privatized would
seem more likely to result in effective control over the target, or
at least some influence on its commercial policy, in violation of
Article 86, than the acquisition of a minority shareholding by a
competitor in a dominant enterprise to be privatized. Finally,
the minority acquisition or commercial arrangement in question
must not constitute a purely passive investment conveying no
rights to exercise any influence over the target's commercial be-
havior. An investment may be defined as "passive" if all of the
following "safe harbor" requirements are met: (1) no voting
stock or other voting interest, no board or management repre-
sentation, and no access to sensitive internal information of the
enterprise to be privatized is acquired; (2) if the acquisition is
carried out in the framework of a broader transaction in which
the passive investor also provides substantial financing to the tar-
get, the investor does not obtain conversion or preemption
rights potentially affecting the target's voting share capital, or
creditor's rights beyond the usual creditors rights, such as the
right to accelerate repayment or to place the debtor into bank-
ruptcy for failure to make interest or principal payments; and
(3) the investor and the undertaking to be privatized do not
enter into cooperation agreements requiring post-closing per-
formance, such as joint research and development, manufactur-
109. Mediobanca/Generali, [1994] 4 C.M.L.R. at M1-M3. The Commission de-
cided not to review, under Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty, the minority acquisition by
Mediobanca in combination with the non-voting shareholders' agreement with
Euralux. Presumably, however, the transaction conferred on Mediobanca at least
.some influence" over Generali's commercial policy. Id. It may be argued that the
Commission took the view that the Treaty competition rules were inapplicable in the
absence of any significant horizontal or vertical relationship between the acquirer and
the acquired entity. Id.
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ing, distribution, cross product supplies, and exchanges or li-
censing of intellectual property rights that have significant ef-
fects within the European Union. By contrast, if one or more of
these conditions are not met, including the "no voting stock"
condition, notwithstanding the fact that the acquisition of voting
stock below 25% was sanctioned in Philip Morris, it would seem
that, depending on the legal and factual circumstances of the
case, the investing company may be found to be in a position to
exercise "some influence" over the undertaking to be privatized.
C. Special Issues Raised by the Privatization of Enterprises Holding a
Dominant Position Prior to Privatization
Almost inevitably, the process of privatization will involve
state-owned companies that, before their outright or partial
transfer to private owners, hold a monopoly1 0 or a dominant
position. It is submitted that, in such cases, market dominance
will usually be the consequence of exclusive or special rights
granted to the entity to be privatized by a national public author-
ity rather than the result of internal growth in competitive condi-
tions. Accordingly, a breaking-up of the dominant undertaking
will often be the best means of ensuring that privatization does
not lead to the replacement of a public monopoly with a private
monopoly. I I
The mere transfer by the state of control over a monopolist
or dominant enterprise to the private sector should not amount
to a per se "creation of a dominant position" within the meaning
of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, since the dominant
position existed prior to the privatization of the acquired com-
pany, the conduct of which was already subject to scrutiny under
110. E.g., "Telemarketing", Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261. According to the
well-established case law of the Court ofJustice, an undertaking that holds an exclusive
right in a substantial part of the common market can be regarded as in a dominant
position within the meaning of Article 86. Id. An exclusive right covering the whole
territory of a Member State certainly covers a substantial part of the common market,
and a part of a Member State's territory may amount to a substantial part of the Com-
mon Market. E.g., Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v. Siderurgica Gabrielli, Case
C-179/80, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5009 (holding that port of Genova was substantial part of
common market); Accord, Corsica Ferries Italia v. Corpo dei piloti di Genova, Case C-
18/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1783, 41.
111. Guislain, supra note 26, at 121; see Commission Decision, O.J. C 334/23
(1991) (Campsa).
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Articles 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty. 12 If, in the framework of a
concentration involving a monopolist or dominant firm, or a mi-
nority acquisition not conferring control, the acquirer is a com-
petitor, a supplier, or a customer of the acquired firm or is an
entity-holding conglomerate power, there may be a risk that the
transaction will reinforce the acquired firm's pre-existing domi-
nant position.
1. Acquisition of Sole or Joint Control of a Monopoly to be
Privatized: Substantive Assessment of the Transaction
under the Merger Regulation
As mentioned above,1 13 the Merger Regulation provides
that a concentration must be declared incompatible with the
common market and blocked if it either creates or strengthens a
dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded in a relevant market within the
Community. Indeed, if a high degree of dominance exists in the
markets affected by a concentration, "the Commission must be
particularly vigilant because in such circumstances even a very
small increase in market power can have a disproportionately
large negative effect on the competitive conditions on the mar-
ket place." ' 4 Accordingly, the Commission's policy is that a
merger-to-monopoly or a concentration otherwise strengthening
a dominant position already held by one or more of the combin-
ing entities may only be approved subject to structural or behav-
ioral undertakings from the parties to the concentration, 15 facil-
112. Conversely, it is possible that the privatization of a non-dominant firm results
in the creation of a dominant position held by the combined entity on one or more of
the markets affected by the concentration, irrespective of whether the acquirer was it-
self dominant before the transaction. The creation of a dominant position as a result of
a concentration, however, does not necessarily imply that the transaction is incompati-
ble with the common market.
113. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text (describing the Merger Regula-
tion).
114. Commission Decision No. 91/535/EEC, O.J. L 290/35 (1991) (Tetra Pak/
Alfa-Laval).
115. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 8(2), O.J. L 395/1, at 6 (1989). The
Commission may approve notified concentration conditional upon modifications to the
original project and attach to its final, second-phase decisions, "conditions and obliga-
tions intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commit-
ments they have entered into vis-4-vis the Commission with a view to modifying the
original concentration plan." Id.; see supra note 31 (discussing second-phase decisions);
see, e.g., Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand, O.J. L 186/38 (1993). In order to resolve the Com-
mission's concern that the acquisition by K+S of its ailing state-owned competitor MdK
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itating entry by new competitors.
In light of the substantive analysis carried out by the Com-
mission under the Merger Regulation," 6 a tentative catalog of
the factors to be taken into account in assessing the risk that a
dominant position held by a privatized enterprise would be
strengthened would include the following. First, with respect to
the horizontal effects in concentrations involving competing
firms: (1) the risk that the concentration would lead to an in-
crease in a dominant undertaking's market shares or market
power.1 1 7 One example would be the case where, through a tied
would lead to a situation of oligopolistic dominance by K+S and the French company
EMC/SCPA in the Community market for agricultural potash outside of Germany, K+S
and the new joint venture agreed: (1) to withdraw from Kali-Export, an export joint
venture set up in Austria for the coordination of the sales of K+S and EMC/SCPA
outside the European Union; (2) to terminate its distribution arrangement with EMC/
SCPA and set up its own supply network in France; and (3) to use its best efforts to
renegotiate the terms of an existing Canadian joint venture with EMC/SCPA to ensure
that its parents could sell its potash production independently in the Community.
These undertakings were challenged by EMC/SCPA before the Court of First Instance,
which by interim order found that the withdrawal of K+S and the new entity from Kali-
Export would cause irreparable injury to the applicant because it would lead to the
dissolution of Kali-Export. The Court of First Instance, therefore, stayed the implemen-
tation of the relevant part of the Commission decision until it pronounces on the sub-
stance of the appeal. Soci6t6 commerciale des potasses et de l'azote and Entreprise
Minire et Chimique v. Commission, Case T-88/94 R, [1994] E.C.R. 11-401 (Ct. First
Instance). As of March 1, 1995, any proposed modifications to an original concentra-
tion plan must be submitted by the parties to the Commission within three months of
the date of initiation of proceedings. Commission Regulation 3384/94 on the notifica-
tions, time-limits and hearings provided for in the Merger Regulation, Commission
Regulation No. 3384/94, art. 18(1), O.J. L 377/1 (1994). In Air France/Sabena, the
Commission accepted for the first time undertakings from a third party to a concentra-
tion (namely, the French Government). Air France/Sabena, Case IV/M517, [1994] 5
C.M.L.R. MI. Moreover, in a number of cases the Commission accepted commitments
made by the parties in order to remedy clear-cut competition problems within the one-
month initial examination with a view to avoiding the commencement of formal pro-
ceedings.
116. Air France/Sabena, Kali+Saz/Mdk/Treuhand and EniChem/Union Carbide
actually involve a total or partial privatization of the company subject to a change in
control. Air France/Sabena, Case IV/M517, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. M1; Kali+Salz/MdK/
Treuhand, O.J. L 186/38 (1993); Commission Decision No. 95/C 123/05, O.J. C 123/3
(1995) (EniChem/Union Carbide). In AT&T/NCR and Mannesmann/VDO, however,
a dominant undertaking was involved in the concentration as the acquired entity. Com-
mission Decision No. 91/C 16/15, OJ. C 16/20 (1991) (AT&T/NCR); Commission
Decision No. 92/C 88/10, OJ. C 88/13 (1992) (Mannesmann/VDO).
117. E.g., Air France/Sabena, Case IV/M517, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. Ml, 54-57.
The Commission reasoned that the establishment by the two airlines of a jointly run
"hub and spoke" network (i.e., a system of flights at least twice a day to and from 75
European destinations), centered on the Brussels National Airport, could strengthen
the dominant position held by Air France and Sabena on all of the existing routes
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sales policy, the product in relation to which dominance exists
would be supplied as part of a comprehensive package to pro-
mote sales of the combined entity's other products,'1 8 particu-
larly regarding the conditions in the industry in question;119 and
between Belgium and France by making their flights the most practical for users in
transit and making entry to the routes concerned by third-party competitors very diffi-
cult. Id. Eventually the transaction was approved in light of the commitment offered
by the French government to allow, if any competing airline would so demand, the
creation or development in Northern France of an integrated network comparable to
the planned Brussels-based "hub and spoke" network. See EniChem/Union Carbide,
OJ. C 123/3, 1 47, 52 (1995). The Commission authorized the formation of a joint
venture by and between Union Carbide and Enichem, a subsidiary of the Italian state-
owned holding company ENI, in which the parents pooled their polyethylene activities.
Id. The Commission held that the proposed transaction would not strengthen the pre-
existing arguably dominant position of Enichem in the upstream market for the pro-
duction and supply of ethylene in Italy, because Union Carbide did not produce ethy-
lene in Western Europe and would not contribute any ethylene facilities to the new
entity. Id. See also Commission Decision No. 91/C5/04, OJ. C 5/7, 1 13-15 (1991)
(Mitsubishi/UCAR). The Commission ruled out that the proposed joint venture would
lead to a strengthening of UCAR's arguably dominant position on the EU markets for
graphite electrodes and graphite specialties because Mitsubishi's pre-concentration
share of these markets was negligible and its trading expertise would not significantly
strengthen the dense and comprehensive distribution network of UCAR in Europe.
Commission Decision No. 93/C104/06, OJ. C 104/10, 25-28 (1993) (concerning
establishment ofjoint venture pooling parents' activities in fields of colors and coatings
for ceramics and glass, including silver pastes). The Commission ruled out that the
proposed transaction would strengthen Degussa's arguably dominant position in the
EU markets for glass colors and silver pastes as the new entity's market shares would
increase by less than 10% and 5%, respectively, Ciba/Geigy was active in only a few
Member States before the transaction, and there was no indication that the concentra-
tion would reduce the alternatives available to industrial purchasers of the relevant
products. Id.
118. E.g., Commission Decision, OJ. C 37/3, 1 35-42 (1995) (Akzo Nobel/Mon-
santo). The Commission authorized the formation of a joint venture between Akzo
Nobel and Monsanto to produce rubber chemicals, which are used principally in the
production of tires. Id. The Commission ruled out the possibility that the transaction
would strengthen Akzo Nobel's arguably dominant position in the EU market for insol-
uble sulfur, in which Monsanto had no interest prior to the transaction, and noted that
despite the lack of product substitutability for insoluble sulfur due to its specific proper-
ties, Akzo Nobel had never in the past supplied it as part of a "package" with its other
rubber chemical products, or offered discounts and rebates over a range of products
including insoluble sulfur, and there was no reason to suppose that the new entity
would start selling the product on a different basis. Id. Furthermore, the combined
entity's market power would be restrained by actual or potential competition from sev-
eral independent producers both within and outside of the European Union. Id.
119. E.g., Commission Decision, OJ. C 59/13 14 (1991) (A~rospatiale/MBB)
(concerning creation ofjoint venture grouping civil and military helicopter business of
two parent companies). The Commission took the view that the transaction would not
strengthen the monopoly position held by Afrospatiale and MBB in their respective
home markets for military helicopters because, in light of the national fragmentation
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(2) the risk that a non-dominant party to the transaction that is a
significant actual or potential competitor would disappear from
the market as a result of the concentration, 12 0 or that the domi-
nant undertaking would obtain access to competitively signifi-
cant know-how in the possession of another party to the transac-
tion.1 2 ' Second, with respect to the vertical effects of concentra-
peculiar to the defense industry, neither of the two parents was an actual or foreseeably
potential competitor of the other. Id.
120. E.g, O.J. C 65/3, It 26-31 (1995) (Glaxo/Wellcome). Clearing Glaxo's pub-
lic bid for the acquisition of its competitor Wellcome, the Commission reasoned that
the proposed concentration would not strengthen Glaxo's arguably dominant position
in some national markets for anti-migraine drugs because: (1) the removal of
Wellcome's competing product, which has been off-patent for over 20 years and is sup-
plied in generic or branded form by a number of other competitors, would have no
significant impact on the competitive conditions of the market; (2) although both
Glaxo and the acquired company have two new anti-migraine drugs in an advanced
phase of clinical trials, Glaxo resolved any possible anticompetitive concerns by under-
taking to grant an exclusive license to a third party to develop and independently mar-
ket one of the two most promising new drugs; and (3) several competitors of the new
entity also have anti-migraine compounds under research and development. Id. See
also Union Carbide/Enichem, O.J. 123/3, 1 62-81 (1995). In Union Carbide/
Enichem, the Commission stated that, although in the framework of the proposed com-
bination Enichem would cease to offer its own polyethylene ("PE") technology for li-
cense within Western Europe, this would not result in a strengthening of Union Car-
bide's arguably dominant position in the worldwide PE technology market, founded on
its proprietary gas-phase PE process. The Commission opined that Enichem had never
been particularly active on the technology licensing market and its technologies are
distinct from, or not comparable to, Unipol. The Commission further reasoned that, to
the extent that there will still be demand in the high-pressure segment of the market,
other technologies comparable to Enichem's are offered by certain competitors; in ad-
dition, no cross-fertilization was expected between Unipol and Enichem's low-pressure
slurry technology, given the fundamental technical differences between the two
processes. The Commission finally reasoned that the experiments made by Enichem in
the area of gas-phase technology have never been developed to the level of commercial
production. Id. See Mitsubishi/UCAR, O.J. C 5/7, 15 (1991) (holding that with-
drawal of Mitsubishi as a trading company from UCAR's markets would not endanger
possibility of other Japanese producers selling their products on EU markets as they
already did).
121. See, e.g., Commission Decision, O.J. C 88/13, 27-30, 36-37 (1992) (Mannes-
mann/VDO). The Commission noted that the acquisition by major German conglom-
erate Mannesmann of a majority of the voting shares of VDO, an important German
manufacturer of mechanical, electrical and electronic information and control systems
for the automobile industry, In concluding that the concentration would not
strengthen either the arguably dominant position held by VDO in the German markets
for (1) instrument panels; (2) liquid level sensors; or (3)Mannesmann's possible domi-
nant position in the German tachography market, the Commission reasoned that Man-
nesmann could not be viewed as a significant potential competitor of VDO as, accord-
ing to the industry expectation, in the long run existing technology would be substi-
tuted by new purely electronic instrument panels so that potential competitors would
not consider it worthwhile to invest in old technology. Moreover, Mannesmann's disap-
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tions between firms not competing on the market of the
dominant undertaking, or in a supplier-to-customer relationship
with each other: (1) the ability of the new entity to offer a fuller
product range as a result of the combination of the complemen-
tary product ranges of the parties to the concentration, thereby
limiting actual or potential competition, particularly if the mar-
ket of the dominant firm is characterized by high entry barriers
of a technical or commercial nature; 22 (2) the ability of parties
to the concentration with strong positions in upstream product
markets to make access to their goods or services more difficult
for non-integrated competitors of another party to the concen-
tration active and dominant in a downstream market, 123 thereby
pearance as a potential competitor to new electronic products was not significant as a
number of other independent potential competitors remained both within and outside
the Community and the concentration would not allow VDO to get access to specific
know-how belonging to Mannesmann. The Commission also relied on the absence of
material barriers to entry of a technical nature with respect to the German market for
liquid level sensors, which are relatively simple products, and the existence of potential
competition existed since liquid level sensors do not represent significant vehicle com-
ponents so that no consumer preferences, technical, or marketing reasons existed for
car manufacturers not to purchase products produced captively by other car manufac-
turers. Id.
122. See, e.g., Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, 0.J. L 290/35, at 39-41, 3.5-5.2 (1991). The
Commission particularly noted the acquisition of the entire share capital of Alfa-Laval, a
Swedish manufacturer of food processing equipment, by packaging equipment manu-
facturer Tetra Pak. The Commission found that Tetra Pak held a dominant position on
the Community market for aseptic carton packaging machines, and in the separate but
related market for carton blanks, but that the proposed concentration would not con-
fer on the combined entity "an advantage of real significance that would be likely to
further increase the difficulty of entry or penetration of actual or potential competi-
tors" because historically there were very few simultaneous purchases of processing and
packaging equipment from the same source, the interface between the two being rela-
tively simple, there were a number of strong competitors in the processing equipment
market, and the customers (diaries and juice processors) had significant buying power.
See also, e.g., Akzo Nobel/Monsanto, O.J. C 37/3; 26-28, 42 (1995). In Akszo Nobel/
Monsanto, the Commission held that the new entity's capability to provide a complete
product range of rubber chemicals would not lead to a strengthening of Akzo Nobel's
arguably dominant position in the EU market for insoluble sulfur because, despite tire
manufacturers' tendency to conduct commercial negotiations on an across-the-board
basis, certain competing manufacturers of single rubber chemicals had recently entered
and obtained increasing shares in their respective market segments. Id. See Mannes-
mann/VDO, OJ. C 88/13, 28, 30 (1992) (finding that proposed concentration
would not strengthen dominant position held by VDO and Mannesmann in German
markets for instrument panels and tachographs, respectively, because combined sales of
two products were possible only in one market segment representing less than 10% of
total market and certain competitors were able to offer both products).
123. An example would be where A, enjoying significant market power in the up-
stream market for gypsum, combines with B, which is dominant in the downstream
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strengthening the combined entity's position in the downstream
market;1 24 and (3) the ability of a dominant firm operating in an
market for plasterboard. As a result of this concentration, the new entity may make
access to gypsum more difficult for its competitors in the plasterboard market that are
not also integrated upstream.
124. See, e.g., Commission Decision, O.J. C 16/20, 11 15-16 (1991) (AT&T/NCR).
The Commission cleared the contested takeover bid for NCR launched by AT&T. In
analyzing whether the upstream integration of AT&T's activities, particularly its copy-
righted UNIX open operating system software that is used inter alia in a number of
workstation systems, could strengthen NCR's dominant position in the EU market for
financial and retail workstations by restricting NCR's competitors' access to UNIX, the
Commission put considerable emphasis on the continued availability to AT&T's com-
petitors of UNIX through AT&T's policy of granting, usually irrevocable, paid-up
licenses to all major computer manufacturers, who, moreover, were cooperating with
each other to develop a competing open operating system software. Id. See also Com-
mission Decision No. 04/022/EC, O.J. L 364/1, 16, 82-93 (1994) (MSG Media Ser-
vice) In MSG Media Service, the Commission declared a proposed joint venture to
provide digital pay-TV services incompatible with the Common Market. MSG was set up
by and among Bertelsmann, the German telecommunications monopoly Deutsche
Bundespost Telekom ("DBT") and the Kirch group. The Commission found, inter alia,
that MSG's expected dominance on the market for pay-TV technical and administrative
services would strengthen the already "extraordinarily strong," "leading" position of
Bertelsmann and Kirch on the downstream pay-TV market because: (1) potential new
entrants would be forced to use pay-TV services under terms, conditions and prices
controlled by their strongest competitors via the new entity; (2) DBT would be able to
favor the pay-TV programming of Bertelsmann and Kirch through its power over the
input of competing pay-TV programs into its broadband cable network, especially in
the first few years when transmission capacity for digital signals will be somewhat lim-
ited; and (3) Bertelsmann and Kirch would be in a position to influence consumers'
choice of pay-TV programs through MSG's control of the decoder and the on-screen
modulator, which gives the user guidance as to the various programs offered or
through MSG's control over the "smart cards" that users will have to insert into the
decoder in order to haveaccess to programs. Id. The Commission also found that the
creation of MSG would lead to a strengthening of DBT's dominant position resulting
from its statutory monopoly on laying and operating cable networks in public road, by
making it more difficult for private cable network operators to penetrate the market
since they could not obtain their programs, which are required for attractive program
packages, thereby slowing the competition that might occur after the expected liberali-
zation and deregulation of the cable network market. Id. See also Commission Deci-
sion, Case IV/M490, Nordic Satellite Distribution, slip op. 1 113-132 (Eur. Comm'n
July 19, 1995) [hereinafter NSD]. In Nordic Satellite Distribution, the Commission de-
clared the setting-up of NSD incompatible with the Common Market. NSD was a joint
venture to operate in the markets for the provision of transponder capacity to broad-
casters, the operation of cable TV networks, and the transmission and distribution of
satellite pay-TV and other encrypted TV channels to direct-to-home households in the
Nordic region, by and between Norsk Telekom, a subsidiary of the state-owned Norwe-
gian telephone and television service provider Telenor, Tele Denmark, the state-owned
Danish telecommunications monopoly that also holds a legal monopoly on the owner-
ship of commercial cable TV infrastructure and the transmission of TV signals by cable
across municipal borders, and Kinnevik, a Swedish private conglomerate active also in
the sector of satellite TV broadcasting and distribution. Id. The Commission took the
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upstream market to acquire a substantial competitive advantage
by combining its activities with those of another party to the con-
centration, which operates in a downstream market, thereby
strengthening the combined entity's position in the downstream
market. 125 Third, and finally, with respect to the conglomerate
effects of the transaction, the risk that the market position of the
dominant undertaking to be privatized will be strengthened by
the know-how, manufacturing, or marketing capacity of the ac-
quiring company or group, or its financial power.
126
Approval of a concentration that strengthens the dominant
position held by the acquired company is unlikely to be permit-
ted under the "failing company defense," since, by definition, a
failing company is unlikely to be dominant. On the other hand,
the Commission may apply this defense to transactions that
strengthen a dominant position held by the acquirer com-
view, inter alia, that since the proposed joint venture would hold a dominant position in
the transponder market in the Nordic countries, Tele Denmark's dominant position in
the Danish market for the operation of cable TV networks would be strengthened by
the proposed transaction because any competing independent cable TV operators
would have henceforth to negotiate with NSD the terms, conditions and prices for ob-
taining the TV channels, and, therefore, NSD would be in a position to discriminate
against them in favor of Tele Denmark. Id. See Mitsubishi/UCAR, OJ. C 5/7, 15
(1991) (finding that proposed joint venture would not lead to a strengthening of
UCAR's arguably dominant position on EU markets for graphite electrodes and graph-
ite specialties inter alia because Mitsubishi's position in upstream markets, in particular
market for calcined nedle petroleum coke, was not dominant and .these markets were
competitive so that new entity's competitors would be able to have unrestricted access
to them).
125. See, e.g., MSG Media Service, O.J. L 364/1, at 17, 89 (1994) (finding that
MSG's expected dominance on the market for pay-TV technical and administrative serv-
ices would also strengthen the leading market position of Bertelsmann and Kirch on
the downstream pay-TV market because, inter alia, Bertelsmann and Kirch could ac-
quire via MSG substantial information on the pay-TV customer structure and viewer
behavior, which would make it much easier to develop target-group-oriented programs
or program packages, through their access to the subscriber data handled by MSG's
subscriber management system).
126. See, e.g., AT&T/NCR, O.J. C 16/20, 23-31 (1991) (ruling out that NCR's
dominant position in the market for workstations would be strengthened by its combi-
nation with AT&T's strength in the telecommunications and network processing busi-
nesses because, despite the important role played by networking in setting up worksta-
tion systems, AT&T had a limited presence on the Community telecommunications
markets, synergies stemming from other combinations of computer and telecommuni-
cations business in the industry had proved hitherto "theoretical," and the new entity
would face a number of important competitors), and Mannesmann/VDO, C 88/13,
28, 30 (1992) (finding that the possible strengthening of the combining parties' market
position brought about by the proposed concentration would not affect their competi-
tive position since certain competitors enjoyed even greater financial strength).
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pany. 127
Interestingly, some of the above indicia of the strengthen-
ing of a pre-existing dominant position seem to relate to poten-
tial behavioral rather than structural aspects of the transaction,
and thus seem to be more relevant to an assessment of abuse of
dominant position under Article 86 of the EC Treaty than to an
assessment under the Merger Regulation.1 28 Some examples
are: (1) the possibility that the concentration would enhance a
dominant undertaking's market power through a tied sales pol-
icy operated by the combined entity; (2) the power of a party to
the transaction operating in an upstream market to refuse to
sell; and (3) the imposition of discriminatory prices or other dis-
criminatory sales conditions on competitors of another party
dominant in a downstream market.129
2. Acquisition of Limited Influence over an Enterprise to be
Privatized: Substantive Assessment of the Transaction
under the EC Treaty Rules
A dominant undertaking may be partially privatized in a way
that does not constitute a concentration, for example, through
the transfer of a minority shareholding or other commercial ar-
rangements, like cross-shareholdings, shared directors or manag-
ers, non-voting equity interests, or financing agreements that are
intended to give a private acquirer limited influence, but not
control, over the commercial conduct of the undertaking to be
privatized. In such cases, the risk that the privatization, which
127. See Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand. OJ. L 186/38, at 45-53, 46-50, 70-90, 95
(1993) (approving the acquisition by K+S of the ailing company MdK, a company held
in trust by the Treuhandanstalt which combined the potash and rock salt activities of
the former German Democratic Republic, despite the fact that it would strengthen K+S'
dominant position in the German market for agricultural potash; the Commission took
the view that this would have happened even in the absence of the transaction as MdK
would have ceased production and its market share would have been captured by K+S,
which was the only other significant supplier on that market, since despite strenuous
efforts by an investment bank no other company had made a competing offer for
MdK).
128. See Union Carbide/Enichem, O.J. 123/3, 53, 84 (1995) (making this state-
ment with respect to the possible concerns that the creation of the planned joint ven-
ture would create an incentive for either Enichem or the new entity to curtail their
ethylene supplies to third parties in the future, or. for Union Carbide to cease to make
available for license to third parties in Western Europe the Unipol gas-phase PEe pro-
cess technology, for which a non-exclusive license was granted to the joint venture).
129. Id.
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the Merger Regulation is inapplicable to,130 may lead, as a result
of one or more of the factors discussed above, to the strengthen-
ing of a dominant position held by a state-owned firm would not
seem to constitute an infringement of the prohibition of abuse
of a dominant position in Article 86 of the EC Treaty.
Even in the absence of any abusive conduct by the domi-
nant undertaking to be privatized, however, the sale by a Mem-
ber State of a minority shareholding to one of its competitors,
suppliers, customers, or an entity holding conglomerate power
may constitute a violation of Article 86 of the EC Treaty. Indeed,
where such a transaction leads to the strengthening of the ac-
quired company's dominant position, the privatization may
amount to a state "measure" violating Article 86 of the EC Treaty
in conjunction with Article 90(1).
In addition, Article 85(1) will be applicable to the extent
that the minority acquisition or other non-joint venture arrange-
ment is capable of acting as an instrument for the coordination
of the commercial conduct of the dominant company and its
acquirer. The strengthening of a pre-existing dominant position
will thus only be relevant under Article 85(1) if it is the result of
such unlawful coordination.
a. Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty
As mentioned above, Article 85(1) focuses on whether an
agreement or concerted practice13 ' between independent un-
dertakings that is capable of affecting trade between Member
states has as its purpose or effect an appreciable restriction or
distortion of competition within the European Union. In other
words, if the undertakings involved in the concerted action in-
tend, or are led, to cease to determine independently their com-
mercial policies in a manner that affects normal market condi-
tions. 1 3 2
130. See supra notes 85-109 and accompanying text (examining application of Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of EC Treaty to acquisitions of influence short of control).
131. ICI v. Commission, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619, 64. "Concerted prac-
tice" means "a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having
reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, know-
ingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition." Id.
See also, Co6peratieve vereniging Suiker Unie v. Commission, Joined Cases 40-48, 50,
54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, 173-74; Rh6ne-Poulenc v. Commis-
sion, Case T-1/89, [1991] E.C.R. IH-867, 121.
132. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(2)-(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627. Any agree-
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As previously mentioned, even the acquisition by way of an
agreement of a minority equity interest in a competitor, includ-
ing a dominant firm, may fall within the scope of Article 85(1) of
the EC Treaty to the extent that it could operate as an instru-
ment for coordinating the commercial conduct of the compa-
nies involved. One example would entail allowing an acquirer
direct access to sensitive information relating to the activities of a
competitor. 133 The risk of coordination between the companies
involved is particularly severe if they operate, or are the leading
players in, an oligopolistic industry, in which such a minority ac-
quisition might not only destroy the pre-existing balance be-
tween the businesses present in the market, but might also pre-
vent competitors from acquiring financial control of the target.
Moreover, the investing company cannot be expected to endan-
ger its investment by competing strenuously with a firm in which
it has a substantial shareholding.
Because the focus of Article 85(1) is the prohibition of an-
ticompetitive cooperation, it has few implications in situations
where a minority interest is acquired in a dominant undertaking
by one of its competitors, suppliers, or customers, despite the
risk that such an acquisition may result in a strengthening of the
target's market power. Indeed, Article 85(1) is concerned not so
much with structural changes in the market-place brought about
by concerted action by independent operators as with its behav-
ioral aspects, or the coordination of their commercial policies.
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty thus applies to restrictive con-
certed action by independent undertakings even in the absence
of market dominance. The scope of Article 85(1)'s substantive
test is "the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market." The two-pronged test of Article
2(3) of the Merger Regulation, which is "the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position as a result of which effec-
ments in violation of Article 85(1) are automatically void, unless granted exemption by
the Commission. See generally ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments 921-
49 (3d ed. 1992).
133. Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4487. Philip Morris promulgated a test
whereby such a restriction or distortion of the competitive conditions of the market
may arise where the agreement in question gives the acquirer an opportunity to rein-
force its position at a later time, thereby eventually taking effective control, or creates a
structure likely to be used for commercial cooperation between the parties, or where
the acquisition of the shareholding requires the two companies to take account.of each
other's interests when determining their commercial policy. Id.
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tive competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it," is much less broad. Con-
versely, if a concentration involving a dominant state-owned un-
dertaking results in "no creation or strengthening of a dominant
position, the transaction must be authorized, without there be-
ing any need to examine the effects of the transaction on effec-
tive competition."13
4
Moreover, the substantive test in Article 2(3) of the Merger
Regulation focuses exclusively on the foreseeable structural ef-
fect of a proposed concentration, whereas no effect on competi-
tion is necessary for the application of Article 85(1), since its
prohibition extends to agreements whose purpose is anti-com-
petitive,1 3 5 regardless of whether that purpose is in fact
achieved. 136
In sum, an agreement for the purchase of a minority share-
holding in a dominant enterprise to be privatized by one of its
competitors, suppliers, or customers that would lead to a
strengthening of the privatized entity's dominance, will violate
Article 85 (1) of the EC Treaty. That violation depends, however,
on the surrounding circumstances and the precise context of the
transaction, whether such strengthening is "the object or effect"
of the parties' coordination of their commercial conduct. Viola-
tions of Article 85(1) may be found where the share purchase
agreement creates a "two-way" flow of sensitive competitive infor-
mation between the parties, enabling the dominant undertaking
to access specific know-how, manufacturing or marketing capac-
ity, or the financial power of its shareholder, or where the ac-
quirer is a strong player in an upstream product market and
starts making access to its goods or services more difficult for the
non-integrated competitors of the dominant undertaking in a
134. Air France v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. 11-323, 79.
135. E.g., Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines v. Commission, Joined Cases
29 & 30/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1679, 26. According to the case law of the Court ofJustice,
in order to determine whether an agreement has as its object a restriction of competi-
tion it is necessary to assess not the subjective intent of the parties at the time when the
agreement was concluded, but rather the aims objectively pursued by the agreement as
such, in the light of the economic context in which it is to be applied. Id.
136. E.g., Etablissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs v. Commission, Joined
Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, 342. "[T]he offense involved is a pure "conduct"
offense so that it is not necessary to attempt to explain the actual effects of the agree-
ment". Rhdne-Poulenc v. Commission, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-922. On the other hand, if the
anticompetitive effect of an agreement between undertakings is established, proving
that the agreement also has an anticompetitive object as well is unnecessary. Id. at 923.
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downstream market. This is particularly evident through con-
comitant cooperation agreements requiring post-closing per-
formance, such as supply or technical support agreements or
licenses of intellectual property rights.
b. Article 86 of the EC Treaty
Article 86 of the EC Treaty prohibits abusive conduct by
dominant undertakings, which include unilateral practices in-
volving a direct exploitation of market power or otherwise result
in a substantial reduction in competition on a relevant market
within the European Union, or a substantial part thereof, to the
detriment of customers or suppliers.' 37 Where the abusive con-
duct takes place by way of concerted action or the execution of
formal agreements, such as with non-dominant third parties on
which the dominant firm imposes its will, either Article 85 or 86
of the EC Treaty, or both, will be applicable, "taking into ac-
count the nature of the reciprocal undertakings entered into
and the competitive position of the various contracting parties
on the market or markets on which they operated.
11 38
Market dominance, as such, is not prohibited by Article
86.139 A dominant firm's strengthening of its market position
through conduct that affects the structure of competition in the
relevant market, reducing the opportunities for effective
137. See generally, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 949-57
(3d ed. 1992). "Abuse" for the purpose of Article 86 indicates "the behaviour of an
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a
market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the de-
gree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different
from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of
the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance
of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competi-
tion". Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, 1 91.
138. Hoffmann-La Roche, [1979] E.C.R. at 550, 1 116. See also Ahmed Saeed
Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebfiro v. Zentrale Zu Belumpfung Unlauteren
Wettbewerbs, [1989] E.C.R. 803, 1 37. The Commission applied Article 86 of the
Treaty to the behavior of undertakings on an oligopolistic market which it also found to
have indulged in concerted action contrary to Article 85(1). Commission Decision No.
89/93/EEC, OJ. L 33/44 (1989) (Flat Glass). This approach was upheld in principle
by the Court of First Instance on appeal, although on the facts the Court quashed the
Commission's finding of a collective dominant position and stated that in order to es-
tablish an infringement of Article 86 it was not sufficient to "recycle" the facts constitut-
ing an infringement of Article 85. SocietA Italiana Vetro v. Commission, Joined Cases
T-68, 77 and 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1403, 11 357-68.
139. E.g., Societti Italiana Vetro, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1403, 360.
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residual competition by making it more difficult for rivals to
compete and for potential competitors to enter the market, how-
ever, may constitute an abuse. 140
Since the principal focus of Article 86 is abusive conduct by
one or more firms with market power, a scenario in which the
acquisition of a minority shareholding in a dominant enterprise
to be privatized by one of its competitors, suppliers, or custom-
ers that leads to a strengthening of its dominant position ap-
pears to raise few issues under Article 86 in the absence of an
abuse by the acquired company. Indeed, the Commission's pol-
icy is that the acquisition of a minority shareholding in a compet-
itor, which by conferring on the acquirer at least "some influ-
ence" over the target brings about a change in the structure of
the market that adversely affects competition on it, is, prima fa-
cie, in violation of Article 86 only if the acquirer, and not the
target company, is dominant. 41 On the other hand, it is doubt-
ful whether a dominant firm's sale of a minority holding in its
own shares to a competitor, supplier, or customer, by which the
commercial policy of the dominant firm becomes subject to the
acquirer's influence, could constitute an abuse by the dominant
firm, particularly in the context of a privatization process. Fur-
thermore, it is doubtful whether an abuse would be recognized
even where the participation of particular private investors in the
capital of the dominant firm results in a strengthening of its
market position, for example, by facilitating access to the finan-
cial, industrial, or technological resources of the new sharehold-
ers. 142I
140. E.g., Continental Can, [1973] E.C.R. at 245, 1 26 (holding that concentrations
which strengthen an existing dominant position may be caught by Article 86 of Treaty);
see also Tetra Pak I (BTG license), Commission Decision No. 88/501/EEC, O.J. L 272/
27, at 40, 1 47 (1988); Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R.
11-309, 23 (Ct. First Instance) (upholding Commission decision declaring that acqui-
sition by dominant Tetra Pak group of exclusive patent license for new technology that
constituted key element to entering market, by means of take-over of former competi-
tor and exclusive licensee, amounted to abuse of dominant position because it pre-
vented or at least considerably delayed entry of new competitor (third player which had
hitherto cooperated with target company in developing new product incorporating new
technology) into a market where only minimal competition existed so as to considera-
bly raise the barriers to entry therein).
141. See Gillette, O.J. L 116/21 (1993).
142. This was the view that the intervener Philip Morris took. Philip Morris, [1987]
E.C.R. at 4530. The Philip Morrsjudgment is of no help on this matter since the cryptic
language of its paragraph 65 refers ambiguously to the arguably dominant position of
the target company Rothmans International and to the possibility that "an abuse of such
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The acquisition of a minority shareholding in a dominant
enterprise to be privatized may be abusive within the meaning of
Article 86 of the EC Treaty in the marginal case in which the
acquirer is itself dominant, because the relevant market is an
oligopolistic one. An oligopolistic market is characterized by a
high level of concentration, high barriers to entry and product
homogeneity. Another aspect of abuse in the context of Article
86 is when strong enough economic links exist, like through
agreements or licenses, between the acquirer and the acquired
company, which is an abuse of a joint dominant position.'4 3
3. Creation of a True "Public Corporation" Through a Public
Flotation of a Dominant Enterprise: Substantive
Competitive Assessment
In order to resolve the anticompetitive concerns potentially
raised by the privatization of a monopolistic or dominant enter-
prise, a Member State may decide to implement the privatization
via its public flotation and the creation of a true "public corpora-
tion" with a large number of small shareholders. As indicated
above, by definition, privatization by public flotation results in
no acquisition of control or influence over the enterprise to be
privatized and thus falls outside the scope of both the Merger
Regulation and Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. 44 In addi-
a position .. . arise[s] where the shareholding in question [i.e., PM's shareholding in
Rothmans International] results in effective control of the other company or at least in
some influence on its commercial policy [i.e., arguably in PM's acquiring effective con-
trol or some influence over Rothmans International]" (emphasis added). The only
possibly consistent reading of this statement of the Court ofJustice is that a dominant
firm may abuse its market power even by transferring to a competitor a minority equity
interest which enables the latter to control it or influence its commercial policy. See EC
COMPETITION L. REP. (CCH) 49, 153-54 (Ivo Van Bael &Jean-Franqois Bellis eds., 1994)
(suggesting that reduction in competition between acquirer and target company would
have precisely same effect whichever of two were dominant).
143. See, e.g., Societti Italiana Vetro, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1403, 358 ("There is nothing,
in principle, to prevent two or more independent economic entities from being, on a
specific market, united by such economic links that, by virtue of that fact, together they
hold a dominant position vis-i-vis the other operators on the same market.") A similar
argument was submitted in the Philip Morris case by the applicant British American
Tobacco, according to which the conclusion of the new agreements was an abuse of
dominant positions held jointly by Rembrandt and Philip Morris in the Benelux mar-
ket. Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4526-27. As mentioned in the text, however, this
case is of virtually no relevance in the context of the privatization of public utilities,
which in general enjoy exclusive production and distribution rights.
144. See supra notes 28-85 and accompanying text (examining control of concen-
trations in context of application of Merger Regulation to privatizations). If, on the
1996] PRVATIZATION AND EC COMPETITION LAW
tion, Article 86 will be inapplicable to the privatization of a dom-
inant firm by means of its transformation into a "public corpora-
tion" owned by a large number of private investors, because no
strengthening of a dominant position is likely to be involved in
this process.145
In the absence of a concomitant- liberalization of the rele-
vant market, however, the privatized "public corporation" will re-
tain its exclusive or special rights and, thus, its monopolistic or
dominant position. As a result, its future market behavior will
remain subject to Articles 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty. Moreover,
in order to avoid a replacement of the public monopoly with a
private monopoly, and to guarantee consumer welfare and eco-
nomic growth, privatization should go hand in hand with market
liberalization.
4. Liberalization of the Relevant Market as a First Step to
Removing the Pre-existing Shield to the Dominant
Position Held by a Publicly-Owned
Enterprise to be Privatized
In the event that, instead of creating a true "public corpora-
tion," a Member State intends to privatize a dominant enterprise
by conferring on specified acquirers control or a more limited
influence over it, and that acquisition of control or influence
would lead to a strengthening of the acquired company's domi-
nance, making the privatization subject to review under the
Merger Regulation (or, for concentrations not having a Commu-
nity dimension, the applicable national merger control rules) or
the EC Treaty competition rules, the Member State concerned
may find it desirable to resolve the possible anticompetitive con-
cerns raised by the privatization by eliminating the dominant po-
sition before starting the privatization process. This can be done
by liberalizing the relevant market and breaking-up the domi-
nant enterprise.
For instance, the marketing assets of CAMPSA, the adminis-
trator of the former Spanish state monopoly for the distribution
of certain petroleum products, which accounted for 90% of the
other hand, the public floatation is combined with a private placement to create a
"hard core" of investors acquiring control or a more limited influence over the enter-
prise to be privatized, the Merger Regulation or the Treaty competition rules, respec-
tively, will remain applicable. Id.
145. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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national retail market, were divided into three separate legal en-
titles to be run by the refineries REPSOL, CEPSA, and PE-
TROMED, which were CAMPSA's main shareholders and suppli-
ers. The Commission, acting pursuant to the Merger Regula-
tion, established that the proposed transaction would increase
competition, since three separate businesses would operate in
the market instead of a monopoly, and noted that the proposed
split-up would not substantially affect future access to the market
by other important European refiners because the transaction
did not relate either to primary distribution logistics or to in-
dependent petrol stations. Finally, in authorizing the concentra-
tion, the Commission favorably regarded the fact that the divi-
sion of CAMPSA's assets was effected in a way that gave all three
purchasers significant retailing premises throughout Spain and,
as a result, regionally balanced positions. 4 6
As emphasized by the Commission, market liberalization by
definition brings about an improvement in the competitive
structure of a market by creating potential competition. One of
the effects of the opening up of a regulated market to competi-
tion, however, may be to free a privatized monopoly from some
of the constraints of Article 90, such as the ban on financing a
predatory pricing policy through cross-subsidization between
formerly reserved and other activities. On the other hand, mar-
ket liberalization does not mean the end of regulation, since the
privatized entity will normally be subject to regulatory agencies
that will limit its opportunities to exercise unfettered market
power on the market.
Moreover, according to the policy statements of the Com-
mission, 4 7 the liberalization bf a market in which, on the basis
of public interest grounds of a non-economic nature, exclusive
or special rights existed in favor of a public utility is consistent
with both the maintenance in force of rules directed at safe-
guarding major public policy objectives in that sector14 and with
146. CAMPSA, 0J. C 334/23, 11 27-31 (1991) (Campsa).
147. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY 1993, at 32, 39 (1994).
148. Id. "Thus, in transport, competition must not be to the detriment of passen-
ger safety, and rules must be laid down to cover this. Similarly, in telecommunications
and the postal sector, a universal service must be provided, without neglecting the so-
cial aspects of telecommunications, such as the help they provide for the elderly or the
handicapped. In the energy sector, security of supply must be maintained, as must the
universal service in the case of electricity." Id.
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the continued reservation to the privatized enterprise, on a tem-
porary basis, of certain activities, in order to guarantee it the eco-
nomic resources necessary for the performance of its public-in-
terest tasks and to avoid "cream skimming" by private competi-
tors. 
149
5. Does the Privatization of a Dominant Firm Without
Concomitant Market Liberalization Infringe Articles
90 and 86 of the EC Treaty Within the
Meaning of the CorbeauJudgment?
According to the traditional approach of the Court of Jus-
tice,150 the mere creation a dominant position by granting exclu-
sive rights within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the EC Treaty
is not in itself incompatible with Article 86, unless the grant of
such a right: (1) inevitably leads to or induces an abuse by the
privileged undertaking; 151 or (2) is liable to create a situation
where the privileged undertaking is encouraged to infringe Arti-
cle 86,152 either through active conduct,1 53 or the passive exer-
149. Id. "If this were not the case, there would be a risk that firms acting on the
basis of strictly commercial criteria would carry out only the most profitable activities at
the expense of the public-interest task which the Member States wished to see per-
formed." Id. See also Corbeau, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 621.
150. E.g., Sacchi, [1974] E.C.R. 409, 14; Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-5009, 19 16-17 (stating that Member State infringes Articles 86 and
90(1) when undertaking in question is induced, by mere exercise of its exclusive rights,
to abuse its dominant position, or when those rights are capable of creating situation in
which undertaking is led to commit such abuses). See also Corsica Ferries Italia, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-1783, 42.
151. See, e.g., Hoffner, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, 9 26-27; Merci Convenzionali Porto di
Genova, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5009, 1 19. This approach was followed most recently by the
Court of Justice in Centre d'Insimination de la Crespelle. Centre d'Ins~mination de la
Crespell v. Cooperative de la Mayenne, Case C-323/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5077, 11 18-22.
The Court dismissed the argument that approved centers enjoying a statutory monop-
oly, which were legally empowered to require breeders requesting bovine semen from
other production centers to pay the attending additional cost, could not avoid abusing
their dominant position in exercising their exclusive rights by charging disproportion-
ate costs simply because they were by the law given the task of calculating those costs.
152. E.g., Elliniki Radiophonia-Tileorassi v. Pliroforisis and Kouvelas, Case C-260/
89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925, 137 (finding that grant by Greek state to national television
monopoly of further exclusive right to retransmit television broadcasts from other
Member States created risk that monopolist undertaking would adopt discriminatory
broadcasting policy favoring its own programs in violation of Article 86 of Treaty). See
also Corsica Ferries, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1783, 99 43-45 (ruling that Articles 90(1) and 86
prohibit national authority from inducing undertaking holding monopoly for provi-
sion of compulsory piloting services, by approving tariffs adopted by it, to apply discrim-
inatory tariffs to maritime transport undertakings depending on whether they operate
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cise of its special or exclusive rights, 154 without any objective jus-
tification.
In addition, it has been suggested that, following the recent
Corbeau ruling,155 a Member State should be regarded as infring-
ing Articles 90(1) and 86 of the EC Treaty by its inactivity in
situations where, irrespective of the existence of any abusive con-
duct by the legal monopoly other than the foreclosure of compe-
tition inherent in the existence of a dominant position, the de-
velopment of effective competition is restricted as a result of
changes that have occurred in market conditions over time.
In other words, under certain circumstances, a Member
State's failure to redefine and circumscribe, in light of the
changing nature of market demands over time, the scope of a
broad exclusive right lawfully granted to a privileged undertak-
ing at some time in the past may constitute an infringement of
Article 90(1).156 According to the Corbeaujudgment, the redefi-
nition of the exclusive right must satisfy the two-prong test of
Article 90(2), which focuses on: (1) the existence of a public
service justification, of either an economic or a non-economic
character, for maintaining a monopoly of such a scope; 15 7 and
transport services between Member States or between ports situated within national
territory).
153. For example, through the implementation of a discriminatory policy, by
charging unfair prices or conditions on final users or by illegally extending an existing
monopoly into new related markets.
154. For example, through inefficiency, lack of innovation, poor product quality
or inability to satisfy consumer demand for value-added services. Article 86(b) specifi-
cally mentions limiting productions, markets or technical development as a possible
form of abuse of dominant position. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86(b), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 627.
155. Corbeau, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 621. The case concerned the issue of whether the
Belgian postal law of 1956, which reserved all postal services involving the collection,
transportation, and distribution of correspondence, including courier services, to the
Belgian postal authorities, was compatible with Articles 90 and 86 of the Treaty. Id.
156. Leigh Hancher, Case Note on Corbeau, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 105, 114
(1994); David Edward & Mark Hoskins, Article 90: Deregulation and EC Law: Reflections
Arising from the XVIFDE Conference, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 157, 168 (1995). Inaction
may also be considered an infringement of Article 90(1) where a Member State fails to
exercise its supervisory powers in relation to an undertaking enjoying exclusive rights
which abuses of its dominant position in using, on its own initiative, its margin of discre-
tion. DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DAsHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 553 (3d ed.
1993). See also CLAuS-DIETER EHLERMANN, Managing Monopolies: The Role of the State in
Controlling Market Dominance in the European Community, 14 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 61,
65 (1993).
157. In Corbeau, the Court of Justice noted that the Belgian postal authority is
charged with the provision of basic postal services in Belgium and pointed out that,
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(2) whether the elimination or restriction of competition inher-
ent in maintaining the monopoly is proportionate with the
proper performance of the tasks assigned to the monopolist.1 5
Against this background, it may be argued, for at least three
reasons, that the process of privatizing a public utility provides a
Member State with an opportunity to reconsider whether to con-
tinue to allow exclusive or special rights enjoyed by an enterprise
to be privatized and, thus, of discontinuing its "inaction" for the
purposes of Article 90(1) of the EC Treaty.
First, the privatization and liberalization experiences of
pursuant to Articles 90(1) and (2), exclusive rights could be granted to the Belgian
postal authority on public service grounds (i.e., for the provision of the basic postal
services), provided that such exclusive rights were necessary to ensure the performance
of the basic postal services in balanced economic conditions. Corbeau, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R 621, It 13-15. The Court defined "services of a general economic interest" as
services that are provided to the benefit of all users, on the entire territory of a state, at
uniform tariffs and similar quality, without regard to particular situations and the de-
gree or profitability of each individual activity. Id. According to the case law of the
Court ofJustice, the provision of a telecommunications network for the use of the gen-
eral public, the provision of employment placement services, the operation of regional
public electricity supply and the operation of air routes that are not commercially viable
but which are necessary for general interest reasons are also services of general eco-
nomic interest. See RT'I v. GB-INNO, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941; Htfner, [1991] E.C.R. I-
1979; Gemeente Almelo v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, Case C-393/92, [1994] 2 C.E.C.
(CCH) 281 (Eur. Ct. J. Apr. 27, 1994); Ahmed Saeed flugreisen, [1989] E.C.R. 803.
158. Corbeau, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 621, 16-19. The Court affirmed that, when
examining the extent to which a restriction on, or even the exclusion of, competition is
necessary to allow an undertaking entrusted with a service of general economic interest
to perform its task under economically acceptable conditions, the starting point must
be that the undertaking in question is obliged to perform its service in conditions of
economic equilibrium and thus to offset less profitable sectors against the profitable
ones. Id. Therefore, a restriction of competition from individual undertakings operat-
ing also in the profitable sectors, provided for by the applicable national legislation,
may be justified lest these competitors be free to concentrate on such sectors and to
offer more advantageous tariffs than the undertaking holder of the exclusive rights (so-
called "creaming off"). Id. However, the exclusion of competition is not justified with
respect to specific services, dissociable from the general interest service, which meet
special needs of economic operators and call for certain additional services not offered
by the traditional service, provided, however, that such specific services - by their na-
ture and the conditions in which they are provided, including the relevant geographical
area - do not compromise the economic equilibrium of the general economic interest
service provided by the undertaking granted exclusive or special rights. Id. The ques-
tion of whether the specific services at issue met these criteria was referred back to the
Belgian court. See Luc Gyselen, Anti-competitive State Measures Under the EC Treaty: To-
wards a Substantive Legality Standard, 19 EUR. L. REv. CC55, CC82-83, CC96-97 (1994);
Gardner, supra note 28, at 85 (suggesting that in recent jurisprudence of Court public
monopolies are presumed to be incompatible with Treaty unless monopolist can prove
that its exclusive right is permitted under specific circumstances, so that Article 90(1)
has been practically subsumed into Article 90(2) inquiry).
1056 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:999
some Member States may prompt other states to revise their
traditional view regarding the existence of statutory monopolies
in certain sectors, such as water, electricity, gas, and postal and
telecommunications services, as justified on grounds of legiti-
mate national objectives.
Second, the liberalization or deregulation of a public sector
at the same time as the privatization of the related public sector
monopoly has the advantage of removing any uncertainty as to
the regulatory regime in which the privatized entity will operate.
This works to the benefit of the public, of investors, and the state
vendor, the latter being in a position to assess more accurately
the revenues likely to be obtained through a total or partial dis-
posal of its interest in the former monopoly.
Finally, combining the privatization of a public utility with
market liberalization avoids the risks inherent in the creation of
a private monopoly, particularly where it is likely to be very large
and/or to operate in strategic economic sectors, 159 which may be
difficult to effectively regulate and supervise, even where regula-
tory activities are limited to the setting of quality standards and
tariffs to final users. Indeed, as the state withdraws from its role
as market participant, retaining only its role as market regulator,
its ability to pursue general objectives of efficient resource allo-
cation and consumer protection may be seriously endangered by
asymmetric access to relevant economic information, in particu-
lar, data concerning the structure and level of the cost of supply-
ing the relevant product, and the consequent dependence of the
state regulator on information provided by the privatized enter-
prise. 16
0
Accordingly, although Member States are not in all circum-
159. See Guislain, supra note 20, at 71, 121-22. It has been submitted that in such a
situation the opening up to competition of a regulated sector if not accompanied by a
re-organization or splitting-up of the monopoly or dominant firm or by other structural
measures directed at removing the pre-existing dominant position of the state-owned
enterprise granted exclusive or special rights, may be insufficient to establish conditions
of effective competition in the marketplace if the market strength of the large priva-
tized company or conglomerate operating in strategic economic sectors is such as to
remove any likelihood of potential competitors entering the market for some time. Id.
160. E.g., AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Nota informativa al
Ministro dell'Industria, del Commercio e dell'Artigianato e al Ministro al Bilancio e della
Programmazione economica in merito al riassetto strutturale del settore dell'energia elettrica [Ital-
ian Antitrust Authority, Memorandum for the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Crafts and the
Ministry of the Budget and Economic Planning on the structural reorganization of the electricity
sector], 30 BOLLETrINO DELL'AuToRITA GARANTE 59, 66 (Aug. 1, 1995).
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stances prevented by the EC Treaty from granting or maintain-
ing a legal monopoly,16 a Member State's failure to withdraw
the exclusive or special rights enjoyed by an enterprise to be
privatized ("privatization without liberalization"), or otherwise to
reorganize the privatized company in such a way as to ensure an
immediate increase in the degree of competition in the mar-
ket,1 62 may amount to a "measure contrary to" Article 86 of the
EC Treaty, within the meaning of Article 90(1), where: (1) the
exclusive rights enjoyed by the undertaking to be privatized are
not justified by a legitimate national objective, such as the need
to ensure universal service, or extend to a distinct market value-
added services that meet emergent consumer demand and are
not traditionally offered by the public monopolist; (2) the result-
ing restriction of competition exceeds that which is necessary to
attain the required level of public service, i.e., to ensure the mo-
nopolist's financial viability, because, for example, the reserved
general service activities are profitable and need not be subsi-
dized by revenues from other non-reserved sectors,16 or because
such revenues are only a minor part of the monopoly's overall
revenues and are thus not necessary to its financial equilib-
rium;1" or (3) the monopolist enterprise to be privatized ap-
pears, for example, on the basis of indicators such as the produc-
tivity of its employees, price increases relative to the industry re-
tail price index, the level of imported competing products or the
number of customer complaints for poor product quality, to
consider itself insulated from the need to maintain and improve
its efficiency and the optimum use of resources, is unable to
161. Edward & Hoskins, supra note 131, at 164. This approach would above all be
unacceptable in terms of an economic analysis since competition may be technically
impossible or economically undesirable for certain economic activities constituting nat-
ural monopolies, in light, for example, of the scale and expense involved or the nature
of supply. Id.. But see supra note. 18 and accompanying text (explaining Member States'
obligation to adjust progressively any state monopoly of commercial character pursuant
to Article 37 of Treaty).
162. For example, by splitting-up or by unbundling its production, distribution,
and transport functions, privatization and liberalization not immediately affecting the
pre-existing dominance.
163. See Dutch Express Delivery Services, O.J. L 10/47 (1990).
164. See Spanish International Express Courier Services, O.J. L 233/19 (1990). See
also Gyselen, supra note 158, at 97 n.1 (suggesting that loss-making services should also
be open to competition and carried out by company agreeing to accept smallest sub-
sidy, and noting difficulty inherent in determining exact scope of restriction of compe-
tition necessary to permit cross-subsidization).
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meet demand or has failed to respond to new market develop-
ments, such as high quality or rapid value-added services, due to
lack of innovation caused by the absence of competitive pres-
sure.
6. The Combined Impact of Privatization and Market
Liberalization on Competition: Does the
Privatization of a Dominant Firm "Create" a
Dominant Position on a Newly-
Created Market?
The combination of the privatization of state-owned enter-
prises enjoying exclusive or special rights with market liberaliza-
tion would seem to create the optimum conditions for the estab-
lishment of effective competition in previously regulated sectors.
Since liberalization, in effect, creates a market that did not previ-
ously exist due to the presence of a statutory monopoly, it could
be argued that liberalization coupled with simultaneous priva-
tization of the monopolist or dominant enterprise would "cre-
ate" a dominant position in that "new" market. In such a situa-
tion, if the privatization is carried out through a transfer of con-
trol of the dominant business there is a risk that the privatization
would be blocked under the Merger Regulation, at least in so far
as the dominant position created significantly impedes effective
competition in the common market or a substantial part of it.165
It may be argued in response, however, that, unlike the situ-
ation in which a truly new market develops as a result of techno-
logical innovation 166 or the state's withdrawal from the provision
of a service traditionally constituting an activity iure imperii,167
165. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 2(3), OJ. L 395/1, at 4 (1989). On the
other hand, the creation of a dominant position as such falls outside of the scope of
Article 86 of the Treaty, which only prohibits structural strengthening of a pre-existing
dominant position.
166. MSG Media Service, O.J. L 364/1, at 10-11, 55 (stating that "[a]lthough a
monopoly in a future market [for technical and administrative services for pay-TV in
Germany] that is onlyjust beginning to develop should not necessarily be regarded as a
dominant position within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, the
assumption that no market dominance exists presupposes in such a case that the future
market in question remains open to future competition and that the monopoly is con-
sequently only temporary," and finding that this condition was not met in the case of
the proposed transaction since the relevant market was foreseeably "being sealed off
already in the development phase by the establishment of the joint venture and [MSG
would] acquire a long-term monopoly").
167. Such as employment procurement, basic education, health care, or prison
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even before liberalization, a market, in the sense of price-making
forces directed at trading the relevant commodity or service, ex-
isted, albeit a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic one, for the
product supplied by the privatized enterprise, as did that enter-
prise's dominant position. Indeed, the dominant firm was not
free to exercise unfettered market power, because its commer-
cial conduct was subject to the restraints in Articles 86 and 90 of
the EC Treaty.1 68 Although the privatization of the dominant
firm by way of a concentration may well result, therefore, de-
pending on the market power of the acquirer and the effects of
the transaction at the horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate
levels, in a "strengthening" of the dominant position of the ac-
quired company, technically, it cannot "create" such a position,
other than in exceptional circumstances. 69
Moreover, as mentioned above, even if a dominant position
was created by a concentration resulting from the privatization
of a dominant enterprise operating in a newly-liberalized mar-
ket, this finding would not be sufficient, per se, to make the priva-
tization incompatible with the Common Market, at least where
there is strong evidence that any such dominant position would
only subsist for a limited period of time due to the likelihood of
new entrants into the new market. 70 Of course this would de-
management (which in most Member states is a state activity iure imperii but in the
United Kingdom has been farmed out to private undertakings on a trial basis).
168. A possible counter-argument is that, in the absence of competition in the
relevant market, Article 86 applied to the former monopoly mainly as a consumer pro-
tection provision (for example, to bar unfair trading conditions, or excessive pricing or
tie-in policies operating against the public interest), or in order to safeguard effective
competition in a distinct but neighboring market (for example, to prevent the monop-
olist firm from refusing to give to interested third parties access to its essential facility
without any objective justification).
169. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
170. See Eridania/ISI, OJ. C 204/12, 26-27 (1991) (finding that ability of new
entity to influence sugar price and market conditions in Italy would be strictly limited
by threat of imports at lower price from neighboring areas of European Union given
low transport costs); A~rospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, O.J. L 334/1 (1991) (finding
that the combined entity would face no realistic significant potential competition in the
Union and worldwide regional aircraft markets in the foreseeable future as entry would
require substantial fixed and sunk costs and six to seven years' lead time, market de-
mand was declining, newly industrialized countries were unlikely to enter international
markets and their products would not be sufficiently reliable, and finally thatJapanese
producers were not likely to participate in the commuter market because it lacks strate-
gic and technical interest); Commission Decision, OJ. L 114/34, 112-14 (1993)
(Mannesmann/Hoesch) (noting high incentives and opportunities for new entries in
German market for gasoline pipes, in particular as result of on-going European Union
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pend on the timespan necessary for potential new entrants to
build a new plant of minimum efficient scale and the life span
and amortization period of such a plant, the likelihood of recov-
ering the initial investment through alternative use, the rate of
technical change in the industry, and the ability of customers to
shift from one supplier to another.1 71
D. Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty to the Market
Behavior of Undertakings Enjoying Exclusive or Special
Rights After Privatization
1. Potential Recourse by Privatized Utilities to Unlawful
Commercial Practices Directed at Reinforcing Their
Market Power
Article 90 of the EC Treaty is neutral as to the ownership,
public or private, of business enterprises and makes only a func-
tional distinction in favor of undertakings that are required to
perform specific tasks on behalf of all consumers in the general
economic interest. Accordingly, following their privatization,
formerly state-owned undertakings holding exclusive or special
rights remain subject to the EC Treaty competition rules. 172
Even where privatization is accompanied by market liberaliza-
harmonization of technical standards and forthcoming entry into force of EU Directive
90/531 on public procurement in so-called excluded sectors); Commission Decision,
O.J. L 217/35, 30, 65-70 (1993) (KNP/Bfihrmann-Tetterode/VRG) (finding that
combined entity would control over two thirds of Belgian and Dutch markets for distri-
bution and servicing of printing presses and that such dominant position was unlikely
to be eroded quickly because, as availability and reliability of local maintenance service
is key issue in decision to purchase printing press, customers would have no effective
alternative; approval of transaction was ultimately made conditional on parties' agree-
ing to terminate by end of 1993 existing distribution and servicing agreements in
Belgium and Netherlands with one of two major manufacturers of printing presses in
European Union, and to transfer assets relating to terminated distribution and serv-
icing agreements, including staff, to purchaser capable of continuing business); see
NSD, slip op. 1 110-11 (finding that the combined entity would acquire a medium-to-
long-term dominant position on the market for satellite TV transponder services suita-
ble for Nordic viewers since the transaction would leave no sufficient capacity on the
actual competitors Astra and Eutelsat or on other satellites not controlled by NSD, the
additional capacity becoming available over time through digitalization was likely to be
absorbed by NSD, and the combined entity would also have the power to define compe-
tition among its parent companies in their position as TV broadcasters).
171. See 2 BuTrERWORTHS COMPETITION L. VII/222 (Sufrin & Lowe eds., 1992).
172. This is similar to the Merger Regulation, supra note 5, 0.J. L 395/1 (1989);
See notes 109-71 and accompanying text (examining special issues raised by privatiza-
tion of enterprises holding dominant positions prior to privatization).
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tion, these rules still play an important role in ensuring that the
pre-existing public monopoly is not merely replaced by a new
private monopoly, since privileged undertakings undoubtedly de
facto retain their market power for at least a certain period after
privatization, and are thus in a position to use their strength to
eliminate or restrict competition through restrictive practices,
abusive conduct or concentrations, 173 on the relevant market or
on other distinct but related markets, thereby depriving consum-
ers of the benefits of demonopolization.
1 74
2. Possible Issues for Review Under Article 85 of the
EC Treaty
The potential application of the prohibition in Article 85(1)
on concerted action in restraint of competition to a privatized
utility raises several specific issues. One such issue arises where a
planned privatization involves the separation of the privileged
enterprise, since, in such circumstances, it will frequently be nec-
essary to formalize, prior to privatization, the internal practices
of the enterprise concerned as agreements between the separate
businesses created from it.' 75 As with all activity taking place
within a single enterprise, a privatized company's practices are
not subject to Article 85 of the EC Treaty so long as they remain
internal. 176 As a result, those practices may have restrictive as-
173. As discussed above, privatized undertakings enjoying exclusive rights or
otherwise holding a dominant position may make recourse to acquisitions in order to
strengthen their market power and create a situation in which competition from actual
or potential rivals is not in fact possible. In the absence of structural or behavioral
undertakings from the parties, aimed at maintaining conditions of effective competi-
tion and modifying the original concentration plan, concentrations resulting in a
strengthening of a pre-existing dominant position are incompatible with the common
market and must be blocked. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. The Com-
mission, however, "does not intend to oppose such regroupings where their real pur-
pose is to allow firms to cope with the new competitive environment, which may some-
times be worldwide." COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 1993, at 32-33, 1 40 (1994).
174. Id.
175. When one privatized utility is split into a number of separate businesses, they
will deal at arm's-length with one another. Therefore, the pre-existing internal prac-
tices of the privatized utility must be formalized as new agreements.
176. See, E.g., B6guelin Import v. GL Import Export, Case 22/71, [1971] E.C.R.
949, 8; Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, Case 15/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, 1 41; Bodson v.
Pompes Fun~bres des R6gions Lib&6es, Case 30/87, [1988] E.C.R. 2479, 1 19; Viho
Europe v. Commission, Case T-102/92, [1995] 1 C.E.C. (CCH) 562. Article 85 does not
apply to concerted action among connected undertakings belonging to a single eco-
nomic unit, such as parent-subsidiary agreements, within which a subsidiary company,
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pects, which, if incorporated in an agreement between in-
dependent undertakings, will, prima facie, amount to violations
of Article 85 unless granted an exemption.' 77 The Commission,
however, can be expected to look favorably on agreements en-
tered into pursuant to the reorganization of a national industry
prior to its privatization.
For example, until March 31, 1990, Scotland's electricity re-
quirements were met by two publicly-owned corporations, North
of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board and South of Scotland Electric-
ity Board. These companies generated, transmitted and distrib-
uted electricity in their assigned geographical areas, covering the
northern and southern parts of Scotland, respectively. Prior to
their privatization, two new companies were created to assume
the non-nuclear activities of these Boards with respect to the
north and south of Scotland, Scottish Hydro-electric ("Hydro-
electric") and Scottish Power, respectively. The nuclear facili-
ties, which would remain in public ownership, were taken over
by Scottish Nuclear, formerly run by the South of Scotland Elec-
tricity Board. Under the terms of an exclusive sale agreement
between Scottish Nuclear and the two new entities, Scottish
Power and Hydro-electric would be obliged to purchase all the
electricity generated by Scottish Nuclear on a take-or-pay basis,
at an identical price and on the basis of quotas from which they
could not deviate. Scottish Nuclear could not supply electricity
to third parties without the consent of both Scottish Power and
Hydro-electric. The Commission determined that the agree-
ment met the conditions for an Article 85(3) individual exemp-
though having separate legal personality, enjoys no economic independence and no
real freedom to determine its course of action in the market, as the agreement or con-
certed action in question is concerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks as
between the undertakings involved. Id.
177. Commission Decision, O.J. L 45/34 25 (1987) (Austin Rover Group/
Unipart Group) (distribution agreement between vehicle manufacturer Austin Rover
and wholesaler Unipart, which followed separation of ownership of two parties and
provided that latter would continue to operate manufacturer's parts business). Under
the Commission's policy, the applicability of Article 85(1) of the Treaty to a restrictive
agreement between two businesses is not excluded merely because they were formerly
fellow subsidiaries in the same group of companies and the agreement is connected
with the privatization of one party, where the obligations imposed upon the parties (for
example, to co-ordinate their purchasing, quality standards and controls, stockholding,
ordering and invoicing, marketing and distribution) determine the competitive stance
of the now independent businesses and are not a necessary and inherent part or condi-
tion of any such transfer of ownership. Id.
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tion after the parties accepted the Commission's request that the
agreement be limited to fifteen years instead of thirty. The
Commission reasoned that the agreement formed an integral
part of the electricity privatization scheme in Scotland and was
necessary to allow transition from the previously monopolistic
structure to a market-based electricity industry. The take-or-pay
feature would allow the long-term planning necessary for relia-
ble production, ensuring security of supply and an independent
energy supply market. The agreement would also allow consid-
erable economies of scale, induce Scottish Nuclear to maximize
its output, and ensure the profitability of the nuclear power sta-
tions, including the offsetting of the high investment costs. In
the Commission's view, the reorganization of the electricity in-
dustry, of which the agreement formed a part, and the gradual
introduction of competition into the system would result in ben-
efits to consumers, while the restrictions contained in the agree-
ment did not limit competition any more than was necessary to
achieve its goal of furthering the transition to a market-based
structure. The quotas allocated to Scottish Power and Hydro-
Electric did not reflect the market shares of the companies, since
each would be free to determine its output individually, to allow
the two new entities gradually to compete in their relations with
customers. The Commission noted that, although the price set
in the agreement was independent of the price at which Scottish
Power and Hydro-Electric purchased electricity from other gen-
erators, particularly independent generators, that price should
not be improperly used to justify a very low purchase price that
would disadvantage independent generators and Scottish Nu-
clear's competitors. Given that the relevant market was defined
as the market for the generation of electricity and that the agree-
ment was confined to a part of that market, i.e., nuclear-powered
generation, the Commission found that the market would re-
main sufficiently open and that there were real alternative
sources of supply. Moreover, the agreement would gradually in-
crease competition in the electricity industry. The Commission
decided, therefore, to exempt the agreement until its expiration
date of March 31, 2005.178
178. See also Commission Notice, OJ. C 223/7 (1994) (Scottish Electricity Indus-
try) (notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 informing any interested third
parties of the Commission's intention to grant an individual exemption to coal supply
arrangements for electricity generation in Scotland entered into by Scottish Power,
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3. Possible Issues for Review Under Article 86 of the
EC Treaty
If a privatized utility manages and itself uses an essential fa-
cility,179 and access to that facility is liberalized, other undertak-
ings already operating on the market or planning to enter it,
including value-added service providers, must be able to benefit
from the essential facility on non-discriminatory terms. Using
the strength of an essential facility in one market to protect or
strengthen its position in another related market, by denying
third-party access or granting it on less favorable terms than
those it allows to itself, amounts to a violation of Article 86 of the
EC Treaty. 80
Since the privatized enterprise owning the essential infra-
structure will have incurred and will continue to incur certain
costs in maintaining it and since it may also incur additional
costs in fulfilling its obligation to provide public interest services
not borne by its competitors, particularly if it retains exclusive or
special rights, as in the case, for example, of national telecom-
Scottish Hydro-Electric and British Coal in preparation for the privatization of the coal
industry in the United Kingdom); Commission Notice, O.J. C 191/4 (1990); Commis-
sion Notice, OJ. C 281/5 (1993); Commission Notice, OJ. C 15/9 (1994) (English and
Welsh Electricity Industry) (notices pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 inform-
ing any interested third parties of the Commission's intention to grant an individual
exemption to the notified agreements implementing arrangements for the privatization
of the electricity industry in England and Wales, namely (i) the coal supply contracts
between British Coal Corporation and the fossil-fuel generators National Power and
PowerGen, (ii) the option contracts or contracts for differences between the fossil-fuel
generators and 12 regional electricity companies, and (iii) the coal supply contracts
between National Power and 17 United Kingdom coal producers); Commission Notice,
O.J. C 92/5 (1992) (Northern Ireland Electricity Industry) (notice pursuant to Article
19(3) of Regulation 17/62 informing any interested third parties of the Commission's
view that there was no need for Commission action under Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty in respect of the notified connection, power station and generating unit agree-
ments forming part of plans to privatize the electricity industry in Northern Ireland).
179. An example of an essential facility is one without which, due to the absence of
adequate alternatives, its competitors are unable to offer their services to customers.
180. See Commission Decision No. 94/19/EC, O.J. L 15/8, 66 (1993) (Sea Con-
tainers v. Stena Sealink). The Commission has also found that the Danish Transport
Ministry caused DSB, a public undertaking that managed the port of Rodby andjointly
operated a ferry service from that port between Denmark and Germany, to abuse its
dominant position by refusing access to the port, without any objective justification, to a
Swedish group that planned to set up a competing ferry operation on the same route.
Commission Press Release IP(95) 492, Irish Ferries Access to the Port of Roscoff in
Brittany: Commission Decides Interim Measures Against the Morlaix Chamber of Com-
merce (Eur. Comm'n May 16, 1995).
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munications operators in respect of voice telephony, third-party
access to the essential facility will often be made conditional
upon the payment of a fee to its owner. This, of course, raises
the issue of how fairly to determine that fee.1 8 '
Finally, a privatized utility with exclusive or special rights
may make use of its market power in the sector once, or still,
reserved it to subsidize its activities in non-reserved markets, in
which it faces fiercer competition, by allocating all or part of the
costs of its non-reserved activities to its activity in the market in
which it is dominant. Such cross-subsidization may amount to
an abuse of dominant position contrary to Article 86 of the EC
Treaty to the extent that it is instrumental in financing predatory
pricing by the privatized utility in competitive markets. On the
other hand, it is in principle unobjectionable for the monopolist
or dominant firm to use part of its profits from non-regulated
sectors, or other reserved activities, to comply with the universal
service requirement." 2
The main difficulty as regards the prevention of predatory
pricing via cross-subsidization between competitive and domi-
nated markets appears to be establishing the existence of such
cross-subsidization, not only because transparent accounting
techniques have rarely been employed in the sectors tradition-
ally reserved to state monopolies, but also because subsidies can
be provided covertly in a variety of ways, for example, by not
taking full account of the actual cost of access to the infrastruc-
ture, which is involved in providing a non-reserved value-added
service, when setting the price charged for the latter and cover-
ing any resulting shortfall by increasing prices for the reserved
service.'1 3
4. Possible Issues for Review Under Article 5 juncto Articles
3(g) and 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty
Finally, as noted above, one consequence of the withdrawal
by a Member State of the exclusive or special rights previously
181. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1993, at 32-33, 40 (1994).
182. Commission Guideline, O.J. C 233/2, 102 (1991) (clarifying the application
of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector). See also COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1993, at 32-33,
40 (1994).
183. Edward & Hoskins, supra note 156, at 180.
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granted to a privatized enterprise will be that the activities of the
enterprise concerned will fall outside of the scope of Article
90(1) of the EC Treaty. The establishment of effective competi-
tion and the integration of markets in once-regulated sectors,
however, could be jeopardized if Member States, after privatiza-
tion and liberalization of such industries, were free to displace
competition by creating regulatory regimes that might frustrate
or undermine the attainment of such objectives.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the EC Treaty, Member States "shall
abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attain-
ment of the objectives of this Treaty," including the establish-
ment of "a system ensuring that competition in the common
market is not distorted."'18 4 This objective is elaborated in sev-
eral Treaty provisions, including Articles 85 and 86. Accord-
ingly:
[W]hile it is true that [Articles 85 and] 86 [are] directed at
undertakings, nonetheless, it is also true that the EC Treaty
imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in
force any measure which could deprive th [ose] provision [s]
of [their] effectiveness .... Likewise, Member States may not
enact measures enabling private undertakings to escape from
the constraints imposed by Articles 85 to 94 of the EC
Treaty.185
As previously mentioned in this Article, according to the
case law of the Court of Justice, a Member State may infringe
Article 5 in combination with Articles 3(g) and 85 or 86 of the
EC Treaty where, after completion of the privatization and liber-
alization processes in a hitherto regulated industry: (1) it adopts
or maintains in force national legislation that requires a priva-
tized utility to enter into restrictive agreements, favors the adop-
tion of such agreements,18 6 to indulges in abusive exploitation of
market power;187 (2) it adopts or maintains in force national leg-
islation that reinforces the effects of anti-competitive agreements
entered into by a privatized utility by approving the agreement
184. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(f), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-89.
185. GB-INNO v. ATAB, [1977] E.C.R. 2115, 11 31, 33.
186. E.g., id.; Bureau National Interprofessionel du Cognac v. Clair, Case 123/83,
[1985] E.C.R. 391.
187. E.g., Hfner, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, 26-27; Merci Convenzionali Porto di Ge-
nova, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5009, 1 19; Centre d'Ins6mination, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5077, 18-
22.
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or incorporating it into national legislation;' 88 or (3) it deprives
its own legislation of its official character by delegating to a
privatized utility the responsibility for taking decisions affecting
the economic sphere.18 9
Even in industries that have been privatized and liberalized,
Member States retain their power to regulate entrepreneurial ac-
tivity to attain general economic or monetary policy objectives
through the adoption of measures of a general character, such
as the fixing of maximum prices to control inflation and the re-
duction of taxes or social charges to stimulate investment in de-
pressed regions or to support employment. Although this type
of public intervention in the national economy may restrict com-
petition, that effect is insufficient to constitute an infringement
of Articles 5, 3 (g), and 85 or 86 if the restrictive national legisla-
tion or policy involves no form of delegation of regulatory pow-
ers to private economic operators.' 90 For example, a Member
State may lawfully fix the price, or minimum retail price,19 of a
commodity or service following a decision-making process in-
volving ad hoc tariff boards made up of industry representatives
appointed by the public authorities, provided, first, that such
representatives are not bound by orders or instructions from the
undertakings they represent, including any privatized utility, and
are required to take account of the public interest in setting
prices, and, second, that the public authority retains the ultimate
power to fix the price or tariff itself, regardless of the price set by
the board, if it sees fit.
188. E.g., Bureau National Interprofessionel du Cognac v. Aubert, Case 136/86,
[1987] E.C.R. 4789, It 23-24; Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. Sociale Dienst
van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, Case 311/85, [1987] E.C.R.
3801, 11 13-23.
189. E.g., Van Eycke v. ASPA, Case 267/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4769, 19; Meng, slip
op.; Reiff, slip op.; Ohra, slip op.; Delta Schiffahrts, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2517.
190. See Gyselen, supra note 158, at 65-73 (advocating three-filter test according to
which, where state measure distorts competition within meaning of Article 85 of Treaty
without achieving genuine economic or monetary policy objective, it should be open to
national authorities to demonstrate that measure serves other legitimate objectives such
as, for example, protection of consumers or fairness of commercial transactions).
191. Cullet v. Leclerc Toulouse, Case 231/83, [1985] E.C.R. 305.
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II. PRIVATIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES
APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS
A. Liberalization and Privatization: Article 90, a Critical Overview
The European Union utilities liberalization program is an-
other important factor in creating pressure for privatization. In
its recent pronouncements on competition policy, the Commis-
sion has repeatedly emphasized that liberalization, through the
restriction of state-created monopolies and the opening up of
economic sectors so far characterized by high levels of state in-
tervention, is one of its main priorities.192 To this end, the Com-
mission is currently advocating liberalization in regulated sectors
including gas, electricity, telecommunications, transport, and
postal services. 193 As a result, certain authors have concluded
that, in the Commission's view, "the restrictions of competition,
which are inherent to legal monopolies, are, as a matter of prin-
ciple, irreconcilable with the concept of the Single Market." 194
The Commission has been supported in its drive for liberali-
zation by developments in the Court of Justice case law relating
to Article 90, the Article of the EC Treaty that seeks to strike a
balance between the existence of state-created monopolies, par-
ticularly those entrusted with the provision of public services and
the requirements of free competition. 95 In a difficult set of re-
cent cases concerning Article 90, the Court has limited the
power of Member States to establish and maintain special and
exclusive rights.
Despite the Commission's protestations that "the EC Treaty
192. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1990, at 125-26, 169 (1991); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
XXIsT REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1991, at 25-38, 15-41 (1992); and COMMIS-
SION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1993, at
30 36 (1994).
193. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper for a European
Union Energy Policy, COM(94)659 (Feb. 1995); Commission of the European Commu-
nities, Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure and
Cable TV Networks, COM(94)440 & COM(94)682 (Oct. 1994 &Jan. 1995); Commis-
sion of the European Communities, Draft Commission Notice on the Application of the
Competition Rules to the Postal Sector, COM(95)830 (July 1995).
194. Erik Hordijk, EC Law Versus Legal Monopolies: A Tense Relationship, 5 INT'L BUS.
L.J. 595 (1995).
195. See id.; Gardner, supra note 28; Maurits Dolmans, Are Monopolies Compatible
with theEC Treaty?, Address at the 16th Annual Conference on Recent Developments on
Competition Law (1993).
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does not concern itself with the question of whether ... enter-
prises enjoying such . .. exclusive rights are publicly or privately
owned," 196 it is clear that in almost all Member States the under-
takings principally affected, such as post offices, telecommunica-
tions operators, and energy utilities, are publicly owned. In-
deed, even the Commission concedes that "the entry of new
competitors onto the market . . . will probably result in some
privatization of these sectors."'97 In fact, the opening up of mar-
kets, which is also a result of EU deregulation initiatives, is creat-
ing a strong incentive for Member States to privatize previously
monopolistic service providers. Once such undertakings are ex-
posed to competition on a free market the arguments for contin-
ued state ownership are weakened. In such circumstances, priva-
tization is both a means of raising revenue and of freeing public
undertakings to compete fully in a deregulated market.
Although the number of resulting privatizations may be small,
their impact on the market is likely to be significant.
This new approach is a long way from that of the framers of
the EC Treaty who, in 1957, tried to strike a balance between the
free market and state planning through Treaty provisions such
as Article 222, which provides that the EC Treaty will not preju-
dice national rules governing the system of property ownership,
and Article 37, which calls on Member States to adjust only those
state monopolies of a commercial character, i.e., non-produc-
tion monopolies that discriminate between EU nationals. As
one commentator puts it, these provisions "indicate that the
framers of the Treaty of Rome wished to adopt a neutral position
in the debate between state planning and free competition and
that they preferred to leave to the Member States the liberty,
within certain limits, to choose the appropriate model of eco-
nomic organization."191 In the European Union's new ap-
proach, characterized by the liberalization process, private un-
dertakings have largely become the preferred business organiza-
tions of the EC legal order.
196. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1993, at 30 36 (1994).
197. Id. at 30 41.
198. Gardner, supra note 28, at 78.
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B. Article 90(1) of the EC Treaty
Article 90(1) obliges Member States not to enact or main-
tain measures contrary to the EC Treaty in relation to public un-
dertakings 99 and undertakings entrusted with special or exclu-
sive rights.2"' Article 90(1) is thus infringed only in conjunction
with other provisions of the EC Treaty."0 '
Traditionally, the Court of Justice interpreted Article 90 (1)
narrowly, taking the view that the enactment or maintenance of
an exclusive right could not, of itself, constitute a state measure
contrary to Article 90(1). 202 More recently, however, the Court
has developed a theory of structural abuse in relation to Article
90(1) that limits the power of Member States to establish and
maintain exclusive rights.
C. The Traditional Interpretation of Article 90(1) of the EC Treaty
The traditional interpretation of Article 90(1) was estab-
199. Commission Directive No. 80/723, art. 2, O.J. L 195/35, at 36 (1980), as
amended, defines public undertakings as:
any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly or
indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their finan-
cial participation therein, or the rules which govern it. A dominant influence
on the part of the public authorities shall be presumed when these authorities,
directly or indirectly in relation to any undertaking:
(a) hold the major part of the undertaking's subscribed capital; or
(b) control the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the under-
takings; or
(c) can appoint more than half of the members of the undertaking's adminis-
trative, managerial or supervisory body.
200. Commission Directive No. 90/388, art. 1, O.J. L 192/10, at 14 (1990). In
Directive 90/388, special or exclusive rights are defined as "the rights granted through
by a Member State or a public authority to one or more public or private bodies
through any legal, regulatory or administrative instrument reserving them the right to
provide a service or undertake an activity;" see also Telecom Services, 50, where Advo-
cate GeneralJacobs states that exclusive rights are those granted to a single undertaking
and special rights are those granted to a limited number of undertakings, but more
than one.
201. Aurelio Pappalardo, State Measures and Public Undertakings: Article 90 of the EEC
Treaty Revisited, EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 29, 36 (1991). The Treaty provisions most
commonly infringed in conjunction with Article 90(1) are Article 6 (non-discrimination
on grounds of nationality), Articles 30 to 36 (free movement of goods), Article 48 (free
movement of workers), Article 59 (free movement of services), Articles 52 and 53 (right
of establishment), Article 85 (restrictive practices) and Article 86 (abuse of dominant
position).
202. See Simon Taylor, Article 90 and Telecommunications Monopolies, EUR. COMPETI-
TION L. REv. 322, 322 (1994).
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lished by the Court ofJustice in the Sacchi case.203 Under Italian
law, Radio Audizioni Italiane enjoyed a monopoly over televised
advertising. As part of that monopoly, other undertakings were
prohibited from receiving audio-visual signals for the purpose of'
retransmission.
Mr. Sacchi, who had been fined for running an unauthor-
ized cable television relay business, claimed that the Italian mo-
nopoly of television services contravened the rules of the EC
Treaty on the ground that it infringed Article 90(1) in conjunc-
tion with Article 86. The Italian court referred the case to the
Court of Justice under Article 177 for a preliminary ruling.
In his opinion to the Court, Advocate General Gerhard
Reischl argued that the EC Treaty did not prohibit dominant
positions per se and that "the dissolution of every kind of monop-
olistic structure cannot . . . be required by reliance on Article
86."2o4 He therefore concluded that the mere grant or exten-
sion of an exclusive right could not be contrary to Article 86 in
the absence of "abuse" on the part of the undertaking benefiting
from such rights. In the Advocate General's view, Article 86
could be infringed by an undertaking granted exclusive rights
only where that undertaking made use of the dominant position
that its exclusive rights conferred on it.
The Court of Justice followed the reasoning of the Advocate
General. It held that "the interpretation of Articles 86 and 90
taken together leads to the conclusion that the fact that an un-
dertaking to which a Member State grants exclusive rights has a
monopoly is not as such incompatible with Article 86" and that
"[i]t is therefore the same as regards an extension of exclusive
rights following a new intervention by this State."2 0 5
Since only the abusive exercise and not the mere grant of
an exclusive right could constitute an infringement of EC law,
Article 90 could not be used in connection with Article 86 to
dismantle legal monopolies. Either there was no abusive con-
duct on the part of the undertaking entrusted with the exclusive
right, in which case Article 90 could not apply to the state mea-
sure that had established that right, or, the undertaking en-
trusted with the exclusive right engaged in abusive conduct, in
203. Sacchi, [1974] E.C.R. 409.
204. Id. at 441.
205. Id. at 441, 14.
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which case Article 86 alone seemed applicable, since the in-
fringement was not caused by the establishment of the right, but
by the abusive behavior of the undertaking to which it had been
granted.
This interpretation was systematically applied until the mid-
1980's, when the Court of Justice and the Commission began to
use Articles 90(1) and 86 to challenge the extension and, argua-
bly, the very existence of monopoly rights.
D. The New Theory of Structural Abuse
In several recent cases, the Court of Justice adopted a much
broader interpretation of Article 90 (1), holding that, in conjunc-
tion with Article 86, it can apply to the existence of exclusive
rights, conferring a dominant position on an undertaking in cir-
cumstances that inevitably lead to its abuse. °6
In Hifner,20 7 a case referred by a German court, the Court of
Justice was asked to give a preliminary ruling on issues relating
to the exclusive right of the German national employment
agency, Bundesanstalt ffir Arbeit, to provide recruitment and
placement services and, in particular, on the rules prohibiting
private companies from providing executive recruitment serv-
ices.
A German company had engaged a private recruitment
agency to assist in its search for an executive officer, but had
ultimately decided not to retain the candidate suggested by the
agency and had refused to pay its fees. Before the national
court, the German company claimed that its contract with the
recruitment agency should be annulled as it infringed the
Bundesanstalt's monopoly of placement services. In response,
the recruitment agency argued that the Bundesanstalt's monop-
oly violated Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 86 and, as a
result, was unenforceable.
Referring to the Sacchi case, the Court of Justice recalled
that an undertaking entrusted with exclusive rights may be re-
garded as occupying a dominant position within the meaning of
Article 86, but that the creation of such a dominant position by
206. See P. Manzini, L Intemento Pubblico NeU'Economia Alla Luce Dell'Art. 90 Del Trat-
tato CE, RIVISTA DI DRrTro INTERNAZIONALE 379 (1995).
207. See Hdfner, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979; see PietJan Slot, Case Note, 28 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 964 (1991).
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granting exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90(1) was
not, as such, incompatible with Article 86.
The Court added that a Member State is in breach of the
prohibition contained in Articles 90(1) and 86 "if the undertak-
ing in question, merely by exercising the exclusive rights granted
to it, cannot avoid abusing its dominant position.""'8 The Court
indicated that this would be the case where an undertaking
granted exclusive rights by a Member State to provide executive
recruitment services is "manifestly not in a position to satisfy the
demand prevailing on the market for activities of that kind" and
"the effective pursuit of such activities by private companies is
rendered impossible by the maintenance in force of a statutory
provision under which such activities are prohibited and non-
observance of that prohibition renders the contracts concerned
void."
By identifying this new category of exclusive rights whose
exercise necessarily leads to an abuse of dominant position, the
Court ofJustice established a bridge between what had appeared
to be two mutually exclusive provisions and made Articles 90(1)
and 86 applicable to the very existence of inefficient legal mo-
nopolies.
In ERT °9 and Poito di Genova, ° the Court confirmed this
doctrine of structural abuse. In ERT, the Court held that Article
90(1) prohibits the establishment of a television broadcasting
monopoly if establishing such a monopoly is "liable" to create a
situation in which the undertaking enjoying the monopoly is led
to infringe Article 86.
Similarly, in Porto di Genova, the Court considered that Arti-
cle 90(1), taken together with Article 86, is infringed when an
undertaking "merely by exercising the exclusive right granted to
it cannot avoid abusing its dominant position or when such
rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is
induced to commit such abuses."2 1 1 In the Porto di Genova case
itself, the Court identified a number of Article 86 infringements
208. H6fner, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-1987, 28.
209. ERT, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925, 37; see D. Chalmers, Television
and the Court of Justice, 17 EUR. L. REV. 248 (1992).
210. Merci Convenzinali Porto di Genova, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889; see L. Gyslen, Case
Note, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1229 (1992).
211. See e.g., ERT, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-2946, 39 (providing example where Treaty is
violated because undertaking cannot avoid abusing its dominant power); H'fner, [ 1991 ]
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that the port companies were led to commit by reason of their
exclusive rights, including requiring payment for services that
had not been requested, charging unfair or discriminatory
prices and failure to use modern technology.
In the RTT case,212 the Court of Justice went even further,
taking the view that the extension of a legal monopoly through
state measures to a separate but neighboring market also consti-
tuted a violation of Article 90(1) in combination with Article 86.
The Court's reasoning was based on its established case law to
the effect that an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 is com-
mitted when a dominant position on one market is used to mo-
nopolize a separate but neighboring market. 21 3 Referring to
that case law, the Court held that Article 90(1) obliges Member
States not to put public undertakings and undertakings en-
trusted with special or exclusive rights "in a position which the
said undertakings could not themselves attain by their own con-
duct without infringing Article 86. 1214 This holding implies that
any state measure extending the dominant position of a public
or privileged undertaking constitutes an infringement of Article
90 in conjunction with Article 86.
In sum, it is now settled case law that state measures creating
or maintaining inefficient legal monopolies as well as those ex-
tending existing legal monopolies are, in principle, unlawful
pursuant to Article 90(1) when taken together with Article 86.
E. The Public Service Defense
Article 90(2) provides that undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest or having the
character of a revenue-producing monopoly are subject to the
rules of the EC Treaty, in particular the rules on competition,
insofar as the application of those rules does not obstruct, in law
or in fact, the performance of the particular tasks assigned to
them.
As well as creating a public service defense for the undertak-
ings to which it applies, Article 90(2) limits the application of
E.C.R. 1979 (providing example where Treaty is violated because undertaking is in-
duced to commit abuses).
212. RTT v. GB-INNO, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941; see Gyselen, supra note 158.
213. RTTv. GB-INNO, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941.
214. Id.
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Article 90(1) to state measures granting exclusive rights to such
undertakings. As the Court of Justice's interpretation of Article
90(1) has become increasingly hostile to state monopolies, this
aspect of Article 90(2) has become more important. The
Court's recent case law, however, makes it clear that Article
90(2) provides only limited protection to public monopolies.
Despite the fact that Article 90(2) is phrased expansively, apply-
ing the rules of the EC Treaty to undertakings performing pub-
lic service duties only where this does not obstruct, in law or in
fact, the performance of their tasks, the Court has applied it as a
narrow exception to Article 90(1).
In Corbeau,21 the Court of Justice was asked by a tribunal in
Liege to give a preliminary ruling on the compatibility with Arti-
cle 90 of a law imposing penal sanctions for infringement of the
Belgian postal monopoly. The issue arose as a result of the pros-
ecution of Mr. Corbeau for operating a private postal service in
and around Liege.
Mr. Corbeau would collect mail from the homes of his cus-
tomers in the evening and deliver it within the Liege area before
noon the next day. He would put mail to be delivered outside
the Liege area into the ordinary post.
In responding to the tribunal's question, the Court began
its analysis by referring to Article 90(1), reiterating that the grant
of an exclusive right does not of itself violate Article 86 and ad-
ding, citing ERT, that Member States are nonetheless obliged
not to enact or maintain in force measures threatening the "effet
utile" of that article. The Court gave no analysis, however, of the
way in which the Belgian postal monopoly might violate Article
90(1) in conjunction with Article 86 or any other rule of the EC
Treaty.
Instead, the Court moved directly to an examination of
whether the Belgian postal monopoly could be justified under
Article 90(2), which, according to the Court, permits Member
States to:
[C]onfer on undertakings' to which they entrust the opera-
tion of services of general economic interest, exclusive rights
which may hinder the application of the rules of the EC
Treaty on competition insofar as restrictions on competition,
215. Corbeau, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 621. See Dolmans, supra note 166; Gardner, supra
note 28; Gyselen, supra note 158; Taylor, supra note 173.
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or even the exclusion of all competition, by other economic
operators are necessary to ensure the performance of the par-
ticular tasks assigned to the undertakings possessed of the ex-
clusive rights. 2
16
The Court accepted that the collection, transport, and dis-
tribution of mail is a service of general economic interest, since
it is a service benefiting all users in the territory of the state,
provided at "uniform tariffs and similar quality conditions, irre-
spective of the specific situations or the degree of economic
profitability of each individual operation. "217 Consequently, the
Court stated that it was necessary to examine whether restric-
tions on competition were necessary to allow the provision of
that service on acceptable economic conditions. The Court rec-
ognized that this presupposed the possibility of cross-subsidizing
less profitable aspects of the service with revenues from more
profitable activities. Private enterprises should not be able to
"cherry-pick" profitable parts of a service as they are under no
obligation to undertake its loss-making aspects.
The Court concluded, however, that this did not mean that
the exclusion of competition could be justified in relation to:
[S]pecific services dissociable from the service of general in-
terest which meet special needs of economic operators and
which call for certain additional services not offered by the
traditional postal service ... insofar as such specific services,
by their nature and the conditions in which they are offered,
such as the geographical area in which they are provided, do
not compromise the economic equilibrium of the service of
general economic interest performed by the holder of the ex-
clusive right.
2 18
The decision in Corbeau has two important aspects. First,
while the Court refers to the "effet utile" of Article 86, it makes
no express finding that either Article 86 or any other provision
of the EC Treaty was breached in conjunction with Article 90(1).
This has led some commentators to suggest that Article 90 must
now be understood to permit state monopolies only where they
can be justified under Article 90(2).219 Others suggest that the
216. Corbeau, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 643, 14.
217. Id. at 643, 15.
218. Id. at 643, 19.
219. See, e.g. Gyselen, supra note 158.
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case involves an implicit application of the structural abuse doc-
trine described above, i.e., a finding that the Belgian mail com-
pany had abused its dominant position by failing to develop new
"value added" postal services for which a demand existed.22
This latter reading of the case is preferred, since it conforms bet-
ter with previous case law and the wording of the EC Treaty.
Even if Corbeau does invoke an implicit finding of breach of
Article 90(1) in combination with Article 86, the fact that the
Court felt able to deal with the point so briefly underscores the
extent to which public monopolies are now regarded as incom-
patible with EC law. Indeed, whatever the correct legal interpre-
tation of Corbeau, in practice, the burden of proof may now be
on state monopolies to justify their own continued existence.
The second important aspect of the Corbeau decision is the
narrow interpretation given to Article 90(2), the scope of which
was restricted in two ways. First, the Court defined services in
the general economic interest narrowly, as services provided at a
uniform tariff and similar quality without regard to profitability
or particular circumstances. Second, the Court held that Article
90(2) limits the application of competition rules to a provider of
a service of special economic interest only to the extent neces-
sary to allow provision of the service on economically acceptable
conditions. In particular, an exclusive right to provide services
may not be extended to "dissociable" services, the provision of
which by private operators does not threaten the economic equi-
librium of the public monopoly.
This restrictive interpretation of Article 90(2) has now been
confirmed by the Court's decision in Almelo, 221 a case concern-
ing standard terms that breached Article 85 and, potentially, Ar-
ticle 86 in agreements between a Dutch regional electricity dis-
tributor and local distributors prohibiting the local distributors
from importing electricity. In examining whether the import re-
striction could be justified under Article 90(2), the Court first
determined that the supply of electricity was a service of general
interest since it was provided at a uniform tariff and on terms
that did not vary other than in accordance with objective criteria
applicable to all customers. The Court then went on to state
that the restriction on importing electricity was compatible with
220. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 28, at 82; Taylor, supra note 173, at 329.
221. Gemeente Almelo, Case C-393/92, [1994] 2 C.E.C. (CCH) 281.
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Article 90(2) insofar as it was necessary to allow that service to be
carried out.
In examining the extent to which restrictions of competi-
tion, and in particular exclusive rights, are likely to be found
necessary to ensure the provision of public services, it is interest-
ing to note recent developments in the legislation concerning
the liberalization of the telecommunications sector. Both the
Council and Commission have recognized that the universal ser-
vice obligation to provide a basic voice telephony service may
involve the provision of services at a loss.222 Traditionally, such
services have been provided by national monopoly telecommuni-
cations undertakings that cross-subsidized them with revenues
from other telecommunications services. Current proposals,
however, for interconnection in telecommunications and the im-
plementation of full competition in telecommunications mar-
kets envision that Member States should provide for the
fulfillment of the universal service obligation either through sup-
plementary infrastructure charges imposed on all telecommuni-
cations operators in the liberalized market, or through direct
contributions levied on such operators.223 The implication of
these proposals is that, at least in the eyes of the Commission,
there are sectors in which exclusive rights cannot be justified by
the need to provide public services. If that view were accepted
by the Court of Justice, the public service defense of Article
90(2) would, in practice, provide no protection to monopoly
rights granted in such sectors.
Article 90(2) must now, therefore, be understood as a nar-
row exception to the EC Treaty rules. Indeed, in light of the
position now apparently taken by the Commission, it may be
that, in practice, exclusive rights cannot be justified under Arti-
cle 90(2).
222. Council Resolution of 7 February 1994, O.J. C 48/01 (1994) (concerning
Universal Service Principles in the Telecommunications Sector); Green Paper on the
Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks,
supra note 164, § 5.
223. See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Intercon-
nection in Telecommunications, COM (95) 379, art. 5 (Eur. Comm'n July 1, 1995);
Commission Notice, O.J. C 263/07 (1995) (concerning full competition in telecommu-
nications markets).
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F. Article 90(3) of the EC Treaty: The Role of the Commission
Article 90(3) gives the Commission the task of ensuring the
application of Article 90, and grants it the power, where neces-
sary, to address appropriate directives or decisions to Member
States.
While the theory of structural abuse under Article 90(1) has
challenged the existence of state measures creating or extending
exclusive rights and the restrictive interpretation of Article 90(2)
has limited the public service defense, the Commission has be-
gun to use its powers under Article 90(3) to introduce legislation
to break up traditional state monopolies.224 The importance of
Article 90(3) is that it allows the Commission to act indepen-
dently of the Council and Parliament. Other Treaty articles
under which legislation of this sort might be adopted, such as
Article 100a, which allows the adoption of harmonization legisla-
tion, grant the power to finally adopt legislation to the Council
rather than the Commission, although the Commission initiates
the legislative process.
The Commission first used Article 90(3) to enact legislation
abolishing monopoly rights in 1988 when it adopted Commis-
sion Directive No. 88/301 on Terminal Equipment, 25 which
opened up the market for telecommunications terminal equip-
ment. This new exercise of power by the Commission was imme-
diately challenged.
In Terminal Equipment,22 6 France, supported by a number of
other Member States, argued that rather than adopting the Ter-
minal Equipment Directive under Article 90(3), the Commission
should have proceeded individually against Member States
whose telecommunications laws breached Article 90(1) under
Article 169 and that the Commission's power to issue directives
under Article 90(3) was restricted to situations in which it was
unclear what action Member States were required to take in or-
der to comply with the EC Treaty. France also argued that since
the directive had the effect of restructuring the market for termi-
224. Gardner, supra note 28, at 84; Pijnacker Hordijk, supra note 194, at 603-11.
225. Commission Directive No. 88/301, OJ. L 131/73 (1988).
226. [1991] E.C.R. 1-1223; see S. Wheeler, Competition in the Telecommunications Sec-
tor, EUR. L. REv. 67 (1992);J. Naftel, The Natural Death of a Natural Monopoly: Competition
in EC Telecommunications After the Telecommunications Terminals Judgment, 14 EUR. COMPE-
TITION L. REv. 105 (1993).
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nal equipment, the appropriate basis for such legislation was Ar-
ticle 100a.
Despite suggestions in the opinion of Advocate General
Giuseppe Tesauro that the use of Article 90(3) had indeed been
improper, the Court rejected the challenge to the Commission's
authority, finding that the purpose of Article 90(3) is different
from that of Article 169 in that it gives the Commission the
power to define the obligations imposed on Member States by
Article 90(1) without the need to find that Member States are in
breach of it. In addition, the Court held that the use of Article
90(3) was appropriate as its scope was more specific than Article
100a, since it expressly related to state measures as defined in
Article 90(1).227
The Court's endorsement of the Commission's jurisdiction
to attack public monopolies has allowed the Commission to con-
tinue to adopt legislation under Article 90(3) breaking up legal
monopolies,228 particularly in the telecommunications field
where technological progress has undermined the concept of
"natural monopoly." The Court's support also appears to have
"persuaded" Member States, through the Council, to enter ac-
tively into the liberalization process in order to retain some con-
trol over it. 2 2 9 As a result, current legislative proposals for liber-
alization in the fields of electricity and gas relate to Council di-
rectives to be adopted under the Article 100a process.23 °
Article 90(3) has, therefore, both allowed the Commission
to take action against state monopolies and, indirectly, led to the
expansion of the liberalization process to include the Council
and the Member States.
The developments in the law in relation to Article 90 all
227. However, in "Terminal Equipment" and "Telecom Services," the Court an-
nulled the Commission Directives at issues insofar as they purported to apply to the
grant of special (as opposed to exclusive) rights without defining such rights or explain-
ing how they might infringe the treaty.
228. See, e.g., Commission Directive No. 90/388, O.J. L 192/10 (1990) (concerning
Competition in the Markets for Telecommunication Services); Commission Directive
No. 94/46, OJ. L 268/15 (1994) (concerning Satellite Communications Services);
Commission Notice, OJ. C 263/07 (1995) (concerning full competition in telecommu-
nications markets).
229. Gardner, supra note 28, at 85.
230. See e.g., Commission Communication, OJ. C 65/4 (1992) (concerning pro-
posed Council Directive on internal market in electricity), amended by OJ. C 123/1
(1994); Commission Communication, O.J. C 63/14 (1992) (concerning proposed
Council Directive on internal market in gas), amended by OJ. C 123/1 (1994).
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move in a single direction, against state monopolies. The new
theory of structural abuse under Article 90(1) and the gradual
expansion of its scope, means that, in principle, state monopo-
lies may now in many cases be unlawful, while the narrow inter-
pretation given to the public service defense in Article 90(2) has
reduced the circumstances in which otherwise unlawful monop-
olies can be justified on public interest grounds. Meanwhile, the
volume of legislation actively dismantling legal monopolies has
increased as the Commission, with the support of the Court, has
made use of its powers under Article 90(3) and the Council has
been persuaded to take part in the process.
This process of limiting and even eliminating national mo-
nopolies through EC competition rules is bound to speed up the
pace of privatization, in particular of public utilities. Provided
that universal service in public utilities is safeguarded, the new
regulatory environment makes it easier for Member State gov-
ernments to justify to public opinion disengagement from previ-
ously monopolistic undertakings, thus freeing up state resources
without cutting spending and realizing revenues without raising
taxes. In addition, successful publicly owned undertakings are
likely to exert pressure to be freed from state interference to
compete in liberalized markets. Consequently, in sectors previ-
ously characterized by state intervention through state-owned
undertakings, private companies are likely to become, over time,
with the encouragement of EC law, the typical market partici-
pants.
III. PRIVATIZATION AND STATE AID RULES
A. General Principles: An Overview
Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty231 provides that any aid
granted by a Member State or through state resources, in any
form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competi-
tion by favoring certain undertakings or the production of cer-
tain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member
States, be deemed incompatible with the common market. Arti-
cle 92(1) together with the other Treaty rules relating to state
231. Similar provisions are contained in Articles 4(c), 54-56 of the ECSC Treaty;
not, however, in the EAEC Treaty. This Essay focuses on the provisions of the EC Treaty
and only refer to the ECSC Treaty in so far as privatization of undertakings covered by
the latter Treaty are affected.
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aid, do not prohibit all state aid, but only aid that may distort
competition and affect trade between Member States. Rules on
state aid were, at least originally, seen not so much as an instru-
ment for reducing subsidies in general, but as a mechanism for
ensuring that the establishment and development of the com-
mon market was not undermined by the granting of state aid to
national producers in a way that would give them an unfair com-
petitive advantage and delay necessary structural change.23 2
Thus, in contrast with the ECSC Treaty,2 3 the EC Treaty does
not impose an absolute ban on state aids. Indeed, Article 92(2)
creates various mandatory exceptions to the general prohibition
of aid for certain categories of state support, and the Commis-
sion may, at its discretion, authorize: aids in particularly de-
pressed regions;234 aids to promote important European projects
or to remedy a serious disturbance in a Member State;235 and,
sectorial and regional aids which do not adversely affect trading
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.236
Although these exceptions are to be construed in a restrictive
manner, 237 the Commission enjoys broad discretionary powers as
to their definition and application. 238
Although it has been suggested that the EC rules on state
aid have indirectly had a profound effect on privatization, 239
those rules do not, and pursuant to Article 222 cannot, specifi-
cally address privatization issues. Article 222 stipulates that the
EC Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States
governing the system of property ownership. The EC Treaty is
neutral as between public and private ownership. Member
States are, therefore, fully entitled to establish and maintain pub-
lic undertakings, to nationalize entire sectors of the economy,
and to acquire or increase shareholdings in companies.240 While
232. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY 1982 109-10, 158 (1983).
233. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Apr.
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
234. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92(3) (a), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630.
235. Id. art. 92(3)(b)), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630.
236. Id. art. 92(3)(c)), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630.
237. Philip Morris [1987] E.C.R. at 4577, 37.
238. Fritz-Harald Wenig, Artikel 92-94, in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, Kom-
mentar zum EWG-Vertrag 39 (4th ed. 1991).
239. Abate, Droit Communautaire, Privatisations, D'irglementations, in REVUE DU
MARCHI UNIQUE EUROPIEN 69-71 (1994).
240. HANCHER ET AL., EC STATE AIDS 12.2 (1993).
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the Commission has always been cautious in referring to this
principle of neutrality, 4 1 it has constantly stressed, following the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, that pursuant to Articles
3(f), 5, and 90(1) of the EC Treaty private and public undertak-
ings must be treated equally and that the EC rules on competi-
tion, and in particular those relating to state aid, apply equally to
public and private undertakings.242
B. Reasons for Privatization of Public Undertakings
While some public undertakings are involved in commercial
activity, most pursue non-economic goals, such as providing ba-
sic and universal services, maintaining an adequate level of em-
ployment, or furthering regional development. As a conse-
quence of their non-economic functions, and, occasionally, lax
management, public undertakings have frequently encountered
financial difficulties and have often been able to survive only as a
result either of being sheltered from competition or being
granted state aid. The adverse effect that such protective meas-
ures may have both on competition and trade between Member
states is obvious. The problem is aggravated by the fact that a
state's role as the protector of the public interest may become
confused with its economic role as the owner of public undertak-
ings. The potential magnitude of this problem becomes appar-
ent when the role played by the public sector in the economies
of most Member States is considered. In the Member States of
Southern Europe, in late 1991, public undertakings represented
an average of 20% of the national economy. In other Member
States the figure was approximately 12%.214
241. Commission Communication, OJ. C 307/3, 4 (1993) (to Member States on
Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty and of Article 5 of Commission
Directive 80/723 to Public Undertakings in the Manufacturing Sector); COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIsT COMPETITION REPORT 1991, at 126-27, 1 168
(1992).
242. See, e.g., France, Italy and UK & N.I. v. Commission,Joined Cases 188 to 190/
80, [1982] E.C.R. 2545.
243. This data is based on statistics provided by the European Center for Public
Undertakings. Les Enterisis d Participation Publique dans ' Union Europienne, ANNALES
Du CEEP (1994). The public sector accounted, at the end of 1991, for 19% in Italy,
18% in France, 23% in Portugal, and 20% in Greece. For the purpose of these statistics,
by the term "public undertakings" reference is made to those entities engaged in manu-
facturing and services, excluding agriculture, which are under the control of a State
either through its shares or its voting rights. Central and local governments, as well as
social security administrations, are not taken into account. Abate, supra note 239, at 15.
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Public undertakings have come under pressure as a result of
several interrelated developments. First, the gradual process of
European integration, and in particular the creation of the Sin-
gle Market as envisaged in the Single European Act in 1986,44
has led to the progressive dismantling of trade barriers. This
process has gradually exposed public undertakings to competi-
tion and has, as a result, increased their reliance on state aid. At
the same time, the significance of the distortion of competition
and intra-Community trade resulting from the grant of state aid
to public undertakings, much of it illegal, has become increas-
ingly apparent. After its first comprehensive survey of state
aid, 45 the Commission concluded that, with the completion of
the internal market in 1992, state aid would be one of the few
remaining mechanisms by which Member States could pursue
protectionist policies in intra-Community trade.246 A stricter en-
forcement of state aid rules was, therefore, seen as an important
means of protecting the benefits generated by the Single Mar-
ket.2 14 7 The White Paper on growth, competitiveness, and em-
ployment2 48 emphasized that part of the reason for the Euro-
pean Union's recent poor record of growth and job creation was
its resistance to structural adjustment caused, inter alia, by an ar-
tificially large public sector and unwarranted state aid to public
undertakings. The control of state aid was, therefore, regarded
as "part of the essential regulatory framework which will under-
pin and facilitate achievement of the objectives of the White Pa-
per." 2
49
As the importance of controlling state aid has grown, Com-
munity institutions have gradually developed, from the princi-
ples enshrined in the EC Treaty, a detailed and comprehensive
set of both substantive and procedural rules governing state aid.
This development, and in particular the policies and rules
adopted by the Commission and the Court of Justice in dealing
with state aid granted to public undertakings, merit in-depth
244. SEA, supra note 1, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
245. First Survey on State Aids in the European Community, Brussels-Luxembourg
(EN ISBN 92-825-9535-8, 1988).
246. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH COMPETITION RE-
PORT 1990, at 119 (1990).
247. Id. at 169.
248. Com (93) 700 Final.
249. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD COMPETITION REPORT
1993, at 1 27-30 (1993).
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analysis to assess their influence on the privatization process in
the Member States of the European Union.
In many cases, public undertakings are privatized because
they have become a financial burden that Member States can no
longer can afford, for either legal or budgetary reasons. The
privatization of public undertakings usually involves substantial
injections of capital to attract private buyers or investors. EC
rules on state aid do not expressly promote privatization,
although they have in a number of instances been used to that
end. That the granting of state aid in the context of a privatiza-
tion is subject to the same substantive rules and procedures as
any other form of state aid is confirmed by the Commission's
approach to the approval of both. the Greek and Portuguese
privatization programs, as well as the Commission's approach to
the privatization by the Treuhand of the companies formerly
owned by East Germany following German reunification.
C. State Aid Rules: The Court and the Commission Approaches
A comparison of the papers on state aid presented to the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute by Manfred Caspari in
1983,250 and Claus-Dieter Ehlerman in 1994,251 both at the time
responsible for the Commission's competition policy, clearly in-
dicates that state aid rules have undergone considerable devel-
opment, leading to stricter enforcement by the Commission,
supported by the Court of Justice.
Articles 92 to 94 of the EC Treaty set out only the basic prin-
ciples of state aid law. Thus, only the Article 92 (3) duty to notify
has been found to be directly applicable by the Court of Jus-
252tice. As a result, Articles 92 to 94 give the Commission broad
discretion to determine the legal status of state aid. Indeed, the
Commission was obliged to determine the forms of state assist-
ance'that qualify as aid within the meaning of Article 92(1)253 on
250. Manfred Caspari, State Aids in the EEC, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. I
(Barry Hawk ed., 1984).
1 251. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aids under European Community Law, 1993 FORD.
HAM CORP. L. iNST. 55 (Barry Hawk ed., 1994).
252. Lorenz v. Germany, Case 120/73, [1973) E.C.R. 1471, 8.
253. There have been many attempts to define the concept of State aid. See, e.g,
DESPINA SCHINA, STATE AIDS UNDER THE EEC TREATiy arts. 92-94 (1987). Rather than
establishing abstract definitions the Court as well as the Commission have so far relied
on descriptions of State Aid as working definitions, Wenig in Groeben, Thiesing, &
Ehlermann, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, art. 92, 4.
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a case by case basis before the state aid rules could have a sub-
stantial impact.2 54 This approach was necessitated by the fact
that state aid rules are a unique feature of Community law, so
there were no models to guide their development. A case by
case approach was necessary not only in relation to the rules gov-
erning the application of the discretionary exceptions in Article
92(3), but also as regards the procedural rules set out in Article
93. Gradually, a jurisprudence evolved around the core of Arti-
cles 92 to 94, through a dialogue between the Commission and
the Court ofJustice. During the 1960's the Court rendered only
five cases, only twenty-three during the 1970's. In the early
1980's, the Court started to produce judgments of major impor-
tance in this area. 55
The worldwide recession triggered by the oil crisis in the
early 1970's, and the resulting desire of Member States to give
financial support to their national economies, led to a greater
appreciation within the Commission of the harmful effects of
such support on intra-Community trade.256 This, in turn, led to
an increased focus on the economic impact of state aid law.
The 1970's also saw the introduction of policy guidelines,
the so-called frameworks, dealing with the problems raised by
state aid in various industrial sectors including textiles, synthetic
fibers, and, somewhat later, motor vehicles. 57 There was a gen-
eral perception at that time, that as "sensitive" economic sectors,
these industries should be protected and might therefore legiti-
mately be granted some degree of state aid, provided that the
aid could be controlled in a way that would avoid a surge in
counter-productive measures. In any event, in the view of some
scholars, these frameworks were "more a damage limitation exer-
cise than an expression of policy driving for a reduction of aid
and the attainment of the EC Treaty's system of undistorted
254. The wealth of Commission Directives, Notices and frameworks has been col-
lected in the second volume of: Competition Law - Compendium of the Commission of
1989. See also Della Cananea, Administration by Guidelines: The Policy Guidelines of the Com-
mission in the Field of State Aids, in HARDEN, STATE AID: COMMUNITY LAW AND POLICY [page
number] (1993).
255. See, e.g., Philip Morris v. Comm'n, Case C-730/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2671; France
v. Commission, Case C-301/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-307.
256. Abate, supra note 239, at 31.
257. See Frank Rawlinson, The Role of Policy Frameworks, Codes and Guidelines in the
Control of State Aid, in HARDEN, STATE AD: COMMUNITY LAw AND POLICY 52 (1993).
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competition. 25 8
The 1980's saw significant development in EC state aid
rules. In its Philip Morris decision,259 which was upheld by the
Court in 1980,260 the Commission developed the concept of
compensatory justification, i.e., that aid can be allowed only if it
furthers the objectives and interests set out in Article 92(3). The
national interest of a Member State and the benefit to the recipi-
ent of aid are not in themselves sufficient.261 The concept was
further elaborated in the Twelfth Competition Report,262 which
set out its requirements that the aid should promote develop-
ment that is in the interest of the European Union as a whole,
that the aid should be necessary for the achievement of that de-
velopment, and that the modalities of the aid, such as its inten-
sity, duration, and impact on competition, should be commensu-
rate with the importance of its purpose.263
In relation to aid for the restructuring of ailing companies,
which is often a first step towards privatization, the Commission
has introduced the additional concept of compensatory contri-
bution. 2 64 This requires that the company receiving aid imple-
ment a restructuring plan that will enable it to become viable
within a short period; aid that merely maintains the status quo is
not, therefore, acceptable. 265 Furthermore, the aid recipient
makes a contribution to the Community interest, which in the
case of companies operating in industries suffering from struc-
tural over capacity will comprise a reduction in production ca-
pacity.266
Parallel to the development of increasingly stringent criteria
258. Ehlermann, supra note 251, at 6.
259. Commission Decision No. 79/743/EEC, OJ. L 217/17 (1979).
260. Phillip Morris, [1980] E.C.R. 2671.
261. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1980 216 (1980).
262. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1982 (1983).
263. Id. at 110-11, 160.
264. Community Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in
difficulty, 94/C 368/05, O.J. C 368/12 (1994).
265. See, e.g., Alfa Romeo v. Commission, Case C-305/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1616.
266. See Commission Decision No. 89/58/EEC, O.J. L 28/1, at 92 (1989) [herein-
after Rover]. See also Commission Notice, O.J. C 6/92, at 4 (1995) [hereinafter CMF
Decision]. In CMF Decision, the Commission cleared the aid granted by the Italian
authorities in the form of financial contributions in favor of two construction compa-
nies. Id.
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for the exercise of the Commission's discretion under Article
92(3), procedural developments have made the control of state
aid more effective. Prior to 1980, the Commission had repeat-
edly noted 267 that the control of state aid was greatly hindered by
the fact that many state aids were not reported to it, in breach of
the requirements of Article 93(3). As a result, in 1980, the Com-
mission sent a letter to the Member States reminding them of
their obligation to notify planned aid before granting it.268 De-
spite this very public reminder, Member States continued to fail
to notify aid. This led the Commission to announce, in 1983,
that it would systematically order the recovery of state aid that
did not meet the exemption requirements. 2 69 At the same time,
the Commission warned undertakings receiving aid of the risk
that non-notified aid would have to be paid back. As well as con-
trolling new state aid more rigorously, the Commission began to
review existing aid schemes more systematically under the Arti-
cle 93(1) procedure.270
The procedural powers of the Commission were greatly en-
hanced by the Court's ruling in Boussac.2 71 Although the Court
rejected the Commission's argument that failure to comply with
the notification requirement of itself justified a finding that aid
was unlawful,272 it found that the Commission was entitled, after
giving the Member State an opportunity to submit its comments,
to require the suspension of payment of non-notified aid while it
267. Commission Communication, O.J. C 318/3 (1983) (to Member States and
potential recipients of State aid on application of Articles 92 and 93 to the refund of
illegal State aid); see, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 1980, at 162 (1980).
268. Commission Information, O.J. C 252/2 (1980) (to Member States on failure
of Member States to respect their obligations pursuant to Article 93(3) with respect to
the notification of State aids).
269. Commission Communication, supra note 267, O.J. C 318/3 (1983).
270. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 1989, at 127, 119 (1990).
271. France v. Commission, Case C-301/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-307.
272. In Fddiration nationale du commerce exterieur des produits alimentaires et syndicat
national des ndgociants et transformateurs de saumon v. France, Case C-354/90, [1991] E.C.R.
1-5505 (the "French Salmon" case), the Court of Justice stated, however, in a referral for
preliminary ruling from the French Conseil d'Etat, that Member States courts are enti-
tled to declare unnotified aid unlawful. Id. The notification and prior authorization of
an aid, before it is granted, are strict requirements for its validity. See Community
Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty, 94/C 368/
05, OJ. C 368/12 (1994) [hereinafter State Aid Guidelines]; Commission Communica-
tion, supra note 267, O.J. C 318/3 (1983).
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examined the aid's legality. Where a Member State failed to
comply with such an interim decision the Commission could re-
fer the matter directly to the Court, seeking interim measures
under either the second subparagraph of Article 93(2) or Article
169. The Commission has since made systematic use of this pro-
cedure and recently informed Member States that in appropri-
ate cases it may, after giving the Member State concerned the
opportunity to comment, order the recovery of aid paid out in
breach of procedural requirement.
273
D. State Aid to Public Undertakings
It is in the context of these general developments in state
aid law that the Commission's increasing scrutiny of the aid
granted to public undertakings must be understood. As early as
its first Competition Report in 1971,274 the Commission ex-
pressed its concern over state intervention to support ailing pub-
lic undertakings. The main obstacle faced by the Commission in
policing such state intervention was a lack of transparency.
Often the Commission had no way of discovering financial trans-
actions taking place between the state and public undertakings.
In order to ensure the effective application of state aid rules to
public enterprises, in 1980 the Commission issued Directive 80/
723 on the transparency of financial relations between Member
States and public undertakings under Article 90(3). ' 75 In es-
sence, the Directive requires Member States to ensure that infor-
mation concerning financial relations 'between public authori-
ties and public undertakings is available to the Commission. In
1985276 and again in 1993,277 the scope of the Directive was ex-
tended to sectors not originally covered, namely: water, energy,
273. Commission Communication, OJ. C 156/05 (1995) (to member States advis-
ing that the Commission may order recovery of illegal rescue aid to undertakings to
counteract infringements of Article 93).
274. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1971, at 192 (1972).
275. Commission Directive No. 80/723, O.J. L 195/35 (1980), amended by O.J. L
229/20 (1985) (Transparency of Financial Relations Directive) (concerning trans-
parency of financial relations between Member States and undertakings).
276. Commission Directive No. 85/413, amending Commission Directive No. 80/
723, OJ. L 229/20 (1985).
277. Commission Directive No. 93/84, amending Directive No. 80/723, O.J. L 254/
16 (1993). An earlier Commission Communication had been annulled by the Court,
because it was based on the wrong legal basis. Commission Communication, O.J. C
273/2 (1991); France v. Commission, Case C 325/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-3283. The pres-
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postal services, telecommunications, transport, credit institu-
tions, and manufacturing. The Directive defines both public un-
dertakings and state aid broadly. Thus, not only the setting-off
of operating losses but also the provision of capital and the fore-
going of a normal return on funds invested may be regarded as
state aid, and may, as a result, require prior investigation by the
Commission.278 This has enabled the Commission to extend the
application of the state aid rules to areas that were previously
exempt from them. The Directive's validity has been confirmed
by the Court,2 79 which, while acknowledging that the situations
of public and private undertakings are not necessarily compara-
ble, upheld the Directive, inter alia, on the basis that public un-
dertakings may compete directly with private ones and should,
therefore, be treated in the same way.
In a communication to the Member States, the Commission
summarized the so-called market economy investor principle by
which the Commission determines whether a Member State's
assistance of a public undertaking, for example, by way of capital
injection, involves state aid.28 To apply the principle, the Com-
mission examines whether a private investor seeking a reason-
able return and ignoring all social, regional, and sectorial policy
considerations would have been willing to make a similar invest-
ment. If not, the state assistance is deemed to be aid. This ap-
proach, which the Commission has applied consistently since it
was announced, has been upheld by the Court in a number of
cases. 281 Indeed, in Alfa Romeo, the Court developed the market
economy investor principle, making a distinction between short-
term private investors and private holding groups with a longer
term perspective.28 2 Public holding companies injected signifi-
cant amounts of capital into Alfa Romeo, despite the fact that
the company had been accumulating losses for twelve years and
had not been restructured. The Court found that while the
ent Directive was subsequently issued together with the Commission Communication
93/C307/03, O.J. C 307/3 (1993) (to Member States).
278. Commission Directive No. 80/723, art. 3, OJ. L 195/35, at 36 (1980).
279. France, Italy and UK v. Commission, Joined Cases 188 to 190/80, [1982]
E.C.R. 2545.
280. 7 EC BULL., no. 9, at 94 (1984).
281. Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, [1986] E.C.R. 2280; Belgium v. Com-
mission, Case C-142/82, [1990] E.C.R. 1-959 [hereinafter Tubemeuse].
282. Italy v. Commission, Case C-305/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1603 [hereinafter Alfa
Romeo].
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holding company of a private group might take investment deci-
sions at the group level and in a wider economic context that
would take into account the negative impact of short-term deci-
sions on the group's reputation, the Commission had nonethe-
less been correct in deciding that the capital injected into Alfa
Romeo qualified as state aid, since, even in the long term, no
acceptable rate of return on the capital could be expected.2 83
The Commission, with the support of the Court, has applied
the market investor principle and ordered Member States to re-
cover aid, even where this has resulted in the public undertaking
involved ceasing all economic activity.284 Boch28 is a typical case.
In Boch, the Court held that the Belgian Government was in
breach of EC law for failing to recover state aid granted to Boch.
The Court rejected the Government's submission that Boch's fi-
nancial position was such that it could not repay the aid, indicat-
ing that the objective of abolishing the aid could be achieved by
winding up the company, a process which the Belgian authori-
ties could institute in either its capacity as shareholder or as
creditor.
The Commission's application of Directive 80/723 on trans-
parency and the market economy investor principle, together
with the systematic recovery of illegal state aid, has forced public
undertakings to compete with private undertakings on equal
terms. Consequently, Member States have been effectively pre-
vented from pursuing non-economic goals through public un-
dertakings. This has meant that much of the incentive for Mem-
ber States to bear the economic burden of owning public under-
takings has been removed. It has been suggested that this has
led Member States, even if indirectly, to begin or to accelerate
the process of privatization.2 16 While, in Italy, budgetary con-
straints were also an important factor, the pressure exerted by
state aid rules is seen as one motive for the Italian privatization
programs of the 19901s.27 The Agreement reached between the
Commission and the Italian Government in 1993 on the indebt-
283. Commission Guidelines, O.J. C 368/19 (1994).
284. Tubemeuse, Case C-142/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-959.
285. Commission v. Belgium, Case 52/84, [1986] E.C.R. 100, 104.
286. Abate, supra note 239, at 35.
287. Id. For further reference to Gobbo-Cazzola, see Privatizzazioni e concorrenza, in
AcQuIsIZIONI FuSIONI CONCORRENZA 64 (1993).
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edness of Italian public enterprises clearly reflects this. 288 Under
the Agreement, the debts of Italian public enterprises are to be
frozen at the level reached at the end of 1993, and are to be
gradually reduced between 1994 and 1996. Thereafter, the Gov-
ernment is to sell at least part of its interest in those enterprises
wholly owned by it, so as to terminate the automatic state guar-
antee of their indebtedness.
As illustrated by the compensatory contribution concept de-
scribed above, the approval of aid, in particular in the context of
restructuring, can be conditional on significant commitments
from the aid recipient, such as closing excess capacity, reducing
market share, or abandoning certain business activities.289 The
principle of neutrality in Article 222 means that the Commission
cannot officially seek a commitment to privatize a public under-
taking as a precondition to approving state aid. Nonetheless, the
Commission's approval of aid is often preceded by lengthy and
intensive negotiations between the Member State granting the
aid and the Commission. It is perhaps not uncommon during
such negotiations for Commission officials to suggest that the
donor state formally propose the privatization of the recipient
public undertaking. This allows the Commission to avoid stating
publicly that its decision to approve the aid was conditional on
privatization. Although it is difficult to produce hard evidence
that this occurs, the Commission's decision to approve aid to the
French electronics group Bull 290 suggests that it does. In its deci-
sion, the Commission first referred to an independent consul-
tants report finding that privatization was the only way for the
Bull group to survive, the Commission then endorsed this view
and stated that it was shared by the French Government, which
then proposed to privatize the group.29
288. Commission Press Release Memo/94/67 of November 10, 1994 on Commu-
nity State Aid Policy. See also Commission Notice, O.J. C 349/02 (1993) (agreement of
aid from Italy to EFIM).
289. See Commission Guidelines, O.J. C 368/19, 1 3.2 et seq. (1994).
290. Commission Decision No. 94/1073/EC, O.J. L 386/1 (1994) (Bull).
291. Id. at 10 ("the Commission also recognizes the effect of Article 222 ... and,
therefore, the Commission appreciates that it cannot request or oblige the privatization
of Bull. However it is also apparent that the French Government itself wishes to priva-
tize the group and has made this fact known to the Commission.").
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E. Constraints on Privatization Imposed by State Aid Rules
In recent years, the Commission has repeatedly stressed 9 '
the importance of liberalizing key sectors of the economy, which
more often than not involves the privatization of those sectors.
Aid that facilitates privatization is not exempt from the basic
principle that state aid is incompatible with the common market,
pursuant to the principle of neutrality in Article 222. Privatiza-
tion aid can give the recipient an unfair competitive advantage
that may prevent competition from developing, thereby defeat-
ing the purpose of liberalization.
While Member States may chose to privatize public under-
takings for policy reasons, in most cases, public undertakings are
privatized because they have become a political or financial bur-
den that the Member State can no longer bear. Where this is
the case, the public undertaking involved will likely require some
form of financial assistance in order to attract buyers. Such
assistance, whether it is provided by the writing off of debts or by
the conversion of debt into capital, will in most cases constitute
state aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) and is, therefore,
subject to investigation by the Commission. Because it may be
difficult to determine whether the measures taken during a
privatization constitute state aid, the Commission has established
guidelines in a number of its decisions for determining when
notification under Article 93(3) is necessary. 293 Where a public
undertaking is sold on the stock market or is subject to an un-
conditional public offer involving non-discriminatory and trans-
parent procedures the Commission considers that no aid is in-
volved. If the sale is made via a restricted procedure, however,
and is preceded by a debt write-off or is subject to conditions
that would not be acceptable in a transaction between market
economy investors, the sale must be notified as it may contain
elements of state aid. The latter criterion is of particular interest
in that it clearly implies that Member States should consider the
winding up of an ailing public undertaking as an alternative to
privatization, where this would be a cheaper alternative. In as-
292. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1993, at 31, 37 (1994).293. Commission Notice, O.J. C 253/3, at 4 (1993) (Portugal decision) (advising
other Member States and interested parties concerning Law No 11/90 of 5 April 1990
on the program for the reprivatization of enterprises nationalized after 25 April 1974 in
Portugal).
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sessing the alternatives, the Commission disregards the costs a
Member State may ultimately incur through the payment of un-
employment or other social benefits.
Since the Rover294 decision of 1988, the Commission has
conditioned its consent to privatization aid on the establishment
of a detailed and realistic restructuring plan enabling the under-
taking to improve its long-term profitability, while at the same
time reducing its production capacity. While the Commission
will in most cases review privatization aid in accordance with the
restructuring guidelines, 95 it will generally accept business plans
drawn up by private investors without review, on the grounds
that, unlike a Member State, a private investor will neither be
tempted to bail out the privatized undertaking if the restructur-
ing fails, nor have the financial capacity to do so. The Commis-
sion will not, however, clear privatization schemes that grant the
private investor an unfair competitive advantage through over-
generous terms of sale, as was the case in Rover.296 On the same
basis, the Commission held that the unlimited guarantee
granted to the buyer of a joint-stock company from the state
holding group EFIM was unlawful aid in the context of the priva-
tization of public undertakings formerly owned by the state hold-
ing group EFIM.2 97 Although the Italian Government did not
write off the debts of all privatized companies, Article 2362 of
the Italian Civil Code 298 made the state holding company liable
for all debts incurred by companies to be privatized.299 In 1993,
a political agreement was reached between the Commission and
the Italian Government imposing a strict ceiling on the debts of
Italian State holding companies, thereby ensuring the effective
application of EC rules to future Italian privatizations.3 °°
The Commission also applied these criteria to the recent
294. Rover, OJ. L 28/1, at 92 (1989).
295. Commission Guidelines, OJ. C 368/19 (1994).
296. See Rover, O.J. L 28/1, at 100 (1989). The Commission decided that £331
million out of an envisaged aid of £800 million was incompatible with the Treaty and
could therefore not be granted. Id.
297. Commission Notice, O.J. C 349/02 (1993) (agreement of aid from Italy to
EFIM).
298. Art. 2362 C.c. (Italy).
299. Id. Article 2362 of the Italian Civil Code reads: "Sole Shareholder. For obliga-
tions of the company which arose during the period in which the shares are shown to
have belonged to one person only, such person is liable without limitation in the case of
insolvency of the company." Id.
300. Id.
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privatization programs of Greece 01 and Portugal. °2 Due to the
severe economic situation in Greece during the privatization of
the 208 undertakings owned by the Business Reconstruction Or-
ganization, the Commission approved certain state aids under
Article 92(3) (b) as part of the privatization process. In doing so,
the Commission may have adopted a generous approach to ap-
plying state aid rules, in the hope that privatization would mean
that no further aid would be granted to undertakings involved.
F. The Treuhand: The German Experience
As well as creating problems for the Government of the Fed-
eral Republic, German unification raised a number of difficult
issues concerning the extent to which the Commission could or
should approve aid linked to the privatization of the undertak-
ings formerly owned by the East German Government. At the
moment of German reunification on October 3, 1990, the geo-
graphical scope of the EC Treaty was extended to cover the for-
mer East Germany. Although interim measures in relation to
East Germany were granted in certain areas of Community
law,313 state aid rules were applied with immediate effect. This
point is worthy of note, since, in the accession treaties of most
new Member States, transitional periods for the application of
state aid rules were granted. In relation to East Germany, only
two legislative changes were made, in relation to shipbuilding
and the steel industry.
A few months prior to reunification, the acting Government
of East Germany set up the Treuhand, in cooperation with the
West German Federal Government, as a holding company for all
the undertakings previously controlled by the state, which were
converted into either joint-stock companies or limited liability
companies. After restructuring, the Treuhand held, at its peak,
almost 10,000 companies and was the world's largest holding
301. See Panayotis Bernitsas, State Aids and Public Undertakings, in Harden, STATE
AID: COMMUNITY LAW AND POLICY (1993).
302. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 253/3 (1993). On October 10, 1995, the Com-
mission decided not to raise objections on the privatization of the Companhia Nacional
Petroquimica ("CNP"), the publicly held Portuguese petrochemical company, to be
achieved through a direct sale from the Portuguese government to Borealis, a Danish
petrochemical company. CNP, created in 1972, has been a public sector company since
1982. Id.
303. Commission Regulation No. 2761/90, O.J. L 267/1 (1990); Council Regula-
tion No. 3569/90, O.J: L 353/7 (1990).
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company. The law establishing the Treuhand. °4 stated that its
aim was to restructure the economy of eastern Germany by priva-
tizing formerly state-owned undertakings and financing neces-
sary infrastructure investment with the proceeds of privatization.
It soon became clear, however, that the rapid transition from a
planned to a market economy, together with the loss of markets
in the former COMECON 30 5 states, meant that virtually none of
the companies then held by the Treuhand could survive without
substantial investment. Thus, a number of measures, often in-
cluding the financing of ongoing business operations, were nec-
essary to prevent the economic collapse of entire regions and to
prepare for a massive privatization program. The Commission
indicated that the write-offs of debt incurred under central plan-
ning and exemptions from liability for environmental damage
caused before July 1, 1990, would not be regarded as aid, since
such measures did not confer any competitive advantage on the
beneficiary.10 6 Furthermore, while credits and guarantees pro-
vided by the Treuhand to companies that remained under its
ownership generally involved aid, the Commission decided to
examine such cases flexibly, in view of the need to develop the
economy of the former East Germany. °7 Although the Commis-
sion insisted on being notified of all measures that might poten-
tially involve state aid, it announced that it would adopt a sensi-
tive and flexible approach in the application of state aid rules.30 8
In addition, the Commission unilaterally decided to speed up
the procedure for reviewing notifications, reducing the time re-
quired from two months to fifteen or ten working days.30 9
Interestingly, the Commission cleared state aid under Arti-
cle 92(2) (c) in only two cases.3"0 This mandatory exemption,
which permits aid that compensates for economic disadvantages
304. BeschluB zur Grfindung der Anstalt zur treuhdnderischen Verwaltung.des
Volksverm6gens (Act on the Establishment of the Institute entrusted with managing
the peoples assets) of March 1, 1990, Gbl. (DDR) I Nr. 14, p. 10 7.
305. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
306. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIsT REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1991, at 157, 249 (1992).
307. Id.
308. The Community and German Unification, Communication presented by the
Commission to the Council on August 22, 1990, in E.C. Bull. Suppl. 4/90, at 27.
309. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIID REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1992, at 212, 349 (1993).
310. Commission Regulation No. 2611/92, O.J. L 263/9 (1992) (Potsdamer Platz);
Commission Press Release, IP (94) 300 (1994).
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caused by the division of Germany, was not removed in the revi-
sion of the EC Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty, although the revi-
sion postdates reunification. In most cases, the Commission
based its clearance of aid on Article 92(3) (c). Although it has by
and large fulfilled its pledge to apply the state aid rules in a sen-
sitive and flexible way, aid to sensitive sectors such as the auto-
mobile and textile industries was only permitted where privatiza-
tion involved a reduction in the capacity of the undertaking con-
cerned.3 11
The Commission's approach to privatization in eastern Ger-
many may not, due to the particilar problems associated with
the transition from a planned to a market economy, accurately
reflect the Commission's approach to state aid granted in con-
nection with privatizations in other regions of the European
Union. It may indicate the Commission's approach, if other
countries in transition, like Hungary, Poland, or the Czech and
Slovak Republics, were to join the European Union before hav-
ing fully converted to a market economy. 312 At the same time,
the accession of such states is unlikely to raise as many state aid
issues as German unification since they do not have the same
financial resources as the Federal Republic of Germany.
While the rules on state aid impose constraints on privatiza-
tion, they are not intended to inhibit the privatization process,
but to ensure that privatization does not distort competition.
Moreover, the Commission perceives privatization as an impor-
tant means of achieving greater efficiency and competitiveness
and has used state aid rules effectively. Thus, while Article 222
declares the European Union to be neutral as regards public
ownership, the structure of the EC Treaty and, in particular, the
provisions concerning state aid mandate an economic environ-
ment conducive to private undertakings and a market economy.
Article 222 must be understood in the light of these provisions.
311. Peter Schfitterle, Die Rechtsgrundlage ffir Beihilfen zur fiberwindung der
wirtschaftlichen Folgen der Teilung Deutschlands, Europdische Zeitschrift ffir Wirt-
schaftsrecht 715 (1994).
312. See Michael Schfitte &Jan-Peter Hix, The Application of the EC State Aid Rules to
Privatizations: The East German Example, in 32 COMMON MKT., L. REv. 215 (1995). The
Europe Agreement, concluded between the European Union and Hungary, Poland,
and the Czech and Slovak Republics, provides for state aid rules analogous to Article 92
of the EC Treaty. Id.
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IV. FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT, INVESTMENT, AND
NON-DISCRIMJNATION
A. The Scope of the EC Rules and Their Impact on
Privatization Programs
Measures taken by a Member State in relation to the owner-
ship of public enterprises earmarked for privatization, such as
the creation of special governmental powers, may be of such a
nature as to imply the scope of Article 222 of the EC Treaty.
According to Article 222, the EC Treaty will in no way prejudice
the rules in Member States governing the system of property
ownership. 313
Nevertheless, to the extent that such measures are applica-
ble to EU nationals, they should comply with Articles 52, 58,
73(b), and 221 of the EC Treaty on the freedom of establish-
ment and investment and the free circulation of capital.3 14 The
313. See also, EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 223(1)(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711
("any Member States may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protec-
tion of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of
or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect
the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not
intended for specifically military purposes").
314. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 52, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14. Article 52 reads:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the free-
dom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of an-
other Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of
the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall also apply to restric-
tions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any
Member State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom of
establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-
employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular com-
panies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58,
under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country
where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter
relating to capital.
Id.; see Steinhauser v. City of Biarritz, Case 197/84, [1985] E.C.R. 1819 (the right of
establishment implies the equal treatment of nationals and citizens of other Member
States, and thus any discrimination based on national laws, regulations, or practices
should be forbidden); Micheletti v. Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria, Case C-
369/90, [1992] E.C.R. 4239 (the EU rules prevent a Member State from denying the
right of establishment to a national of another Member State, who was also a national of
a third non-EU country); EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 58, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616
("Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the
Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natu-
ral persons who are nationals of Member States."). "Companies or firms' means com-
panies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative socie-
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EC Treaty rules on non-discrimination and the freedom of estab-
lishment and investment in other EU Member States may exer-
cise a significant influence on the national privatization pro-
grams of the Member States.
The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
is set out in Article 6 of the EC Treaty, formerly Article 7 of the
EEC Treaty, and has been enforced consistently in a large and
well established body of case law.315  In the 1963 Refrigerators
case, 3 16 the Court established the principle that differing treat-
ment of non-comparable situations is not automatically discrimi-
natory. Instead, material discrimination consists either of treat-
ing similar situations differently or of treating differing situa-
tions identically.
As the principle of non-discrimination is of a general na-
ture, it affects the whole spirit and scope of the EC Treaty. As a
result, both in relation to privatizations and in other circum-
stances, the principle of freedom of establishment for European
Union nationals within the Union, in Article 52, extended by
Article 58 to legal entities, must be interpreted in light of the
non-discrimination principle. EU natural and legal persons
have the right to establish themselves in Member States other
than their own in order to engage in economic activity under
ties, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are
non-profit-making." EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 73(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 621. Arti-
cle 73(b) reads:
1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restric-
tions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Mem-
ber States and third countries shall be prohibited.
2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restric-
tions on payments between Member States and between Member States and
third countries shall be prohibited.
Id.; id. art. 221, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711. Article 221 reads:
Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty, Member States shall
accord nationals of the other Member states the same treatment as their own
nationals as regards participation in the capital of companies or firms within
the meaning of Article 58, without prejudice to the application of the other
provisions of this Treaty.
Id.
315. See, e.g., Italian Republic v. Commission, Case 13/63, [1963] E.C.R. 165, 177
(Refrigerators Case); Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, 13;
Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, Case 152/73, [1974] E.C.R. 153, 162; Knoors v. Secre-
tary of State for Economic Affairs, Case 115/78, [1979] E.C.R. 399, 407; Oebel, Case
155/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1993, 2005.
316. Italian Republic, [1963] E.C.R. at 177, [ 4.
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the same conditions as nationals of the Member State of estab-
lishment. In relation to privatizations, these rules imply that na-
tional provisions that limit the ability of EU investors to establish
themselves in another EU Member State by acquiring sole or
joint control of a company to be privatized in that Member State
violate Article 52 and/or Article 58, at least to the extent that
they discriminate between nationals and non-nationals.317
It follows that restrictions on foreign ownership, if applica-
ble to EU nationals, infringe Article 52 and/or Article 58 and
may only be justified under the public policy and public security
exceptions in Article 56 of the EC Treaty,318 which are restric-
tively interpreted. 19
317. The relationship between privatization and non-discrimination has not, to
date, generated a substantial amount of case law. In Commission v. France, Case 270/
83, [1986] E.C.R. 273, the Commission argued that the French Republic failed to grant
to branches and agencies of insurance companies from other Member State set up in
France the benefit of the shareholders' tax credit known as "avoir fiscal" from which
corresponding French undertakings benefit. This omission, and the discrimination re-
sulting from it, was alleged to be a breach of Article 52 of the Treaty. In upholding the
Commission's argument, the Court ofJustice stressed that Member States are obliged to
grant EU nationals equal opportunities to participate in foreign undertakings, and held
that establishment in a Member State may be achieved via the acquisition of a company.
318. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 56, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 615-16.
1. The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof
shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation
or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
2. Before the end of the transitional period, the Council shall, acting unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament, issue directives for the coordination of the afore-mentioned
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action. After the end
of the second stage, however, the Council shall, acting by a qualified majority
on a proposal from the Commission and in cooperation with the European
Parliament, issue directives for the coordination of such provisions as, in each
Member State, are a matter for regulation or administrative action.
Id.
319. G. AMORELLI, LE PRIVATIZZAZIONI NELLA PROSPETTIVA DEL TRATrATO ISTITU-
TWO DELLA COMUNITA ECONOMicA EUROPEA 257 (1992). In Commission v. Luxemberg, a
case concerning Luxembourg legislation requiring that EU nationals be resident in
Luxembourg before being entitled to Luxembourg maternity allowances, the Court
stated that the national legislation at issue failed to comply with the Treaty provisions
concerning the freedom of movement of workers and with Article 52, explaining that
all forms of discrimination, whether overt or implicit, are illegal and, therefore, prohib-
ited. Commission v. Luxembourg, Case 111/91, (Eur. Ct. J. Mar. 10, 1993) (not yet
reported). In Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which
concerned a request for a preliminary ruling relating to the equal treatment between
men and women as regards job opportunities, the Court held that the ability of Mem-
ber States to impose restrictions in the name of public safety must be interpreted nar-
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In addition, Article 221 on the freedom of investment
makes it unlawful for a Member State to restrict the ability of
natural or legal persons established in another Member State to
acquire minority interests in companies that it is privatizing.320
In attempting to maintain domestic control of privatized
undertakings, states generally adopt one of the following de-
vices: (1) fixing a ceiling on the proportion of corporate capital
that can be held by foreign investors, whether individuals or
companies controlled by foreign nationals; and/or (2) stipulat-
ing that the board of directors and management must include a
given proportion of nationals. These systems have been adopted
with a number of slight variations in the privatization programs
of several Member States. The conformity of such systems, how-
ever, and in particular those adopted by the United Kingdom
and France, with the EC Treaty rules on non-discrimination and
freedom of establishment has been questioned.
An in-depth survey of the legislation of all Member States
on this issue would clearly be beyond the scope of this Article. It
may, nonetheless, be worthwhile to describe some of the princi-
pal features of the national legislation whose consistency with
rowly, and that it would not be correct to conclude that the Treaty creates any reserva-
tion in favor of measures motivated by the protection of the essential interests of state
security. Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case
222/84, [1986], E.C.R. 1684. In particular, the Court held that:
the only articles in which the Treaty provides for derogations applicable in
situations which may involve public safety are Articles 36. 48, 56, 223 and 224
which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. Because of their lim-
ited character those articles do not lend themselves to a wide interpretation
and it is not possible to infer from them that there is inherent in the Treaty a
general proviso covering all measures taken for reasons of public safety.
Id. 26.
320. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 221, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711. Commentators
have taken the view that the right to make investments, in Article 221, is part of the
right of establishment, and thus implies the right to make investments abroad. Id. The
principle of freedom to make direct investments is confirmed by a Directive of June
1988. Council Directive 88/361, art. 1, O.J. L 178/5, at 6 (1988). This Directive imple-
mented Article 67 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 73(b) of the EC Treaty), which reads
in relevant part, "Member States shall abolish restrictions on movements of capital tak-
ing place between persons resident in Member States." EC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
73(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 621. See also R. Kovar, Nationalisations - Privatisations et
Droit Communautaire, inJ. SCHWARZE, DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE MEMBER STATES IN
THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THEIR LIMITS UNDER THE EEC TREATY 100 et seq
(1988); E. DEL CASALE, LE PRVATIZZAZIONI IN EUROPA 151-52 (1987); G. AMORELLI, supra
note 319, at 256.
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the EC rules on freedom of establishment and non-discrimina-
tion has come under scrutiny.
B. The United Kingdom Approach
The United Kingdom has introduced a form of indirect
control through the "golden share" system. This system is in-
tended to ensure that some degree of domestic and governmen-
tal control is maintained over the governing bodies, shareholder
base, and principal decisions of privatized companies. The U.K.
"golden share" rules are not statutory provisions, being instead
contained in the privatized companies' articles of association; a
golden share is, in effect, a special share held by the Govern-
ment or its nominee. Certain decisions, as specified in each
company's articles of association, can only be put into effect with
the golden shareholder's written consent.321
The powers allowing the Government to control the propor-
tion of foreign ownership of capital include veto rights, which
allow the Government to limit the proportion of the privatized
company's capital held by foreign investors, as well as to prevent
transfer of the company's business or its liquidation.2 It may
be worth mentioning that, at the time of their privatization, the
articles of Britoil and Enterprise Oil contained golden share pro-
visions aimed at protecting these companies from hostile take-
overs. In particular, they provided that, in given circumstances,
the golden share holder would have the right to exercise voting
majority.5 23
In addition, the golden share rules may also grant the Gov-
ernment the right to monitor the composition of the board of
directors. In the case of certain strategic privatized compa-
nies, 3 24 British citizenship is a requirement for appointment to a
321. J. Flynn, British Report to the XVI FIDE Congress on Competition Law Impli-
cations of Deregulation and Privatisation 175-77 (1994). See generally C.D. FOSTER,
PRIVATISATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF NATIONAL MONOPOLY
(1992); see C. VELIANOVSKY, SELLING THE STATE: PRIVATIZATION IN BRITAIN (1988)
(describing, specifically, privatization of services in Britain); R. FITZGERALD, WHEN Gov-
ERNMENT GOES PRIVATE: SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC SERVICES (1988).
322. See Kovar, supra note 320, at 100; J. Vickers & V. Wright, Special Issue on the
Politics of Privatisation in Western Europe, WEST EUR. POLrrICS, Oct. 1988, at 29; DEL CA-
SALE, supra note 320. Seegenerally Flynn, supra note 321, n.4 (describing UK legislation).
323. Flynn, supra note 321, at 170-71.
324. E.g., Rolls Royce and British Aerospace, cited after Flynn, supra note 321, at
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top executive position.
C. The French Approach
The limits on foreign investment in privatized companies
originally enacted by French law were of an even stricter nature.
The French law of 1986325 created the "action sp~cifique,"3 6 a
variant of the U.K. golden share, which was intended to grant
the Government a number of special powers to protect the na-
tional interest. These powers included: a requirement that the
Ministry of the Economy approve any purchase of shares in the
privatized companies in excess of certain statutory thresholds;
the right to appoint one or two members of the board of direc-
tors or of the surveillance committee of such companies; and the
power to veto any transfer of the company's business that could
be deemed to jeopardize the national interest. In response to
objections raised by the EU Commission, the French law was
amended in 1993. The 1993 amendments repealed, as regards
EU nationals, the prohibition on the purchase by foreign inves-
tors of more than 20% of the shares of privatized companies,
although they maintained the requirement that the Ministry of'
Economy approve purchases by foreign investors, including EU
nationals, of more than 5% of the corporate capital of compa-
nies operating in strategic sectors.
Commentators 327 have questioned the legality of both the
U.K. and French legislation to the extent that they discriminate
between national and foreign investors on the grounds that they
may potentially be inconsistent with the principles of freedom of
establishment and investment. One commentator 328 has sug-
gested that, whereas the U.K. legislation could be regarded as a
legitimate protection of national interests, the amendments of
1993 to the French law of 1986 were necessary, even in the ab-
sence of any formal challenge to it, because the original legisla-
tion differentiated, without apparent public policy justification,
between national and foreign investors in a manner inconsistent
325. Law No. 86-912 of August 6, 1986 (Fr.), amended &y Law No. 92-923 ofJuly 19,
1993 (Fr.).
326. Law No. 86-912 of August 6, 1992, art. 10 (Fr.).
327. See, e.g., Abate, supra note 239; Amorelli, supra note 319, at 256; TURRINI,
PR1VATISATIONS ET DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE, IN REVUE DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES 823
(1993).
328. AMORELLI, supra note 319, at 256.
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with the wording of Article 52 of the EC Treaty. Even after the
1993 amendment, it is questionable whether the French priva-
tization law can be regarded as in full compliance with the EC
Treaty.
D. The Italian Approach
A somewhat different approach has been taken by the re-
cent Italian legislation on privatization.3 29 Law No. 474 provides
that the sale of shares held by the State or by public entities must
normally take place by public offering, through direct negotia-
tions, or through a combination of the two."' If a sale is carried
out by direct negotiation, the Government can select certain in-
vestors with adequate entrepreneurial capacity to establish a
core group of strategic shareholders. 3 ' As to public interest
companies, such as those in the sectors of defense, transporta-
tion, telecommunications, energy sources, and other public serv-
ices, Law No. 474 stipulates that, before the State transfers con-
trol in them, they must adopt in their by-laws a golden share
clause, the precise contents of which is to be defined in a govern-
mental decree, granting the Minister of the Treasury a number
of special powers, including requirements that the Minister ap-
prove significant capital participations, certain shareholders'
agreements regulating voting, and the transfer or purchase of
shares, as well as powers to veto transfer of the business or disso-
lution of the company, and powers to appoint at least one direc-
tor and one auditor.3 3 2
The Italian law on privatizations appears not to contain any
provisions with overt or indirect discriminatory intent or ef-
fect.3 3 3 In particular, Law No. 474 does not discriminate on
grounds of nationality nor does it hinder foreign investment.
The principal objectives of the Law include the prevention of
"creeping acquisitions" after the Government has relinquished
control through a public offering of shares, which may disadvan-
329. Law No. 474 of July 30, 1994 (Italy).
330. Id. art. 1.2.
331. Id. art. 1.3.
332. Id. arts. 2.la-2.1d.
333. Same conclusions can be drawn as to the German privatization law. Accord-
ing to § 3 of the Treuhandanstalt by-laws, the Treuhandanstalt should let both national
and foreign investors participate in the shareholdings of the companies to be priva-
tized.
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tage small investors and avoid paying any premium to the State.
To this end, the Law provides that equity ownership limits iiitro-
duced in the by-laws of privatized companies may be exceeded
only through a public offering for the purchase of the majority
of the company's shares. Law No. 474 also attempts to enhance
"shareholders' democracy" in privatized companies, for instance,
by creating the possibility of voting by mail and reserving at least
one-fifth of the seats on the board of directors for minority
shareholders.334
Prominent Italian legal scholars333 have nonetheless criti-
cized certain aspects of the Law that appear notto be fully con-
sistent with established principles of Italian corporate law. The
Commission for its part, appears to have taken the view that,
since the Law reserves a significant margin of discretion to the
Government in its implementation, there is a risk that the Law
might be applied in a discriminatory manner. If that were to
occur, however, the infringement of EC law would clearly result
from the Italian Government's application of the Law, rather
than from the Law itself.
V. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ISSUES
A. The Scope of the EC Directives on Public Procuremznt
The adoption of measures intended to establish Commu-
nity-wide competition in the public procurement sector consti-
tutes an important part of the completion of the internal mar-
ket. 36 Community legislation in the field of public procure-
ment is specifically designed to prevent government authorities,
other bodies subject to public law, and public and private under-
takings carrying out services of public utility from discriminating
334. Law No. 474 art. 4 (1994) (Italy).
335. See G. Rossi, Privatizzazioni e Diritto Societario, RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 390
(1994). Criticism has been directed at the Italian "golden share" system. Id. See also R.
Costi, Privatizzaione e Diritto delle Societd per Azioni, GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE I 77
(1995).
336. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Mar-
ket: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310 Final,
at 23 (June 1985). See also L.A. CARSWELL, & X. DE SARRAu, LAW & BUSINESS IN THE
EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKET (1993); I. Van Bael, Public Procurement and the Completion of the
Internal Market: Law and Practice, 1 LEGAL IssUEs EUR. INTEGRATION 21 (1989); Laurence
Gormley, Some Reflections on Public Procurement in the European Community, EUR. Bus. L.
REv. 63 (Nov. 1990); J. Winter, Public Procurement in the EEC, 28 COMMON MKT L. REv.
741 (1991).
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against contractors from other Member States. 3 7
The Commission's 1985 White Paper acknowledged the
need for amendment of the public procurement directives then
in force and the extension of their limited scope. The White
Paper identified specific problems in opening up procurement
in the utilities sectors, however, such as water, energy, transport,
and telecommunications, since the entities involved in awarding
contracts in such sectors included not only bodies organized
under public law or otherwise government-owned, but also pri-
vate companies with special or exclusive rights. The approach
adopted by the Council in a new set of directives governing pub-
lic procurement 338 was to apply the public procurement rules to
both types of organization. 339  The public procurement direc-
tives apply to contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writ-
ing between a provider of supplies, services, or construction
works and a contracting authority.3 40 When awarding public ser-
vice, public supply, and public works contracts, bodies and au-
thorities to which the public procurement directives apply are,
in principle, obliged to follow the procedures set out in the di-
rectives, which are intended to ensure that public contracts are
awarded in a non-discriminatory and pro-competitive manner.
B. The "General Directives" and the "Excluded Sectors Directive"
A distinction should be drawn, however, between the scope
337. Commission v. Ireland, Case 249/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4005. The Court of Jus-
tice confirmed that buy-national policies that partition markets are incompatible with
the free movement of goods and Community law in general. Id.
338. Council Directive No. 92/50/EEC, O.J. L 209/1 (1992) (relating to the coor-
dination of procedures for the award of public service contracts); Council Directive No.
93/36/EEC, O.J. L 199/1 (1993) (coordinating procedures for the award of public
supply contracts); Council Directive No. 93/37/EEC, O.J. L 199/54 (1993) (concern-
ing the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts); and Coun-
cil Directive No. 93/38, O.J. L 199/84 (1993) (coordinating the procurement proce-
dures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sec-
tors).
339. See E.M.F. Temple & P.F. Clarke, Public Procurement Contracts, IRCL, 1995, at
32 (Explaining that, as to utility sectors, "there were two choices, either an approxima-
tion of the two types of organization within the directives, or an approach via Articles
85, 86, and 90, the competition Articles of the EC Treaty. In the event, the EC Commis-
sion chose the former").
340. Council Directive No. 92/50, art. 1(a), O.J. L 209/1, at 3 (1992); Council
Directive No. 93/36, art. 1(a), OJ. L 199/1, at 2 (1992); Council Directive No. 93/37/
EEC, art. 1 (a), O.J. L 199/54, at 55 (1993); Council Directive No. 93/38/EEC, art. 1(4),
OJ. L 199/84, at 88 (1993).
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of Directives 92/50, 93/36, and 93/37 ("general directives"),
and that of Directive 93/38 concerning procurement in the utili-
ties sectors ("excluded sectors directive").
The main difference, for our purposes, between the two sets
of provisions concerns the definition of the contracting authori-
ties to which the directives apply. In the general directives, this
includes the state, regional and local authorities, bodies gov-
erned by public law, and associations formed by one or more of
such authorities or bodies governed by public law, regardless of
the sector in which they operate. A body is considered to be
governed by public law where it is established for the specific
purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, meaning
needs not of an industrial or commercial nature. All other legal
entities, even if wholly or partly owned by private shareholders,
established to meet general interest needs that are ultimately fi-
nanced by or controlled by governmental authorities, are re-
garded as bodies governed by public law. 41
Article 1 (b) of the general directives excluded from their
scope of application the bodies having an "industrial or commer-
cial character." It seems, therefore, that public procurement
rules will not play a role in the privatization of state-owned man-
ufacturing or commercial companies.
It cannot be ruled out, however, that Member States will re-
solve to privatize a number of entities performing functions of
general interest, currently organized as public bodies, such as
the postal or the health services. Were this to happen, the com-
panies in charge of providing such services to the public would
no longer be subject to public procurement rules following
privatization, unless they continue to rely on the state or local
authorities as their main source of funding.
The excluded sector directive covers the water, energy,
transport, and telecommunication sectors and applies not only
to public authorities and public undertakings,3 42 but also to pri-
341. Council Directive No. 92/50, art. 1(b), O.J. L 209/1, at 3 (1992); Council
Directive No. 93/36, art. 1 (b), OJ. L 199/1, at 3 (1992); Council Directive No. 93/37/
EEC, art. 1(b), O.J. L 199/54, at 55 (1993).
342. Council Directive 93/38, art. 2, O.J. L 199/84, at 89 (1993). According to
Article 1.1, " 'public authorities' shall mean the State, regional or local authorities, bod-
ies governed by public law, or associations formed by one or more of such authorities or
bodies governed by public law." Id. art. 1(1), OJ. L 199/84, at 87 (1993). Article (1)2
defines "public undertaking" as "any undertaking over which the public authorities may
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vate undertakings that operate on the basis of special or exclu-
sive rights granted by the competent authorities of the Member
States.
To the extent that undertakings earmarked for privatization
are not already organized in the form of a corporation, such re-
organization is normally effected before privatization takes
place. This implies that, even if undertakings entrusted with
such activities were to be privatized, the fact of privatization
would not affect the application of the excluded sectors direc-
tive, provided and to the extent that, the special or exclusive
rights referred to under Article 2.1 (b) and described under Arti-
cle 2.3 of the excluded sectors directive remain unaffected.343
An exception to the rules described above in the telecom-
munications sector is contained in Article 8.1 of the excluded
sector directive.344 Public procurement rules do not apply to
contracts that contracting entities operating public telecommu-
nication networks or providing telecommunication services
award for purchases, intended only "to enable them to provide
one or more telecommunications services, where other entities
are free to offer the same services in the same geographical area
and under substantially the same conditions."34 5 Thus, to the
extent that the provision of such services is liberalized, the pub-
lic procurement rules should cease to apply.
C. The British Telecommunications Case
Guidance as to the precise meaning of Article 8.1 of the ex-
cluded sectors directive, the effects of which are potentially far-
reaching, is likely to be offered by the British Telecommunications
case,346 which is currently pending before the Court of Justice.
exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it,
their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it." Id. art. (1)2, O.J. L
199/84, at 87-88 (1993) The existence of a dominant influence exercised by a public
authority may be presumed, if the latter holds the majority of the undertaking's capital,
controls a voting majority or has the right to appoint more than half of the board of
directors. Id.
343. Id. art. 2.3, O.J. L 199/84, at 90 (1993) ("For the purpose of applying para-
graph 1(b), special or exclusive rights shall mean rights deriving from authorizations
granted by a competent authority of the Member State concerned, by law, regulation or
administrative action, having as their result the reservation for one or more entities of
the exploitation of an activity defined in paragraph 2.").
344. Id. art. 8.1, O.J. L 199/4, at 92 (1993).
345. Id.
346. Italy v. Commission, Case 41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 873, 21-23. Reference for
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British Telecommunications ("BT") was privatized in 1984, and
only 22% of its corporate capital is now held by public entities. 47
BT's privatization was immediately followed by the liberalization
of telecommunications services, including voice telephony, in
the United Kingdom. In the British Telecommunications case, BT
is seeking judicial review of the application of the U.K. regula-
tions implementing the excluded sectors directive. The regula-
tions at issue deny BT the benefit of the "liberalization" excep-
tion, while extending it to all other licensed U.K telecommuni-
cations operators but one.
The central issue to be addressed by the Court is the inter-
pretation and definition of the notion of freedom to offer the
same services on equal conditions. Two interpretations of this
notion may have been suggested, with opposite consequences as
to the impact of public procurement rules on privatization. A
more formalistic but straightforward reading of Article 8.1 is that
the freedom to provide services refers only to the legal freedom
introduced by EC directives and/or domestic legislation enacted
in connection with the privatization of the local telecommunica-
tions operator, to offer competitive telecommunications services.
A more sophisticated interpretation, but also one likely to be
more difficult to apply, is that the concept of freedom to provide
services requires de facto equality of competitive conditions.
This is the interpretation supported by the Commission and the
U.K. Government, which rely for support on recitals 9, 11, and
13 of the Directive." 8 Were the Court of Justice to uphold this
a Preliminary Ruling, The Queen v. the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex
parte: British Telecommunications plc, Case C-302/94, O.J. C 380/3 (1994).
347. See R. Arrigoni, Regolazione e Gestione nelle Public Utilities: Principio di Separazione
e Libera Concorrenza nell'Applicazione di Principi Costituzionali e Comunitari, RvIsTA TRIMES-
TRALE Dt Dutr-ro PUBBLICO, 1995, at 96; see also Flynn, supra note 321, at 183.
348. See Council Directive 93/38, O.J. L 199/84, at 84-85 (1993). Recital number
9 reads: "[W]hereas the need to ensure a real opening-up of the market and a fair
balance in the application of procurement rules in these sectors requires that the enti-
ties to be covered must be identified on a different basis than by reference to their legal
status." Id. Recital number 11 reads:
Whereas, among the main reasons why entities operating in these sectors do
not purchase on the basis of Community-wide competition is the closed nature
of the markets in which they operate, due to the existence of special or exclu-
sive rights granted by the national authorities, concerning the supply to, provi-
sion or operation of, networks for providing the service concerned, the ex-
ploitation of a given geographical area for a particular purpose, the provision




latter interpretation, privatization and liberalization of the utili-
ties sectors would not terminate the applicability of public pro-
curement legislation, if the former state-owned monopolist con-
tinued to enjoy a dominant position.
CONCLUSION
The neutral stance originally enshrined in the EC Treaty be-
tween public and private ownership has given way to an environ-
ment more conducive to privatization in Europe, a movement
that raises issues primarily under two sets of Treaty rules. The
first, Articles 90(1) and 86 of the EC Treaty have significantly
influenced most of the processes of liberalization in the Commu-
nity. Secondly, the rules on state aids, applied with renewed
vigor, have become a powerful force driving the Member States
toward privatization.
The existing competition rules of the Community, espe-
cially the Merger Regulation and Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, can potentially be used to control the entire privatization
process. If these rules are strictly enforced, that process offers a
historic opportunity to modernize and render more dynamic the
structure of the European market.
In sum, liberalization and privatization are two different as-
pects of the same complex process and EC competition rules
may serve as a means of strengthening the link between them.
In particular, while liberalization has been made possible in Eu-
rope thanks to the application of the competition rules, via Arti-
cle 90, privatization should be shaped both by applying competi-
tion rules and, above all, by the need to ensure the complete and
effective liberalization of markets.
Id. Recital number 13 reads: "Whereas this Directive should not extend to activities of
those entities which either fall outside the sectors of water, energy and transport serv-
ices or outside the telecommunications sector, or which fall within those sectors but are
nevertheless directly exposed to competitive forces in markets to which entry is unrestricted." Id.
(emphasis added). According to the United Kingdom and the Commission, the terms
"free" and "conditions" in Article 8.1 of the excluded sectors directive refer not only to
freedom and conditions of a regulatory nature but also to defacto freedom and condi-
tions, since the purpose of the directive is to open the market in the services concerned
to Community-wide competition. See Schmidt v. Spar-und Leihkasse der fruheren
Amter Bordesholm Kiel and Cronshagen, Case C-392/92, 1-12, (Eur. Ct. J. Apr. 24,
1994) (not yet reported). This interpretation of Article 8.1 was recently upheld by the
Court ofJustice. The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte, Case C-392/93 (Eur. Ct.J. Mar.
26, 1996) (not yet reported).
